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Post-Conflict Development, Towards Sustainable Urbanization Strategies

Preparation for potential post-conflict reconstruction strategies for Mekelle by cross-checking and contextualizing existing cases and toolkits.

**A Thesis submitted in the Partial Fulfillment for the Requirement of the Degree
of Master of Science in Integrated Urbanism and Sustainable Design**

**by
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August 2022

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Signature

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIA - Afghan Interim Authority
ANPDF - Afghan National Peace and Development Framework
ANDS - Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ARTF - Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ATA - Afghan Transitional Administration
CPA - comprehensive peace agreement
CBHI - Community Base Health Insurance
CHIS - Community Health Information System
DHIS - District Health Information System
DHS - Health and Demographics Survey
DRC - Democratic republic of congo
EPRDF - Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EEBC - Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission
FDI - Foreign direct investments
FDI - Foreign direct investment
GO's - Governmental offices
GDP - Gross domestic product
GoA - Government of Afghanistan
HF - health facilities
ICTR - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IDP - internally displaced persons
IMF - International monetary fund
ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
KFOR - Kosovo Forces
MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières | Doctors without borders
NPPs - National Priority Programs
NATO - North Atlantic treaty organization
NGO's - Non-governmental offices
OECD- Organization for economic and development
ODA - Official development assistance
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
PISG - Provisional Institutions of Self Government
PLW - Pregnant and lactating women
UN- United Nations

SPLA - Sudanese people's liberation army
SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
TDF - Tigray defense forces
TPLF - Tigray people liberation front
TSA - Tigray Statistics Agency
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
USAID - Agency for international development
UNDP - United Nations development program
UNMIK - United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UPMP - Urban Planning and Management Programme
UNOCHA - United nation office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs
WB - the World Bank

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Abstract

After a two-decade civil war at the turn of the 21st century, the Ethiopian command economy was one of the fastest-growing nations, with average double-digit economic growth. As a result of this economic stimulus, urbanization and mega-infrastructure were constructed rapidly and aggressively to stimulate and facilitate further economic growth in the region. However, On November 4, 2020, the tension between the federal government of Ethiopia and the Tigray regional state escalated into a full-scale civil war involving multiple regional actors (Eritrea, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates). The then seemingly stable economy and politics began to experience multiple shocks due to internal and external forces, most notably unforeseen incidents (as Nassim termed it 'Black Swan', the probability of unlikely events); this began with member states and urban centers' ever-increasing demands for more investment from the central government and representation of their ethnic group in the central power.

Hence, this thesis will primarily try to look at the impact of such foreseen and unforeseen shocks in the region and other similar cases; and assess what made states and urban centers vulnerable in times of conflict, pandemics, climatic change, and other global or local crisis; what is the aftermath of such crisis and approaches to mitigate them in international case studies. Finally, the study will focus on post-conflict reconstruction and the development of more shock resilient and robust strategies for future Urban and regional growth (Nassim called it 'Antifragility', things that gain from disorder). Based on different case studies and theoretical frameworks, to help develop a strategy that is best suited in the case of Tigray. With consideration of future threats and opportunities arising from the conflict and other potential shocks.

The first part of the research will review the nature and interrelation of conflict and urbanization, post-conflict cities, and lessons learned in redeveloping them; further study the conflict caused and other crisis shocks and contemporary resilience strategies. In the second part, the paper will be an exploratory case study in three different contexts; starting with the Sub-Saharan case of Kigali (Rwanda) and the Middle east case of Kabul (Afghanistan) it will be followed by Pristina's case from the eastern European state of Kosovo. And finally, the study narrows down the investigation to Mekelle city as a primal city of the Tigray region and a maximum recipient of internally displaced people. Based on secondary data

from governmental offices (GOs), non-governmental offices (NGOs), United Nations agencies reports, and academic papers on the conflict and its consequences to the region, urban centers, and its people. The second part starts with a brief assessment of pre-war official documents of policies and strategies, followed by a semi-structured interview with officials will be employed and triangulated by focused group interviews with residents, community representatives, and professionals; and experts' observation on the implication of the conflict and siege on spatial, social fabric, economic and political aspects in case of Mekelle city as a representation of major urban center in the region. Finally, after analyzing the primary and secondary data the thesis will conclude with recommendations on post-conflict redevelopment through/with shock-resistant strategies

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Image 1: May 6, 2021 file photo, the city of Mekelle is seen through a bullet hole in a stairway window of the Ayder Referral Hospital. - Copyright © africanews AP Photo

Chapter One: Introduction

The current situation in Tigray is briefly described in this chapter. In addition, the author emphasizes the first thoughts, the reasons, and the incentives for enabling the regeneration of urban settlements in the region through the use of selected tools, which also takes into account the challenges and limitations involved in such situations.

1.1 Introduction and Research background

The purpose of this introduction is to describe the research, its importance, significance, problem, limitation, and context.

1.1.1 Introduction To the Research

Development in post-conflict areas is a challenging process, especially for countries already suffering from poverty and having a fragile political system. The development process is only exacerbated if it is not managed with careful and robust strategies that can bring vulnerable countries out of the vicious cycle of poverty. Post-conflict development measures and processes that are taken here will have a profound effect on the country's long-term development. Even though After the civil war is over, it is often assumed that violence will diminish. However, in reality, the end of that hostility could be the beginning of another type of conflict, due to the results of the ended violence, urban areas can turn into violent places. New forms of violence that may emerge are widespread, moreover are not well understood, and occur due to various factors, including rapid urbanization, lack of economic development, sustained ethnic tensions, and poverty. (post-war cities) and these Urban centers are considered to be at the forefront of state formation and

are major places of political change and crisis most probably to happen in most developing countries (Beall, Goodfellow, and Rodgers, 2010). And most of the modern conflicts nowadays are centered in or around urban settlements causing severe damage to their physical, social, economic, and infrastructure. According to Mkandawire, many African civil wars originate in urban areas, influenced by insignificant 'urban malaise', despite most of them taking place in rural terrain (Mkandawire 2002). Although rural dwellers make up the vast majority of African foot soldiers, he argues that urban elites lead most rebellions in Africa. A civil war in Africa typically consists of two forms: expelled urban elites advancing towards the capital after defeating urban opponents, and rebel movements in exile advancing through the countryside to reach the capital. According to him, both cases were rooted in urban discontent rather than an agrarian crisis (ibid.: 191).

Post-conflict reconstruction is therefore receiving increasing attention from international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the OECD. According to a report by UN Peacekeeping (United Nations Peacekeeping... 2022), the UN has twelve peacekeeping operations deployed in three regions: seven in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe, and one in Asia, as well as political missions and good offices for countries facing conflict. Recovery agendas for conflict-affected countries and the international community generally consist of economic reconstruction, institution building, democratization, transitional justice, and reconciliation. Post-conflict reconstruction aims to achieve sustainable peace and development.

In general, the post-conflict reconstruction process takes into account a wide range of actions since there are usually several causes and consequences of the conflict. Addison et al. (2016) observe that conflict-related actions are not always universal, but always depend on the size, duration, and scale of the conflict. Thus, every post-conflict reconstruction process must be seen as an individual process and planned accordingly. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that effective post-conflict reconstruction maintains peace in the short term and facilitates development in the long run. Many experts agree that post-conflict reconstruction should emphasize security, reconciliation, and development. Due to that, the main objectives of post-conflict reconstruction are often the rebuilding of the state's institutions, the state economy, and social reconstruction. In this way, the state is considered to be able to achieve long-term peace and development.

1.1.2 Research Background

Ethiopia is a country in the Horn of Africa, officially known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The country is bordered by Eritrea to the north, Djibouti to the northeast, Somalia to the east and northeast, Kenya to the south, South Sudan to the west, and Sudan to the northwest. The total area of Ethiopia is approximately 1,100,000 square kilometers. With 117 million residents, it is the 12th-most populous country in the world and the second-most populous in Africa (World population prospect, 2019). Its capital and largest city is Addis Ababa. According to the CSA's (Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency) projection 2017 statistics, Ethiopia's total population was approximately 102.37 million. The country is predominantly rural - more than 80% of its population lives in rural areas - and is undergoing some demographic transitions. Regarding indigenous and minority representation, Ethiopia is a multicultural nation with ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities. According to the Ethiopian census, there are more than 90 distinct ethnicities in the country. It is home to more than 80 languages, and the southwest of Ethiopia is home to an exceptional concentration of these languages. There are nine regions, over 90 ethnic groups, and over 80 languages spoken in Ethiopia. Oromo makes up 35.8% of the population, Amhara is 24.1%, Somali is 7.2%, Tigray is 5.7%, Sidama is 4.1%, Guragie is 2.6%, Welaita is 2.3%, Afar is 2.2%, Silte is 1.3%, Kefficho is 1.2%, other is 13.5% (2022 ets.). (CSA 2007) About 43.5 percent of the population practices Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity and 33.9 percent practice Islam. The rest practice Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, or traditional religions. Historically, the Semitic, Amhara, and Tigray peoples of the northern highlands have dominated politics in the region. They are predominantly Orthodox Christian, whereas Muslims and people of indigenous faith live in low-land areas in the south and east of the country. The ancient Ethiopian monarchy remained independent from colonial rule, except for a brief Italian occupation between 1936 and 1941. By 1974, Emperor Selassie (who had ruled since 1930) was dethroned by the Derg, a military junta and a socialist government. After decades of bloody coups, uprisings, and a massive refugee crisis, the Derg military Junta regime was finally overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995 after its constitution was adopted in 1994. During the late 1990s, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a border war that ended in a peace treaty in December 2000. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) declared in November 2007 that it had completed its work and provided

specific coordinates to demonstrate the border. Ethiopia claimed that the EEBC had acted beyond its constitutional authority by refusing to accept the coordinates. As part of this, it maintained troops in previously contested zones that were considered Eritrea's by the EEBC. Due to this intransigence, tensions between the two countries remained high for years. Longtime Ethiopian leader MELES Zenawi died in office in August 2012, and his deputy, HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, was appointed his successor. This marked the first peaceful transition of power in decades. HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 after a wave of widespread protests and anti-government dissent in 2015. Due to that, Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, took office in April 2018. After taking office, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the ruling of 2000. This led to a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea marked by a peace agreement in July 2018 and the reopening of the border in September 2018. Ethiopia's ethnically-based ruling coalition has merged into one party, called the Prosperity Party, after nearly 30 years of the EPRDF; however, one of its constituent parties (the Tigray People's Liberation Front or TPLF) REFused to join.




Figure 1: Sources: (top) The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (Acled); UNHCR, June 2021

he Federal Government of Ethiopia launched a military operation against the Tigray regional government in November 2020. This was said to restore the seemingly constitutional order in the wake of the election contest in Tigray. Initially, the special military operation was intended to end in a few weeks, Abiy's law and order campaign has now devolved into a civil war. Moreover, the early stages of the war with the TPLF (Tigrayan regional government) went accord-

ing to plan. In less than three weeks, the ruling coalition occupied Mekelle city, the capital of Tigray, with the assistance of the Eritrean Defense Forces from the north side of Tigray. Meanwhile, the Tigrayan Special Force and all political leadership withdrew into the mountains. As a result, the Ethiopian government has established an interim government in Tigray. However, Following the coalition army's brief victory in Tigray, looting and human rights violations were rampant in all occupied areas, pushing a new, Tigrayan-led army to take control. Meanwhile, the federal government has employed hunger tactics, rejecting all but symbolic humanitarian assistance, and imposing a blockade on Tigray.




Figure 2: Access map of Ethiopia, Sources: OCHA Feedback: ocha-eth@un.org www.unocha.org www.reliefweb.int

Recent research conducted at Ghent University found that more than 500,000 people died in Tigray due to the conflict and lack of necessities such, as telecommunications, banks, food imports, and other governmental services. Comparatively to the Tigray local government, the Ethiopian government has more human, economic, and diplomatic powers to impose a siege and make it invisible to the international community. Tigray and its people, on the other hand, lack resources, despite its willingness to fight. But when the economy collapses from the war,

the benefits of ETG resources quickly disappeared. COVID19 restrictions, severe droughts, economic sanctions by International communities, and reduced production, contributed to labor and resource diverts to the war, and have now depleted the federal government and the general public. The government`s blockade has successfully restricted access to food, medicines, and commodities in Tigray, and it's around nine million people – mainly in the Tigray, Afar, and Amhara regions – now require humanitarian assistance. If intense diplomatic pressure is not exerted in short order to get the parties to negotiate and have a national dialogue, renewed hostilities are to be expected, and more damage to the communities is inevitable.

1.1.2.1 Economic impacts of the conflict in Tigray

“It [Mekelle] is not at this time any different from Abiy-Adi, Sheraro, or Beshasha. It is no longer a center with any power as it now stands...Based on the reality now, when it is seen militarily, it has nothing. There is nothing that makes it a center or which makes it appealing to us, as it was when we first went there.”

PM of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed Ali

The ongoing 19 months of the war on Tigray have caused an incalculable economic and humanitarian crisis for all parties to the conflict. Though the magnitude could differ according to their proximity to the epicenter of the conflict northern Ethiopia. Considering Ethiopia's existing highly centralized infrastructure and a command economy, the federal government's denial of access to the Tigray region from all services exacerbates the impact of the war on Tigray's economy and its inhabitants' livelihood. With the paralysis of its financial, communication and transportation system for more than 19 months, all the state and private industries and regional and federal institutions in the region couldn't function at all. As the war is not over yet, the full-scale economic impact is not studied yet.

On the other hand, Ethiopia's foreign exchange reserves have slumped to \$1 in December 2021, according to news reports. 6 billion. In a country that imports all major industrial inputs and other consumables industrial products, A shortage of raw materials, such as iron, cement, and fossil fuel, is causing everyday items to become unaffordable. In May 2022, the official inflation rate was 35%, with cooking oil prices rising by double digits over recent months to 1,000 Birr.

According to Forbes magazine, Addis Ababa, the capital, is now Africa's most expensive city.

1.1.2.2 Physical impacts

In the course of the war, Tigray as a region suffered devastating destruction that amounts to more than 80% of its healthcare facilities being lost. More than 75% of its state and private universities were looted and destroyed. A majority of factories in the region were destroyed and looted. An impending telecommunications and internet blackout with catastrophic consequences for an already deteriorating situation humanitarian crisis. (Omna Tigray Situation report 2022)

1.1.2.2 Political impacts

As a result of the Tigray conflict, across the federation, many people have been killed, human rights violation has become rampant, the economy is descending, displacements have been triggered, infrastructure has been damaged, ethnic divisions aggravated, and the international reputation of the Ethiopian Government has been dented and lost credibility. Moreover, the crisis in Tigray is far from over. It is unlikely that the war will be won solely by military means. Ideological and power struggles, political marginalization, racial and ethnic differences, as well as political marginalization, are fueling this conflict. In order to resolve the crisis in Tigray, which is already started to spill over to the whole East African Region, the International Community and all warring parties must take strong measures. "The table (dialogue) should take precedence over the sword (war) lest the Hobbesian state of nature where life becomes short, brutish, and nasty prevails." Andre Munro (2020)

1.2 Research scope

It is the goal of this project to investigate why and how the existing urbanization model made cities and towns vulnerable in Tigray, and to formulate a way forward to resist the shock through approaches to sustainable urbanization.

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives

Postconflict reconstruction and recovery are essential for a coun-

try that went through war, damaging its economic, political, social, and physical components. Moreover, carefully assessing the problem and addressing all the issues help the nation recover adequately. Hence the primary objective of this study is to investigate the impact of conflict in Tigray Urban centers and identify possible future threats that may arise due to these damages in these urban centers. Consequently, it aims to find solutions to these problems by analyzing different international case studies and exploring related examples to the case area. Furthermore, as there is an opportunity to start over afresh, It will also try to Investigate alternative contemporary development strategies for the region in regard to the context of Tigray's past development patterns; By exploring disaster-resistant strategies, and identifying an appropriate Sustaining shock-resistant planning approach a guideline/toolkit will be developed for rehabilitating and furthering sustainable development in Tigray's urban centers and urbanization.

1.4 Research Questions

A. What impact recovery strategies can be implemented to achieve sustainable | regenerative urbanization?

B. What are the common challenges to be faced?

How to tackle a post-conflict crisis with a robust and flexible urbanization strategy in a post-conflict region using the concept of Antifragility? Due to the volatile and uncertain politics of the region, the cities should be strengthened to withhold other shocks and threats. and obtain a better future.

C. What is the way forward?

1.5 Research Methodology

There are a variety of possible outcomes following a conflict, which is demonstrated in this review by presenting examples of various processes and describing strategies. The thesis illustrates several international case studies that suggest the outcomes of different strategies and stakeholders. Throughout this thesis, the process-tracing method is used in conjunction with the analysis and comparison of three international case studies and their post-conflict strategies. Using a process-tracing approach, the recommended strategies for successful post-conflict reconstruction are identified as well as how recommended theories of post-conflict reconstruction have been applied

in real-life post-conflict reconstruction scenarios. Hence, this thesis first investigates different post-conflict reconstruction strategies and then examines how these theories were applied to the case studies. As a part of the study, case studies are analyzed to determine, which factors contributed to reconstruction success/failure. Then, generalizations for future recommendations can be made based on a comparison of the cases and theory. This thesis utilizes these approaches in answering the research question, What impact recovery strategies can be implemented to achieve sustainable, regenerative urbanization and reconstruction? In order to reconstruct the case references, information was gathered from government and international reports, articles, and books. As well as setting parameters and toolkits in relation to the case area, the City of Mekelle by relating to the scenarios of these international case references, and understanding what could lead to a future successful reconstruction of the region in general and the city in particular.




Figure 3 : Research Methodology.

Source: Author

1.6 Research Limitations

The research on this topic has many challenges and was identified in the beginning and throughout the research journey. Firstly, the research at the beginning aimed to investigate the impacts of conflict in Tigray in particular and identify specific post-conflict reconstruction strategies suitable for the conflict's context and social character aftermath. However, the ongoing conflict and lack of stability made the investigation less predictable. Even though there is a sign of negotiated secession of hostilities and efforts for a national dialog, there is still high polarity of interest in warring parties and inclination to resolve by armed conflict, and the geopolitical nature of the region for proxy war makes the situation uncertain. As a result, this uncertainty has made the future less predictable, and it could make the reconstruction process difficult. Furthermore, the failing economy of the country, particularly in Tigray, the failed economy with no access to basic needs, makes the research unpredictable with unclear ends.

Due to the difficulties for the researcher to enter the country at this stage, because of the ongoing conflict and siege, The data collection and on-ground mapping for possible locations or initiatives to support the research have been challenging to conduct in person for the researcher. This limitation was solved by desktop research and conducting overseas interviews with experts related to the topic, and conducting a focused group discussion related to the topic. Furthermore, the depth of the topic and clarity in comparison to the time period given to the research is contrasting, and the research objectives were shaped for the time frame and restrictions, with limits to the possibility of making a comparison between the selected case study and other potential cities in the region.

Chapter Two:

Theoretical Framework on Post-Conflict Urban centers and its Strategies

Using the discourse of urbanization and post-conflict status quo, this chapter examines conflict types and their relationship to cities. Considering how cities are managed after violent conflict, and sheds light on what conditions can lead to a peaceful future for cities and different strategies for post-conflict development.

What is a post-conflict situation?

Post-conflict is a “conflict situation after open warfare has ended. Conditions such as this can remain tense for years or decades and easily relapse into large-scale violence”. (Junne, & Verokren, 2005). A post-conflict situation does not necessarily entail permanent peace.

In relation to conflict management and reconstruction, post-conflict urbanization offers a lens through which to explore the potential of urban areas to play a positive role. However, Politics and institutions play an important role in determining whether cities become sources of security and hope or of instability and violence.

2.1 Urbanization and conflict:

Urbanization “is the continuous movement of inhabitants to urban areas and their reaction to this phenomenon” (Etuk, 2016). This can happen due to nat-

ural population growth and rural-urban migration, the process can be formal (intended) or informal (unintended) due to multiple factors from within and/or its environment. In general, urbanization can equally be seen as “the process by which towns and cities are formed and become larger as more people begin to live and work in central places.”(ibid) according to these definitions, it is suggested that the very reasons that caused or ignited inhabitants to migrate to where they thought their problems would be solved since there is better opportunity therein. However, rural-urban migration is perceived as a phenomenon caused by ‘pull’ factors which are usually structural change and socio-economic interest in urban areas. Numerous studies suggested, that in many developing countries the urbanization process is caused by not only ‘pull’ factors which are considered formal, but rather ‘push’ informal factors like a different level of socio-political conflicts, climate change, and other external shocks accounts for most of the rural-urban migration. (Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2006). In the case of informal urbanization, the decision of migrants is mostly spontaneous just to save their lives. This form of informal urbanization accounts for major challenges that urbanization is facing in developing economies, and this can be considered a leading cause of the social disorder. (Ubongabasi E. 2018). On the other hand, such pushed/informal urbanization can also impact conflicts directly by competition for scarce resources and by altering socio-economic dynamics. A recent phenomenon has also shown, that in the ever-globalizing world, the factors that are affecting urban areas and urbanization are becoming highly complex and intertwined. Universal factors like climate change are causing and global economic dynamism is exacerbating the problems that urban areas and urbanization are facing. Consequently, The challenges of administering and managing such ever increasingly complex urbanization have become widely common as urban demographic and spatial dynamics have outpaced the capacities of cities to manage. Once seen as places of opportunity, urban centers are becoming battlegrounds for visible and invisible actors, as urban power relations and social, economic, and environmental trends increasingly drive national identity and political legitimacy. (Michael C. 2009.) However, rapid demographic growth, growing needs for vital urban infrastructure, and insufficient resources make urban governance a Severe challenge. Local governments are increasingly unable to meet the demands of urban society. Due to this factor, it is no surprise that the basic issues of urban life (such as housing, water, waste removal, and education) become politicized.




Figure 4 : Venn diagram illustrating the confluence of different outcomes of a conflict might lead to a protracted urban conflict
Source: Author

Cities and conflict

Recent research and discussions suggest a contemporary shift as urbanization in developing countries becomes more conflict-prone and inherently interacts with it. These issues were observed in the late 20th century. In many countries that have experienced civil and sovereign conflict, higher rates of promoted/informal urbanization and deurbanization are caused by conflict. This issue can be seen in two levels of interaction in urban areas and different types of conflict: during and post-conflict. During a conflict, cities can be seen as prime targets since they are the heart of networked infrastructure so as to paralyze the other waring side's logistics (Coward 2009; Graham 2010), as well as sites of social engagement and political activism, become subjects of 'urbanicide' (Graham 2004; Weizman 2004). Moreover, cities can also provide relative security for a variety of reasons; for instance, Kinshasa during the Congolese civil war or Luanda during the Angolan civil war has served as a place of refuge for relative security (Beall and Goodfellow 2014) since they are places where winning parties are seeking to set up new systems.



Image 2: , Freedom Graffiti II – Peace

© Tamam Azzam

Sources: THE NEXUS OF URBANIZATION, VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT conference.

2.2 Types of conflict and their implications on urban areas

The distinction between sovereign, civil, and civic conflict in Jo Beall and Goodfellow's article (conflict and post-war transitions in African cities) goes beyond two more common distinctions: the first between interstate war and civil war, and the second between political and criminal violence. This framework aims to capture the fact that all violent conflicts have a political dimension, and that conflicts can evolve over time. Additionally, it provides a spatial perspective on how cities and urban governance contribute to conflict mitigation.

Types of conflict:

Sovereign Conflicts: are conflicts between two Nations, involving battles crossing international borders, whether it's a conflict between two sovereign states, such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea during the late 1990s, or intervention in a civil conflict such as the current ongoing civil war in Ethiopia involving other sovereign parties.

Civil conflicts: often with external support, can be defined as acts of violence between politically and militarily organized political parties within the country, usually aimed at gaining control of the region or power of the entire country. (Fearon, 2007 & Hironaka, 2005). Civil wars have traditionally been associated with the countryside. In rural areas, military organizations can more easily establish themselves outside the state's reach because of the proximity of ethnic groups to their homeland territories (Kalyvas 2006).

A civic conflict: is typically an impersonal process that requires participation and response, unlike political conflict, which is aimed at taking control of formal structures of power.

Civic conflicts are violent expressions of grievances against the state or other parties. In addition to gang warfare and terrorism, riots and violence over state failures, such as a lack of services, the concept encompasses a broad range of distinct and recurring forms of violence between individuals and groups.

Rather than being a rigid typology or 'absolute' classificatory system, the tripartite construction of sovereign, civil, and civic conflict is intended to serve as a heuristic framework for analyzing the ways in which cities and conflict interact

over time. The Research indicates that when sovereign and civil wars end, urban-based violence

begins, even though both have declined since the late twentieth century (Gurr et al.). The prospect of civic conflict certainly increases when civil conflicts and sovereign wars end, especially in most Sub-Saharan African countries. A major reason for civic conflicts in cities is their power structure (concentration of authorities, services, etc.) and their proximity to mass populations. (Rodgers 2010 in *ibid*)

2.3 African cities in the times of conflict and post-conflict

When it comes to sovereign conflicts, international security actors have struggled to adjust to what has been called the rise of the ‘urbanization of security’ (Coward 2009).

Mkandawire argues that in Africa, the vast majority of civil wars are fought in rural areas. Nevertheless, they are rooted in an urban malaise (discomfort) and therefore need to be viewed as originating from urban areas (Mkandawire, 2002). Showing that most of the African civil wars are caused primarily by poverty and inequality, striking the urban elites to bring the group they believe they represent into conflict.

Amongst the various forms of conflict in Africa, the two most prominent ones are those in which excluded urban elites move from urban confrontations to the countryside, and those in which externally supported rebel movements in exile fight their way to the capital from the countryside. This event is not to say that conflict in Africa has only been fought in rural areas: several civil wars have also been fought in cities. In addition to the infamous Mogadishu and Kigali, cities in the western part of Africa such as Brazzaville, Monrovia, and Freetown also witnessed devastating violence during the civil wars of Africa in the 1990s (Ellis 2003). Moreover, during the second Sudanese civil war, violent attacks on Juba led to a period when the city’s population fled the city (Martin and Mosel 2011). According to Lindley (2010), two-thirds of Mogadishu’s urban population fled the city for temporary reasons in 2007-08. As for Tigray, the region’s capital was relatively safe, while most of its secondary cities and rural areas have been completely devastated by the conflict, and it became home to more than half a million refugees fleeing the conflict.

The aftermath of civil war has resulted in some of the fastest rates of urban growth globally, despite the challenges of rapid urbanization and violent civ-

ic conflict. From 1995 to 2000, Kigali experienced rapid growth from massive refugee returns, and the desire of people to seek economic opportunities and relative anonymity after the civil war and 1994 genocide (Goodfellow and Smith 2013). Compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s, Juba grew more than twice as fast after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). West Africa has also experienced significant urbanization. Liberia saw significant urbanization following its war (Butman 2009), while Freetown in Sierra Leone saw continuous urban-rural migration after the war (Maconachie et al., 2013).

It is also possible that the systems that previously established certain levels of security and stability where elite rent sharing in 'haven' cities can collapse once new groups take control, regardless of whether they are former rebels seeking retribution or branches of the central state seeking to reinsert their authority. In light of Mkandawire's (2002) argument that rural insurgency has urban roots, could other disgruntled urbanites lead further rural insurgencies following the end of rural-based wars? Violence in post-war African situations is often associated with urbanization and differences in population growth rates among ethnic groups, according to Goldstone (2002). In recent decades, the increased urban malaise has led less to rural-based civil war than to violent civic conflict based on urban malaise. As a result, people may turn to violence to express their frustrations or meet their economic goals, partly out of *war fatigue*: urban tensions aggravated by war fatigue may lead people to turn to violence in order to satisfy their needs.

Ugandan politicians reported that following the deadly riots in September 2009, there is a profound reluctance to contemplate war when people have been devastated by war in the past, compared to other forms of violence. Following the end of the war, there is ample evidence that civic conflict continues to escalate. Freetown, for instance, has seen crime rates rise annually since the end of the war, with drug trafficking being a major issue. In fact, urban insecurity has increased since the war ended, despite relatively peaceful conditions after the war. (Kunkeler and Peters 2011: 282).

There has also been discussion of the possibility of increased urban conflict in Gulu after the war (Branch 2013). A study conducted on Managua in Nicaragua (Rodgers 2009), Dili in Timor-Leste (Moxham and Carapic 2013), and other regions also revealed problems with post-conflict urban governance. Increasing civic violence has also been reported in Juba. It was relatively peaceful

during the war, but urban insecurity has increased since the end of the war. At the end of two decades of civil conflict, a resident of Juba said security existed before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with North Sudan. A contributor commented: 'Now there is no security; how can anyone call this freedom?' Another participant said: 'Before the peace, the enemy was distinct. Now, in comparison, enemies are numerous and unknown.' (Martin and Mosel 2011: 30). Hence, Salva Kiir stated in 2010 that *achievements in this regard were if at all, minimal* using the SPLA's "take towns to the people" policy in Juba. A case study of 'urban cleansing' in Zimbabwe illustrates the importance of social differentiation in urbanism, as well as the role of state neglect or failure in civic conflict.

It is necessary to resolve civic conflicts regularly in large urban areas of Zimbabwe to ensure sustainable urban governance. Peace and new identities in cities, Civil war doesn't always lead to a downward spiral in cities. People who live in cities during and after episodes of civil conflict can often take advantage of some of the positive aspects of post-war urbanism. The city of Goma in eastern DRC is an interesting example of how conflict can result in economic advantages, even in the midst of devastating conflict and prolonged regional warfare (between 1996 and 2003).

2.4 Post-conflict Status Quo

2.4.1 Political Status status quo

A conflict is almost always a result of politics, and state power after a conflict tends to be fragile. Weak security, weak legitimacy, and weak administration are the indicators of fragile state power. Post-conflict governments might not be widely accepted by post-conflict communities or have limited capabilities due to limited finances. As a result, there is a low human resource capacity and participation of private sectors in post-war reconstruction, this could also be due to the lack of essential and basic infrastructure, such as roads, energy, and communication, which might not be able to be provided by the fragile state.

2.4.2 Social and Demographic status quo

A post-conflict society goes through many difficulties regarding the aftermath of trauma; many groups and individuals are unable to interact with other distinct groups and individuals. This leads to social fragmentation and high tension in society. The situation may also be sensitive due to the movement of many people and

psychological trauma stemming from violent experiences. Mac Sweeney (2008) Since there are a large number of incapacitated, disabled, or otherwise injured individuals, there will be high numbers of single women households and more women in the workforce. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS increases as a result of sexual violence. Moreover, there will be population displacement, including both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Unemployment among youth, particularly former combatants, is high. (ibid) In addition to these sources, the post-conflict society also suffers from a shortage of educated and skilled human power due to the conflict. Especially in developing countries, it shows a pattern of brain drain and economical migration.

2.4.3 Economical status quo

Post-conflict economic recovery is most critical if needed to ensure sustainable peace and development of a post-conflict nation. Furthermore, break the vicious circle of poverty. Because of the nation's high vulnerability during this time, the state's economy decreases dramatically, with high inflation, currency devaluation, and low values of assets most probable the outcomes of conflict. And this affects the economy of the country, companies, and individuals and needs to be addressed. The economy of a state is negatively affected by conflicts. It is often mismanaged, largely illegal, and heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Conflict-torn countries also struggle with unemployment, poor allocation management, and stagnant economies. Which leads to a downfall of the economy and country. A country's economy shrinks by an average of 2.2% annually during a civil war. Consequently, it is expected that the state's economy will be 20 percent lower after ten years of conflict than it would have been had there not been conflict. Voz, KozulWright, and Fortunato (2008, 1) also pointed out that government GDP levels in war-torn societies are usually lower than the average of other countries with similar per capita income. In addition, the war economy destabilizes the market and causes a reduction in local, regional, and international investments, government revenue, and taxes. Poor physical infrastructure and division in land ownership play a significant role in motivating the private sector to invest, as the destabilization of land tenure, and lack of services make investors unsure of taking the risk of investing in such an atmosphere.

2.4.4 Post-conflict Urban Status quo

It is difficult to plan for equitable access to resources after a conflict, where one side emerges stronger and controls assets and institutions. Furthermore, protracted conflicts can end temporarily without a political resolution, resulting in a governance vacuum and making it difficult to develop an inclusive planning process. Conflict situations often result in land and property grabs. Moreover, post-conflict urban planning may even entrench divisions that will continue to destabilize society. Another concern is that urban planners are unlikely to be able to fulfill their duties in conflict situations, as opposed to other types of natural disaster situations, where they are likely to be more involved and empowered. For post-conflict situations, protectorate systems may be necessary, but post-disaster situations should avoid bypassing governments. (ibid) furthermore, A reconstruction project can either maintain and restore communities in the same state as they were, or it can encourage groups to start thinking about a new, better reality, in terms of physical impacts (such as disrupted services, infrastructure damage or destruction, displaced persons, etc.). Infrastructure destruction can pose both challenges (requiring immediate reconstruction) and opportunities to 'build back better,' improving resilience and inclusivity. Reconstruction planning can be particularly sensitive in these circumstances, along with resolving land issues or where institutions lack the capacity to plan efficiently. Generally, fragile states are characterized by a lack of financial resources, weak governance, and weak security systems. Additionally, protracted urban conflict can result in continued difficulties in providing urban services, housing, and other provisions.

2.5 The Elements of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Post-conflict reconstruction takes into account a variety of factors since there are usually many causes and consequences of a conflict. Conflict-related actions do not always follow a universal pattern, but rather depend on the conflict itself, its scale, and duration (Addison et al. 2016, 32). Therefore, each post-conflict reconstruction process must be seen and planned individually. It is generally acknowledged, however, that long-term peace can be maintained by successful post-conflict reconstruction. Security, reconciliation, and development should also be a focus of post-conflict reconstruction, according to many experts. Thus, the main objectives of post-conflict reconstruction are usually to reorganize state institutions, rebuild the economy, and rebuild society. As a result, sustainable

peace can be achieved, and the state can move forward toward development. The U.S Institute of Peace has outlined six essential aspects of essential post-conflict reconstruction elements, which are discussed below

Security: A country must provide its citizens with protection internal threats following a conflict. The economy and society must recover in a secure environment. State institutions must be re-established, the rule of law must be assured, the state police must be effective, the borders must be protected, disarmament must be implemented, infrastructure must be safeguarded, repressive government agencies must be dismantled, rogue groups must be suppressed, and the internal conflicts must be resolved.

Humanitarian Relief: States must ensure their citizens have access to the basic necessities of life. The immediate aftermath of war often leaves thousands of injured or displaced people incapable of providing all necessities. As a result of the destruction of infrastructure, even healthy people who remain in their homes might not have access to water, electricity, and other necessities. Since the government cannot restore essential services to its people until humanitarian organizations are able to assist, international relief organizations should be able to assist.

Governance: In order to protect security and make fair political decisions, the establishment of an effective system of governance is essential.

Infrastructure: By destroying or disrupting the physical elements of society, such as transportation networks (roads, bridges, railroads, airports, etc.), water and wastewater treatment, telecommunications, and basic sanitation, armed conflict ultimately results in the destruction or disruption of modern society.

Economy: The nation's economy must be rebuilt in order to ensure people have jobs and are able to support their families. As governments begin to re-establish banks and other financial institutions, they must also deal with the consequences of illegal economic activities.

Social/Cultural: Schools, organizations in the arts, medical facilities, and religious institutions all need to be re-established after conflict. Social and cultural institutions need to be re-established for those who were most affected by the conflict. Conflicting groups must reconcile in order to achieve peace.

2.6 Post-conflict reconstruction strategies

As a post-conflict reconstruction initiative, priority has to be addressed when trying to achieve a successful reconstruction in a conflict-torn country. The following is a list of the main strategies that must be prioritized during reconstruction.

2.6.1 Reconstruction of institutions

There is a risk that the state will relapse into conflict in the absence of strong institutions and political order. The best method for strengthening institutions and their capacities at the moment does not exist in a standardized form. It is often recommended to countries following a conflict that they promote “good governance,” such as democratization, liberalization, decentralization, privatization, etc. It is important for donor countries to develop political stability and economic sustainability (Ndikumana, 2016). Vos, Kozul-Wright, and Fortunato (2008) assert that “a strong state can only be achieved through a political process that is sensitive to local values and conditions. Due to this, in political reconstruction, the importance of reconciliation and participation of the locals cannot be underestimated. It is possible to achieve this transition by decentralizing power and establishing institutions that make power-sharing possible at the grass root level. As an outcome, it is also essential to pay attention to the process of building post-conflict institutions.

2.6.2 Reconstruction of the Economy

The basic needs of society can also be met with strong institutions and political order, such as infrastructure, health care, education, and employment. However, this cannot be possible without the economy’s functioning, which is why institutional strengthening and political order must be closely linked to economic reconstruction.

The economy of a state is negatively affected by conflicts. As a result of conflict, an economy becomes largely illegal, mismanaged, and heavily reliant on foreign aid. In conflict-torn countries, unemployment rates are high, allocations are mismanaged, and the economy stagnates.

A country’s economy shrinks by an average of 2.2% annually during a civil war. (Collier 1999, 8) This means that the state’s economy will be 20 per-

cent lower after ten years of conflict than it could be without conflict. Voz, Kozul Wright, and Fortunato (2008, 1) also stated that a war-torn country's GDP level is usually much lower than other countries with similar per capita income. For these reasons, post-war economic recovery is crucial to ease tensions and put the country back on the path of development. According to Ndikumana (2016, 157), mobilizing domestic revenue is one of the main goals of "economic reconstruction" because it allows governments to provide public services and strengthen their institutions. In addition, economic reconstruction should encompass the establishment of basic macroeconomic and microeconomic frameworks in order to create jobs. It is essential to take these steps so that former combatants and civilians can reintegrate into productive activities (Del Castillo 2016, 55). It is also important in the economic recovery to mobilize domestic revenues and build government capacity to use them efficiently, according to Voz, Kozul Wright, and Fortunato (2008). It is the primary objective of economic recovery to mobilize domestic revenues and distribute them to society at large.

2.6.3 Reconstruction of Social and judicial Systems

Another essential step toward sustainable development or institution strengthening is social reconstruction and justice for the victims. As part of social reconstruction, all social confrontations, such as ethnic, religious, and class clashes, which may have caused the conflict must be resolved. This would allow former enemies to peacefully coexist within the same cities and villages (Del Castillo 2016, 51). As well as healing psychological traumas and mental health issues, social reconstruction aims to rebuild social relations and intergroup trust. Alternatively, the case of these confrontations caused during the conflict should be considered as some groups or individuals tend to take advantage during the absence of law.

Furthermore, the most critical part of social reconstruction is the reconstruction of the judicial system. In her article for 2016, Jamie Rowen (2016, 203) explains that investigating, documenting, and publicizing violence has emerged as a popular approach to bridging divides after conflict. Hence, these commissions aim to produce a collective narrative of violence.

2.6.4 Post-conflict reconstruction and foreign aid

In conflict-torn countries, especially developing countries face enormous needs

to reconstruct the damages done due to the conflict; however, they have very limited human power and financial resources to fulfill them. Therefore, international development organizations, NGOs, and the international community support post-conflict reconstruction in conflict-torn countries by providing financial and technical assistance. ODA can be provided bilaterally from a donor to a recipient, or it can be channeled through international agencies that decide where the aid is used (OECD, Net ODA... 2018). Donors cannot target aid to specific outcomes through budget support, as government resources are fungible with aid.

The third key In conflict-torn states, especially developing countries, face enormous needs to reconstruct the damages done due to the conflict; however, they are unable to accomplish these goals without the assistance of donors. According to Ndikumana (2016, 145), foreign aid should prioritize peace and state-building as well as prevent conflict recurrence. As well as this, foreign aid must consider the capacity constraints in post-conflict countries and focus on just a few reconstruction objectives to maximize its impact, while ensuring that it is distributed fairly among the different political, social, and regional entities (Ibid.).

Investing in local capabilities, land, and natural resources is the key to increasing the productive capacity of a country and its citizens (Ibid.). Multilateral development agencies, such as the UN and WB, can channel ODA to different countries (OECD, Net ODA...2018). Ndikumana (2016, 143-144) shows that budget support, trust funds, and aid for regional public goods are the most commonly used aid instruments.

The purpose of budget support is to direct foreign aid directly into the budget of a conflict-torn country so that the country can allocate it accordingly, usually in accordance with its national development agenda. Aid is fungible with other government resources, so it cannot be targeted to specific outcomes. Additionally, trust funds facilitate aid coordination and provide the recipient with a greater degree of autonomy over its post-reconstruction agenda. Using this instrument, donors' aid is used to fund regional reconstruction efforts after conflict.

Donors also use aid to finance specific reconstruction projects in addition to these key instruments. Also, Del Castillo (2016, 64) urges donors to channel aid through national budgets rather than off-budget according to their agenda. The author of Panic (2005) argues that foreign aid should be allocated to meet both

donors' and recipients' expectations for maximum effectiveness. Despite the fact that donors have information on how foreign aid can and should be used to maximize its effectiveness, many post-conflict reconstruction projects have failed.

It is mainly related to sovereignty and the control of where foreign aid is used that foreign aid causes controversy among donors and recipients. It is important for donor countries to keep control over where their aid is used, and it is equally important for recipient countries to retain sovereignty over their reconstruction projects. Misra (2002, 16) argues that civil, military, political, or humanitarian intervention undermines the autonomy of individuals, societies, or states. Throughout this controversy, it has been emphasized that all levels and objectives of post-conflict reconstruction require cooperation.

2.6.5 Post-conflict stakeholders and actors

War disrupts communication channels between people, tearing apart ties between individuals and groups, and weakening social networks. As a result of conflict, cooperation is destroyed, and post-conflict development should therefore be centered around cooperation and the involvement of different actors. It is likely that a variety of actors and stakeholders will attend, in addition to members of the development community in post-conflict reconstruction. Among these are humanitarian relief workers, the post-conflict state itself, the wider population affected by conflict, community groups, local and international private sectors, as well as international military forces and local armed groups. And due to this large number of actors and stakeholders involved in post-conflict situations, fragmentation could be evident. With a wide range of stakeholders, including those not traditionally thought of as development partners. Nevertheless, donors should try to engage with them. Post-conflict situations require the concept of working together for both symbolic and practical values. (Mac sweeny 2008) Having a wide range of partners is more effective than working alone in a fragmented post-conflict environment. It will be necessary to gather information from a variety of dispersed sources, which makes coordinated research and planning more efficient. In addition, implementing a project in a fragmented environment is likely to be more efficient if resources are pooled. Also, as a post-conflict principle and as post-conflict practicality, it is important to work with a diverse range of post-conflict partners. However, these conditions vary from place to place, so strategies must be adapted according to the context. (Nelson 2000, 49 & Specker 2008a, 3)



Image 3: The ruins of buildings destroyed by Soviet attacks and the Afghan civil war. Peter Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images

Chapter Three:

Reference Cases:

This chapter examines three case references from different parts of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, in order to better understand the strategies used during post-conflict reconstruction. By taking into account Four lenses, the lens of the political, economical, and social fabric of the country as a whole and narrowed down to the urban lens through the urban center reconstruction of the capital cities. Additionally, a comparative assessment of post-conflict strategies is needed in order to identify a successful post-conflict strategy that might be useful for future reconstruction in Tigray.

Post-conflict reconstruction, Despite what it may seem, the term does not refer to restoring a country to its pre-war status. An ideal reconstruction process would include multiple transitions: the transition from a state of war to a state of peace, a transition from a government-driven economy to a market-driven economy, and the transition from dictatorship to democracy (Belloni, 2005). By replacing previous institutions with more sustainable and transparent ones, one can ensure a more developing future.

3.1 Selection and Assessment criteria of The reference cases

The selection criteria for the reference cases are

- Type of conflicts: the selected case studies all had religious and ethnic origins as ignitions or starting points of a conflict.
- Comparing successful and failed post-conflict reconstruction stories: Afghanistan is considered a failed example, while Rwanda represents a successful example. The research question can

be answered by identifying effective post-conflict reconstruction strategies and policies, as a result of these two case studies.

- All case studies have a clear role of international aid organizations and their intervention, showing how the excessive power of donors could lead to disaster, in the case of Afghanistan and how having locally based initiatives are important for further development shown in both cases of Rwanda and Kosovo.
- Economic background: all the case studies had economic difficulties due to several reasons. While in both the Afghanistan and Rwanda cases economic hardship was one of the conflict-triggering reasons.
- Development of urban centers: Kabul and Pristina were relatively developed cities compared to Kigali, which was a village before the conflict. Nonetheless, these three case studies show how, in Pristina and Kigali, upgradation and urban governance were accomplished, while in Afghanistan, due to the lack of governance, urbanization development stagnated.
- The three case references have their own significant element to learn from, the case of Rwanda shows a good example of how it integrated foreign aid and its society in the reconstruction process.
- The Afghanistan case shows the importance of inclusive decision-making and establishment of anti-corruption, and sustaining economic revenue.
- The Kosovo, Pristina case shows its successful urban planning development after the conflict

As a result, this thesis explains why some reconstructions succeed and others fail and provide recommendations on how to make post-conflict reconstruction more effective.

3.2 Case study one, Rwanda

Context of Rwanda,

The country is densely populated with about 13 million in a small mountainous region of Central Africa with a history of ethnic violence.

Prior to the recent civil war, Rwanda was populated by approximately 90 percent Hutus, 8% Tutsis, and fewer than 1 percent Towa (indigenous people). For 500 years, traditional Tutsi herders dominated Hutu farmers, Tutsi hunters, and potters. Rwanda's economy is primarily based on rainfed agricultural production from smaller, semi-self-sufficient, increasingly fragmented farms. The main spoken language of Rwanda is Kinyarwanda, but languages such as French, English, and Swahili are some of the official languages. It has since

recovered from the 1994 massacre that severely damaged Rwanda's fast-growing economy. Subsistence agriculture constitutes the majority of the economy. Coffee and tea are the two most important cash crops exported. In recent years, tourism has become the country's largest source of foreign exchange. In addition, Rwanda now has a bright future and socio-economic achievements after the deadly post-war. Currently aiming for Singapore's market strategy, it is becoming the center of African markets and innovation under the name "Singapore in Africa".

3.2.1 Backgrounds of the Rwandan War

Since Belgium's divided colonial rule, Rwanda's politics have been dominated by ethnic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi. A majority rule in Rwanda has been established by the Hutu since the 1960s after the Tutsi elite lost power. The power of the Hutu elite in a broad ethnic pogrom and centralized government against Tutsis continued. Powerful Hutu representatives discriminated against the Tutsi minority, furthering the polarization and forcing them to evacuate to Uganda, which is adjacent to some Tutsis. As reported by Nut J. Colletta and Michelle L. Karen (2000), Tutsis' rights were violated during the Hutu rule. The country's economy has also been declining due to rising debt and government corruption, in addition to ethnic hatred. Poverty and unequal land allocation fuel ethnic tensions, according to Herman Musahara and Chris Huggins (2005). As a result of long-term conflict between ethnic groups and discrimination against ethnic minorities, Rwanda was engulfed in a civil war in 1990. As well as human loss, the conflict has caused a decline in social and economic conditions. According to Oscar Kamanuka (2009, 3940), genocide destroys a country's human resources, institutional capacity, economic and social infrastructure, and social structure. There has been a 50 percent decline in economic activity, for example. Thus, the genocide and civil war have had a profound effect on Rwandan society. As soon as the genocide ended and the civil war ended, reconstruction efforts began. The international community, primarily the United Nations and the World Bank, played a significant role in the reconstruction process. Poverty reduction and national unity were the main goals of reconstruction strategies.

Casualty of the Rwandan civil war and genocide

Genocide in Rwanda was caused by ethnic tensions and economic pressures, ac-

cording to the background of the conflict. In the aftermath of the devastating war, Rwanda's livelihood and infrastructure were destroyed in overwhelming amounts. There was a loss of approximately 12 percent of the 7,000,000 people in the country. Over 2 million Rwandans are internally displaced; another 2 million seek refuge throughout Africa and around the globe. Over 120,000 Rwandans are in country-run prisons. Thousands of Rwandans are suffering physical and mental traumas as a result of the genocide. In general, the war has resulted in the destruction of the social structure and capacity of the country. In addition to affecting Rwanda's social fabric, the war also severely damaged its infrastructure. Due to the conflict, buildings and roads were destroyed. Kigali, for example, was devastated. Records of government and private organizations were destroyed, and employees of government agencies and utilities fled or were killed. This led to the collapse of the entire health delivery system since more than 80% of the country's health professionals were killed. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Rwanda neglected infrastructure rehabilitation, and the resettlement of refugees was a major issue. Rwanda has made important gains by reprioritizing its infrastructure after some time. Vision 2020 was introduced in 2000. Among its main physical reconstruction strategies are poverty reduction plans.

3.2.2 What were the main Reconstruction Strategies in Rwanda

It is mainly the social fabric of the country that was affected by the Rwandan conflict, and since the early 1990s, they have been trying to reintegrate the community, where both perpetrators and victims are neighbors, relatives, and friends.

3.2.2.1 Reconstruction Strategies| Justice

This led to the establishment of three successive courts in Rwanda, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the national judicial system, and the Gacaca courts. Over 120,000 people were imprisoned or held criminally responsible as a result of the conflict.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

A war crimes tribunal was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) following the Rwandan War Crimes on November 8, 1994. During the period between January 1st and December 31st, 1994, the court prosecuted individuals charged with genocide and other international humanitarian

law violations. After starting the first trial in 1997, the court completed the proceedings by December 2011. Among the 92 defendants, 80 were convicted. Raped and sexually assaulted people are considered genocide in this case, as stated in the ruling.

The national court system of Rwanda,

Genocide and serious atrocities, such as rape, have been charged before Rwandan national courts. Approximately 10,000 genocide suspects had been tried by national courts by mid-2006. Until the death penalty was abolished in Rwanda, 22 people were executed. Following the closure of the ICTR, major obstacles to the transfer of the genocide case to national courts have been removed..



Image 4 : Tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees, who have been forced by Tanzanian authorities to go back to their country despite fears they will be killed upon their return, head back toward the Rwandan border on a road in Tanzania on Dec. 19, 1996.

Source: Jean-marc Bouju/AP

Gacaca courts.

Since thousands of defendants are still awaiting trial in Rwanda's national court system, the government has revived a traditional court system called Gacaca. It had been fully operational for several years after a redesigned traditional community court system was implemented in 2005. A community-elected judge hears genocide suspects who are charged with all crimes excluding planning the genocide. Repentance and seeking reconciliation with the community will lead to fewer penalties for the offender. Most confessed prisoners are ordered to serve the community or return home without further punishment. There have been more than 1.2 million court hearings in district courts across the country since 2005. Through the Gacaca Court, victims can also learn the truth about the deaths of their relatives and families, which contributes to reconciliation. Additionally, they allow perpetrators to express regret, seek forgiveness,



Image 5: A gacaca court in session © CC–NC–By- Elisa Finocchiari Source:<https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-ends-gacaca-genocide-tribunals/a-16033827>

and confess their crimes. May 4, 2012, marked the end of the Gacaca Court.

3.2.3 Reconstruction Strategies| Reconciliation + social integration

In a deeply traumatized country, the return of nearly 2 million ‘new caseload’ refugees was yet another tectonic shift. The Rwandan reconciliation process focused on restoring Rwanda’s identity and balancing national justice, truth, peace, and security. The Government of Rwanda has taken various steps to achieve the goal of the peaceful coexistence of perpetrators and victims. As a result of the Constitution, Rwandans now have equal rights. Discrimination and ideologies of genocide were dealt with by law. Rwanda’s National Unified Reconciliation Commission has primary responsibility for reconciliation efforts. Reconciliation activities included: Ingando: As part of a solidarity camp, the Ingando program teaches peace education. These programs were used by more than 90,000 Rwandans between 1999 and 2009. The programs are designed to promote patriotism and fight the ideology of genocide, as well as to illuminate the history of Rwanda and its origins. The Itorero program was launched in 2007 and aims to foster leaders who promote Rwanda’s values and strive to develop the community. The Itorero program had 115,228 participants between 2007 and 2009. Organize seminars: on grassroots leaders, political party leaders, trauma counseling, conflict mediation, and early warning systems for young and females. During the past few years, several national summits have been held on the topics of justice, good governance, human rights, national security, and national history have been held to create more awareness in the community. A number of studies have been published by the National Unified Reconciliation Commission investigating the causes and mitigation of conflict in Rwanda.

3.1.4 Reconstruction Strategies| Development

The Rwandan vision 2020 marked a way in how Rwandans do things. All of Rwanda’s development goals and objectives were focused on community reconstruction. The ideas of both Vision 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) were developed in cooperation with Rwandans, and as a result, they have widespread support from civil society. And have set goals to change the rates and percentages of the following cases: Child death reduction. Than 107/1000 children died before the age of 5 and the goal was to decrease that to 27/1000 children. Life expectancy was 49 years and the objec-

tive was to get it up to 66 by the year 2020. Income Per Capita, At that time, was 220\$ and was planned to increase by 60% to 1240\$. Access to clean water. 52 % of the population had access to clean water and the goal was to get it to 100% by the year 2020. In this post-conflict reconstruction policy, Rwanda has set up pillars of development to progressively achieve its vision by 2020.

3.2.5 Reconstruction Strategies| Funding resources

International aid

Humanitarian aid was essential in Rwanda after the devastating conflict. Foreign aid inflows increased significantly in Rwanda after the conflict. Refugees and IDPs were first provided with food, shelter, and medical and sanitary services by the International Community. Providing funds and other resources to prevent large-scale starvation and malnutrition. However in the long run the international AID was turned into budget support and project funding. The country received more than \$8 billion in ODA between 1995 and 2016 (OECD, Creditor Reporting System 2018). In addition to financial support, technical support was also provided. No general fund was created. The main aid tools were budgetary support and project funding, and these tools remain valid to this day. According to the official report on Rwanda's development assistance for the financial year 2015/2016, the share of budget support is 32%, while the rate of project funding is 68%. (Rwanda Official Development... 2017) According to Hayman (2011), in the first years after the conflict, foreign aid comes with conditions such as good governance and accountability between the government and the people. It is possible to explain the predominance of project funding by the fact that sponsors have greater control over their own resources and are capable of allocating aid according to their own preferences. As a matter of politics, donors desire their aid success stories and project funding to serve their interests. It is more likely that aid provided in post-conflict conditions is due to donors' strong desire to control their own resources. However, Hayman indicated that increasing numbers of donors are providing aid through budgetary support, which is an indicator of trust in the state's public accountability mechanisms and trust. government development agenda. (Ibid.) This shows donors' confidence in Rwanda and its ownership in reconstruction and development, which in turn is a sign of successful reconstruction.

Local and International Investment planning

A great deal of effort was put into mobilizing the diaspora for Rwanda's reconstruction. Later, the Rwandan government tried to establish and convince international investors of its stability, management, and investment policy. In response to these created circumstances, mining, construction, and real estate sectors, infrastructure, and the information and communications technology sector are receiving significant investments from many international investors.

3.2.6 Kigali

Prior to the conflict, Kigali was characterized as a big village with less infrastructure and population, however, after the war, Kigali experienced an influx of refugees and returnees the population of the city grew by 18 percent within a few years. The urban securitization of Kigali was important to achieve the urban development of the city and attract more investors and Decentralization of the cities

As Goodfellow and Smith have noted, 'urban securitization' enabled Kigali as a city to emerge from a catastrophic conflict into a 'model city'.

In 2000, Kigali was no longer a village. As cities grow in size, other characteristics of urbanism, such as density and heterogeneity (Wirth, 1938), become more prevalent, often in extreme forms, such as the perpetrators of genocides and the victims. Despite the odds, the city took a very different path. In 2008, Kigali was presented with the UN-HABITAT Scroll of Honour Award for its contributions to building a model, modern city with a significant crime reduction during this period. Kigali has played a central role in this process with the help of international supporters. A villagization program was implemented by the government in the late 1990s as a means of ensuring land security and productive use, particularly in tackling housing shortages, mainly in Kigali.

Resource flows into Kigali have certainly benefited the status as an elite space that is distinct socioeconomically from the rest of the country. Overall, aid has probably contributed to consolidating RPF rule and making Kigali a space for both domestic and international elites, which has a significant impact on Kigali's security. The United States and Singapore consultants drafted the city's Conceptual Master Plan in 2007. According to the Master Plan, the government has placed a great deal of effort into creating a city that can be regarded as a model of environmental conservation, public order, and social harmony as well as an ideal location for investors. Aside from the government's own funding, no donors

have directly contributed to the Master Plan. While the implementation of the plan was still in its infancy, the government was motivated to create a secure environment with minimal risk. As well as providing a safe and planned city, the anti-corruption agenda makes it very appealing for donors to conduct their business in Kigali. While foreign investments are reshaping Kigali, it is important to point out that the majority of them are domestic.

One could argue that Kigali's progress shows remarkable success: with centralized policy-making and implementation, political will, and international support, the city has demonstrated that urban modernization and security can be accomplished in such a complex post-genocidal situation.

However, it remains to be seen whether Kigali is anything other than just a model of order, rather than a model of development in general. Although security and planning are essential to development, a country facing Rwanda's population pressure and urbanization rate requires cities that can provide adequate economic prospects for the poor. Until a fundamental fragility exists in the political system and the development plan for the city, low-income citizens will experience little benefit from the political system. Goodfellow & Smith, (2013) *et officitur, imet vel magnam, audam expererum etur autem vellam ut quate voloreptat qui dolorum derorem aut volupta tiuribusa dolupit quaero dol-oribero int aceriasperi ut eosam qui di conse dolor-ro rectis nossediciunt offictem eiciduciet doluptas etum consecusae nos sectati comnimi nctenti con-sequas quasition pellaut lab imod molorpo rempo-re plabori tempero vitaepro imaginatur aut vidunt omnim quodignit, sectento oditi quaestr untur, sam fugiae eum sapiendebis eaquo omnihiliti dolor aut*




Figure 5: the Urban Evolution of Kigali from 1999- 2040

Source: Rwanda jornal 2016

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3.2.6 Lesson Learned

Justice

Under Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction strategy, the justice system has been well-integrated, with a fairly distributed distribution of courts, starting from the higher-levelcriminalsthroughtothelow-levelcriminalswithinthelocalcommunity, particularly the Gacaca traditional court, which contributed to social integration at the community level, helping the community move forward towards a better future.

Unity and Reconciliation

Rwanda's social reconstruction was one of the first reconstruction efforts in a conflict-torn country since it was crucial to achieving other development goals in regard to mobilizing all groups to participate in the country's reconstruction. Cooperation between social groups and a healthy social structure is essential for achieving the other development goals. In addition, some studies show that the accomplishment of post-conflict reconstruction can be traced back to the priority placed on social reconstruction.

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Funding

The allocation of funds where they were needed was another successful implementation of the strategies, and Rwanda is an excellent example of this. It demonstrated that international aid and funds should be based on local needs, where they should be integrated into budget support and invested directly in locally initiated projects. Successful post-conflict reconstruction is a result of ownership of the reconstruction by the conflict-torn country as well as the cooperative effort of donors. It was an important motivation for the government of Rwanda to create a secure environment that appeared to contain minimal risks even in the early stages of the plan's implementation. The government has successfully attracted investments from countries ranging from Canada to the UAE to China in sectors such as tourism, finance, energy, and telecommunications (IPAR, 2011). Furthermore, donors appreciate the commitment to a safe and planned city, as well as the anti-corruption agenda. As a result of the presence of expatriates, which includes investors as well as donors, there was an increase in the demand for upscale properties, restaurants, cafes, and shops, which in turn attracts potential investors.

Development

Rwanda's success has been due to community-based development from the grassroots up. Rwanda also demonstrated the effective implementation of the strategies in allocating funds where they were needed. Rwanda integrated all of its society as the main stakeholders in the reconstruction starting from public cleaning days, and teachers teaching peacebuilding and social cohesion in schools to bring the community and more working force into the reconstruction process.

3.3 Afghanistan

3.3.1 A brief overview of the Afghan war

Afghanistan was constantly at war throughout the 1970s. This conflict was initiated by the Soviet invasion in 1979. Mujahideen, a group of Afghan military units engaged in Jihad, were fought by Afghanistan in conjunction with the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In these times, most urban areas were under the control of the secular and socialist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, while rural areas had primarily been governed by the religious mujahideen. The conflict in Afghanistan continued despite the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. There was a significant division between the center and peripher-

al areas of the country due to war, which diminished the chances of successful economic growth. Therefore, Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Hazaras became polarized, resulting in a civil war. According to Misra (2002), there is a substantial proportion of economically backward populations living outside the direct authority of the state who live beyond the center-periphery divide. Therefore, the division between the region's center and its periphery is one of the primary causes of conflict. In addition, there are differences between ethnic groups. Furthermore, with strict resource control and inefficient distribution, unemployment and informal economic activity increased. According to Misra (2002), arms trafficking and the production of narcotics became accepted components of rural life, while the government knowingly ignored them. Around 90% of illicit opiates were supplied by Afghanistan in the 1990s (ibid). The narcotics industry in Afghanistan employed more than 400 000 people, occupied nearly a third of the country's arable lands, and displaced traditional agriculture (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016, 7).

When the Taliban came to power after the civil war, they pushed out former warlords who were in control of the cities and politics in the 1990s. However, the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 to "fight terrorism" after the 9/11 incident. In the wake of that operation, the Taliban were driven out of power. As an additional measure to maintain peace in Afghanistan after the conflict, the UN created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It took place after the Bonn-hosted peace conference in December 2001. During this time, reconstruction also began. Despite Bonn's success in boosting political reconstruction, Goodhand (2010) noted that economic and security reconstruction remained fragile. After 2001, several reconstruction projects and programs were initiated in Afghanistan in addition to the ongoing ISAF mission. Controlled and supervised by the international community.

3.3.2 What were the main reconstruction strategies in Afghanistan?

3.3.2.1 Political reconstruction in Afghanistan

Reconstruction began with the emergence of a political system. With the help of the international community, Afghanistan was able to establish a centralized government system with a two-chamber legislature. The new administration, formally known as Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA), lasted six months be-

fore being replaced by Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) lasted for a period of two years. Additionally, the constitution was amended to ease ethnic divisions within the country, which were one of the contributing factors to the long-standing conflict. An important part of the new constitution is the creation of a strong centralized government with broad powers for the president. In addition, the IMF report indicates that a number of ministries have considered power sharing and ethnic group integration (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2016).

Political Reform: Reform of the Afghan government's administrative and political infrastructure was made in addition to launching the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for reducing poverty, increasing governance, and improving economic growth. And yet, ANDS was not launched until more than six years after the Bonn Conference. As well to the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), National Priority Programs (NPPs) were also established as post-conflict reconstruction strategies. The NPPs are intended to provide donors with the option to fund projects based on the development strategy laid out by the GoA. Both of these programs were designed to transfer responsibility from International organizations to the Afghan government and civil society for peace reconciliation, democratic leadership, economic development, and regional and global collaboration. It is also important to note that the NPPs and ANPDF were launched both after Bonn, in 2010 and 2017. The NPP was essentially implemented by donors, which led to a lack of local ownership according to ATR Consulting (2018, 17). The political reconstruction efforts, despite their efforts, were criticized for their lack of sustainability and efficiency. The Taliban, for example, was excluded from being a part of institution building, which would allow power-sharing to remain unequal. Darby and Mac Ginty (2008, 206) Despite having been suggested that all conflict groups must be involved in decision-making to ensure peace, the Taliban were excluded from it. and it was also predicted that Afghanistan may experience renewed armed conflicts due to this exclusion (Ibid). **Corruption:** Political reconstruction and institutional strengthening have been negatively affected by a high corruption rate in Afghanistan. SIGAR reports that corruption threatens the improvements in security, the rule of law, governance, and economic growth (Corruption in conflict... 2016, 2). According to Integrity Watch Afghanistan, a lack of political will and adequate institutional arrangements have prevented the Afghan government from combating corruption (Bandow 2017). Which a Norwegian development cooperation agency noted that

increased corruption was caused by high levels of aid, a limited capacity to absorb, and a poorly functioning public administration (ibid.). This led to Afghanistan's corruption level rising post-conflict. According to the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, Afghanistan was ranked 177th out of 180 countries in terms of corruption. at its highest level, and is rising again after the 2020 withdrawal of the US troops. and, corruption has worsened since the reconstruction process started.

3.3.2.2 Economic reconstruction in Afghanistan

Afghans have been suffering from poverty, high unemployment, and low trade levels since the 1970s. Illegal narcotics have driven the shadow economy for decades. As part of the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the Government of Afghanistan invested in the reconstruction of the economy after the Bonn Conference in 2002. A privatized market economy was the main development goal when ANDS was launched in 2008, aiming to reduce poverty and ensure sustainable development. In addition to eliminating the drug trade, increasing foreign direct investment, reducing corruption, and strengthening governance, the Afghan National Development Strategy (2008) aims to achieve the strategy's primary goals. (ibid) In 2016, the GDP of Afghanistan grew from 2,46 billion USD in 2001 to 19,47 billion USD (The World Bank, 2018). Nevertheless, most of the nation's revenue comes from domestic sources, and foreign aid still accounts for the majority of its budget. OECD's Creditor Reporting System (2018) also explains Afghanistan's GDP growth by increasing aid flows after 2001. According to Goodhand and Sedra (2011, 55), state incapacity to collect revenue from the shadow economy partially explains the heavy reliance on foreign aid. According to ART Consulting (2018), donors choose aid based on what best suits their interests, and without local consultation, aid rarely meets local needs. Due to the lack of replacement efforts, in the economic reconstruction, the narcotics trade continues to flourish. In addition to that, most development programs are focused on cities, allowing rural areas to survive independently. As a result, the narcotics trade has been further fueled by a lack of attention paid to rural development. The Afghan economy has also been unable to attract foreign investment, as it has been its primary objective. Poverty rates have increased as a result of the failure of the economic reconstruction. About 40 percent of the population falls below the global poverty threshold of 1,25 USD/day, according to ANPDF (2017, 6).

3.3.2.3 Social reconstruction in Afghanistan

There have been various ethnic and cultural groups in Afghanistan throughout history. Consequently, there was a sense of uncertainty in the entire nation as a result of the fragmentation that even followed the post-Bonn agreement. Furthermore, state politics led to further ethnic divisions (Sharan, Heathershaw 2011). Social reconstruction has not been undertaken despite the significant ethnic divisions. The possibility of interethnic or intergroup violence would be significantly reduced if such reconstruction was provided on a broad scale to Afghans, argues Misra (2002). Due to ethnic divisions, which were one of the causes of the conflict, a priority should have been placed on social reconstruction early in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Furthermore, psychological warfare and international invasions affected ethnic and cultural divisions as well. According to Misra (2002), Afghan leaders have always viewed Western involvement in their internal affairs with scorn. Foreign involvement in the conflict and the involvement of foreign troops can be perceived as an invasion by Afghans who are strongly protective of their sovereignty and independence. Additionally, attaching Western philosophies to the Afghan state is counterproductive. Consequently, Misra advises donors to take their time, put themselves in a proper perspective, and decide how to help.

3.3.2.4 City of Kabul

Kabul is the capital city of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. After about ten years, Afghanistan emerged from two-and-a-half decades of war and




Figure 6: The evolution of Kabul city built-up area: (a) 1995; (b) 2008 and (c) 2018. Adopted from (Mahmoodzada, 2019).

internal conflicts in December 2001. It was published in 2005 that Kabul's vision was to become a modern city. Kabul City still faces a range of post-conflict issues, including a phenomenal rate of population growth as a result of the influx of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, a large portion of the city being informally developed for decades already, extensive damage to the city's infrastructure, poor service levels, and weak institutions that cannot cope with the current challenges of rebuilding and modernizing the city. Current urban service levels are extremely low due to rapid population growth, extensive damage caused by the long years of conflict, and little investment in infrastructure. In many formalized or planned areas, basic urban services are also lacking, and service quality is poor.

3.3.2.5 The role of foreign aid in Afghanistan

Afghanistan was supported by the international community after the Bonn Conference. Financial and technical assistance was provided by donor countries to Afghanistan. According to the OECD's Creditor Reporting System, Afghanistan obtained nearly 60 billion USD in ODA between 2002 and 2016. It was established in 2002 that the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was established. It coordinated funding mechanisms for government budgets and national investment projects. World Bank administered the ARTF, an account from which donors could channel aid, and from which the ARTF Management Committee allocated assistance to ANDS and NPPs. ARTF has received over 10,6 billion dollars in contributions from 34 donors since its establishment (The Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund 2018).

Despite the fact that ARTF was intended as the main instrument of assistance, it did not succeed. The Afghan government's budget received less than 30 percent of all expenditures through trust funds, according to Goodhand and Sedra (2011, 51). Due to this, over 70 percent of all aid was provided off-budget. Some examples of non-budgetary methods are the financing and implementation of specific projects based on their interests or disbursing aid through development partners, UN agencies, or non-governmental organizations. Several reconstruction efforts have been undertaken in Afghanistan with the assistance of foreign aid. Security reconstruction has been the main focus of donor countries after Bonn, and they have been in charge of it mainly since then. It has been a priority for donors to target aid, especially against

terrorism. The fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban accounted for 84 percent of international aid after Bonn. On the contrary, Afghan candidates for parliamentary elections on funds to be allocated with a high priority on reconstruction and development (Ibid.). It has resulted in a controversy concerning the distribution of aid between Afghans and donors. Even Though The Afghan government has received substantial foreign assistance, however, some have criticized the aid as being unsustainable and inefficient. Firstly, Waldman (2008, 10) states that “a large proportion of aid has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than answering the needs of Afghans. It has also been heavily influenced by the political and military objectives of donors.”. Therefore, given aid tends to reflect more the expectations of donor countries rather than Afghan preferences and needs. As a result, Afghan ownership and involvement are essential for the success of the reconstruction process (Waldman, 2008). Furthermore, it has been argued that despite the fact that the on-budget aid instrument, ARTF, was established to allow the GoA full control of the reconstruction process, the donor countries still control a large portion of it. ARTF was designed to enable the government of Afghanistan to take responsibility for the development of the country, as reported by ATR Consulting (2018). It should be noted, however, that the World Bank is responsible for making programmatic decisions, under the influence of donors. According to Waldman (2009, 17), only 52 percent of the international aid to Afghanistan was disbursed in accordance with the Paris Declaration in 2006. The lack of GoA’s ownership makes aid unsustainable over the long term. Further, PRTs used conditionalities that were contrary to local interests. Morrison-Métois (2017) notes that donors often failed to take into account the local capacity to handle large amounts of aid when planning short-term aid programs for Afghanistan. Furthermore, due to the widespread belief that immediate results would assist in stabilization, large quantities of aid were allocated instantly, neglecting how local institutions often have a limited capacity to integrate it. As a result, she concludes that the large amounts of foreign aid may fuel corruption and negatively impact the country’s development if there is no local knowledge of how to take advantage of the aid (Ibid.). Furthermore, some foreign aid-funded projects have been designed poorly, resulting in an overall inadequate reconstruction process in Afghanistan. The United Nations development program (UNDP), for instance, initiated the Alice-Ghan housing project for thousands of Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan. The project started five years ago but it soon became evident that most of the

housing had been constructed on the aridest land with no access to water, there was no subsistence agriculture, no schools, no clinics, and the nearest job opportunities were located fifty miles away in Kabul. These factors led to the majority of residents leaving the village, and Alice-Ghan gradually sank into ruin (Del Castillo, 2018). The goal of restoring security in Afghanistan was given priority, and donors invested the greatest amount of time and effort into this endeavor. Despite this, security could not be provided, and violent acts continued.

3.3.2.6 Lesson learned

The reconstruction in Afghanistan compared to the other case studies relatively have an unsuccessful reconstruction process due for several reasons, and highlights that prioritizing all groups of the conflict in reconstruction is an important element in a post-conflict reconstruction process. To develop strategies that meet perceived needs and aspirations, it is essential to gain as much knowledge and understanding about the country's material, social, and political realities as possible. Conflicts may be sparked by failed projects and unequal benefits. It is therefore imperative that funds are disbursed in synchrony with the growth in internal consensus and implementation capacity. Politics and social processes should not take precedence over physical and economic reconstruction. Secondly establishing the anti-corruption system and having legal economic revenue and developing a local-based economic renovation were important, however, clearly shows how these issues were ignored and this case shows that as a result leads to a failing reconstruction and the possibility of another conflict. And finally, in the case of Afghanistan, It is imperative to create mechanisms for civil representation and civil authority.

3.4 Kosovo

3.4.1 Background

The Kosovo War was one of the infamous wars of Yugoslav Succession, lasting 78 days during the 1990s within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Apart from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, the SFRY included multiple nationalities, including Kosovo and other minorities. Many republics and nationalities began to demand more ethnocentric autonomy after the fall of the Communists, despite most being multi-ethnic. Between 1991 and 1995, three wars were fought, followed by a fourth war in 1999. As a result of these four wars of Yugoslav succession, Kosovo disintegrated from the federation in the fourth war. It wasn't until 1999 that NATO endorsed military intervention and policing by the United Nations that the bloodshed came to an end. In March 1999, NATO launched a military operation against Serbia. Serbian government forces were completely withdrawn from Kosovo after a little over three months. As a result, UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK) was assigned the task of establishing institutions for self-government in Kosovo while administering the territory under the military protection of KFOR (a NATO-led peacekeeping force).

3.4.2 Impact of the conflict

For most of civilization's history, cities have been at the center of physical and political conflict, and their physical and ecological systems have been mostly targeted. In spite of this, since the turn of the century, the urban assault has dramatically escalated in terms of scale and technological sophistication and become a prominent target of warring sides. (Graham S. 2010). During the Balkan wars, Europe has witnessed one of the most devastating destructions of urban centers since the end of World War II. There were enormous physical losses in Kosovo alone as a result of the war homes of nearly 800,000 Kosovars/Albanians were destroyed.

3.4.3 Pristina

The capital city, Pristina/Prishtina, is the administrative and educational center of Kosovo. The city is located in the northern part of Kosovo, it's stretched into 7768 hectares of urban and suburban. The city is home to populations within the range of

163.000 (according to Public space profile Pristina 2017.) and 250.000 (according to ESI/IKS3). More than 60% of the population is under the age of 35 while only 7% are 65+, highly balanced in terms of gender with a male proportion of 50.05%. More than 25% of the population are considered daily migrants who reside in nearby cities, towns, and rural villages. Currently, the city is home for the largest University and major governmental institutions and international organizations, which makes Pristina the largest local economy by accounting for nearly 60 % of the investment share in the nation. This is due to the relative developments in the infrastructure, human capital, and developed market (Badivuku-Pantina, 2008.)

3.4.4 Post Conflict Urbanization in Pristina

The post-conflict period was characterized by a demographic shift towards the capital city. Similar to the cases of many post-conflict urban centers, the influx of returnee refugees who have fled their homes, Albanian residents of other parts of the then Yugoslavia, and rural-urban migration exacerbated the already war-torn city's public and social services. The demographic shift, lack of housing, and absence or ineffectiveness of regulatory institutions in the city facilitated major informal constructions within the urban area as well as uncontrolled sprawl of the city in all directions. Such developments highly impacted the urban landscape and livability conditions in the city, contributing to the degradation of hinterland agricultural land (UN Habitat 2017, Public space profile Pristina).

Demographic Dynamicity: The war has impacted the nation and its capital city Pristina in two ways. During and after the conflict many Kosovars, mainly those who can cross borders, migrated to western Europe which caused depopulation. On the other hand, after the conflict has ended Pristina experienced an influx of internal migration due to economic and other reasons. The pushed rural-urban and other less urbanized migration to Pristina caused high growth of the urban population which left the city with number of demographic challenges (Frank D. 2006., Gollopeni B. 2013.)

Spatial growth: Due to post-conflict forced urbanization and unpreparedness of Pristina (lack of skilled human resources and absence of administrative and regulatory framework) exacerbated by damage to the then existing urban planning documentation, informal settlement, and uncontrolled sprawl had become the reality of the city (ibid) In the five years of the post-conflict

period more than 15000 illegal buildings were constructed (Frank D. 2006.) This caused the current highly dispersed irregular spatial layout with very low-density development, the city expanded by more than 200% in the period 1999-2010 (Gollopeni 2013.). Consequently, the city became unable to provide land for the ever-growing housing, investment, infrastructure development, and other public services, which again creates more informal settlements, uncontrolled urban expansion, and loss of agricultural land.

Infrastructure and municipal services: Though the war relatively lasted The technological advancement of war equipment used during Kosovo's conflict by both sides including NATO's aerial involvement damaged the already poor urban infrastructure in the city. Despite the aid from the international community, the nation and city had financial and technical limitations to rebuild and develop new infrastructure; Moreover, the ever-growing shift in demography, uncontrolled urban sprawl, and informal settlement made the reconstruction infrastructure, including public space efforts dwarfed. One of the crucial problems for public service provision faced by the local administration, including the transport infrastructure, is the lack of available municipal land and the limited financial resources for land expropriation (Gollopeni 2013.).

Economical; It is quite clear, referring history of conflicts, that war fundamentally destabilizes economic activity and can be assumed that formal economic activities cease to exist by leaving the informal economy to flourish during conflict times. The economic background of Kosovo is considered to be one of the poorest in Europe, with an estimated GDP of 1,565 euros (2004). There were multiple factors that contributed to this. During the 1990s, their previous federation had a centralized command economy, poor economic policies, international sanctions, limited access to external trade and finance, and ethnic conflict severely impacted the economy. After the war (Frank D. 2006), according to the Family Budget Survey2 of 2002/03, 37% of the population lived below the poverty line (1,42 Euros per adult per day), while 15,2% lived below the extreme poverty line (0,93 Euros per adult per day). In the last decade, the major economic development has taken place in the sectors of trade, retail, and construction. Since 1999, there has been an explosion of private enterprise, primarily on a small scale. The industrial sector remains weak and the electric power supply remains unreliable, acting as a key constraint. The unemployment rate remains high, currently averaging between 40 and 50 percent. Many (mainly young) Kosovars were moving and were

moving from villages to towns and from towns to the capital as a result of a lack of employment. In Pristina, the only urban center with a growing tertiary economy was mainly due to the (temporary) presence of international organizations.

Socio-political; As a result of conflict, the social fabric and political structure were affected. “Urban Disintegration” is another growing phenomenon in Pristina and elsewhere, which involves the development of separate interurban districts that are independently urbanized, constructed, and administered by private companies. As a result of this type of development, there are deep social urban differences as well as territorial disintegration as a result of the creation of these new districts. People with very high incomes can only live in such neighborhoods! Suburbs like these are like “prisons”, divided from the majority of urban and surrounded by high walls. Individuals who live in such a neighborhood experience stress and dissatisfaction due to clashing cultures within and surrounding the neighborhood. The influx of (mainly young) people to cities and especially the capital was/is unprepared because of this fast and partly forced urbanization;

Urban management; As a result of communism and the centralized administration system, the central government was responsible for the majority of skilled professionals, manuals, policies, and regulations. Consequently, Pristina has suffered post-conflict due to the gap after the dissolution of the nation from the republic, even in terms of basic urban governance and management. Because of the low wages, some staff members of the planning department worked themselves as an architect after hours, which added to the risk of conflicting interests due to an extremely weak and almost absent public transport system, car traffic is increasing day by day, as well the traffic insecurity and traffic pollution.

A significant proportion of these problems can be attributed to the lack of a vigorous public administration

This lopsided situation can be explained by three main factors. Apart from the fact that the municipal administration has a significant advantage over the real estate industry (1), it is also important to highlight the lack of experienced professionals in civil administration, politics, and in commercial consultancy firms (2), and the possibly lacking societal support for the permitting and planning process (3).

3.4.5 Reconstruction strategies

Following end of Kosovo's conflict, In 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of UNMIK through Resolution 1244 (1999). As a result of the UNMIK mandate, the organization has been entrusted with the unprecedented responsibility of performing the full range of governmental functions in an entire territory and building from scratch institutions of self-government. (Bieber & Daskalovski, 2005.) As a result, right after the UN and NATO took over the interim administration of Kosovo, a major transition in socio-political and economic structure has been observed, the shift from a rather centralized (Character of Yugoslavia's Planned Economy) form of governance and planning to market-led system. The accumulated ethnic tension between Albanians and Serbs and western intervention seemed to abolish all traditions of urban planning and governance. Consequently, uncontrolled liberalism coupled with a loose governance system made the built environment vulnerable to informal development.

In the former Yugoslavia, since most of the Serb-dominated administration and regulatory institutions were hierarchical and centralized and Kosovo used to have minimal autonomy, the region's political, civil, and technical institutions and administration capacity were not in shape to function autonomously. Thus, UNMIK and the international donors and NGOs started the reconstruction of Kosovo by building institutions, building capacities, and constructing housing and critical infrastructures.

3.4.6 Institutional changes after the conflict

The UN established interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), which focuses on reconstruction, justice, and municipal services; and Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) for other aspects of local and state-level activities including urban planning (Boussauw, K.). Provision of Housing by reconstruction and restoring right in an inclusive manner was among the first engagements of UNMIKs, by establishing subsidiary committees and directorate offices (Minervini, 2002). Right after that, in 2000, The Kosovo Cadaster Agency was established, with the aim of digitalizing and reestablishing the land and property registration system, however, multiple factors delayed its outcome. (Cordial and Rsandhaug, 2009).

In 2003, under the financial and technical assistance of the international community and UN agencies, PISG started to introduce a local capacity-building program in the 2005-2007 Governance and Development Planning Programme (GDPP); along with that, regulations like the “law on spatial planning” were also developed, which included policies affecting the environment and spaces as non-reserved powers. In addition to that, UN-Habitat and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2002, initiated a joint program called Urban Planning and Management Programme (UPMP) to facilitate capacity-building initiatives within the Ministry for Environment and Spatial Planning.

3.4.7 Lesson learned

The unique aspect of Kosovo’s case presents a number of takeaways. With an unprecedented level of UNMIK and NATO involvement, Kosovo begins its socio-political and economic transition almost from scratch after its conflict. Moreover, with the help of the UN and the international community Kosovo undergoes several layers of change within its process of struggle for independence. With all its limitations, Kosovo has transformed its political economy, governance, and urban centers in the way Kosovars decided. The Kosovo case again the same as Rwanda shows that projects should base on local needs, not on the desires of Funders. As a result, according to reports of European cities in transition, the capital city has become a “principal metropolis” of the region with the potential of becoming a service hub in the highly competitive European economy.

3.5 Comparison assessment of post-conflict reconstruction strategies of the Three case references

The case study of Afghanistan shows that post-conflict reconstruction failed primarily because of corruption, flawed political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, and social reconstruction, as well as foreign aid’s too controlling role. Ethnic divisions among Afghans were a major cause of the conflict. It would have been necessary to carry out a thorough social reconstruction in order to rebuild Afghan unity and trust after the conflict. This, however, did not transpire. Social reconstruction should have been one of the first steps in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The sequence in which the reconstruction efforts were undertaken affected the result. Second, a lack of economic activity and large-scale drug trafficking contributed to the conflict, and economic re-

construction was unable to resolve these issues. A centralized political system under the control of one group of elites emerged from the political reconstruction. It is also critical to emphasize that power-sharing was not implemented, in spite of the fact that reconstruction theories recommended power-sharing initiatives and the inclusion of all citizens in the reconstruction process.

Additionally, foreign aid played a disproportionate role in Afghanistan. A number of reconstruction projects were undertaken without local consultation, which resulted in a limited sense of ownership among Afghans regarding their reconstruction. In addition, donors did not succeed in reconstructing Afghanistan because they conducted multiple reconstruction projects simultaneously, which Afghans were unable to continue after the donors had left. The country is still experiencing the same problems as in 2001, despite receiving tens of billions of dollars for reconstruction. Hence, as argued in the theoretical section, a large amount of development aid will not necessarily lead to the development of a country. Consequently, it is vital to pay attention to what kind of projects are implemented and how to maximize the effectiveness of financial aid.

As a result of all these factors, the Afghanistan case provides evidence that post-conflict reconstruction is susceptible to failure due to a centralized political system, rampant corruption, poor sequencing of social reconstruction, and, most notably, lack of local ownership.

Analogous to Afghanistan, a lack of economic opportunities and ethnic divisions caused Rwanda's civil war and genocide. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Rwanda's reconstruction has been more successful than Afghanistan's. Furthermore, after the end of the conflict, Rwanda placed a high priority on social reconstruction. Due to this, the unity of the nation became one of the major objectives of the reconstruction process. Additionally, political reconstruction was undertaken in addition to social reconstruction. Every Rwandan was included in the decision-making process through the creation of a decentralized democratic political system. Accordingly, both Hutu and Tutsi ex-combatants were represented in the government.

Contrary to Afghanistan, Rwanda took corruption seriously, and anti-corruption efforts were initiated. As a result, the level of corruption decreased. It can be argued that the reconstruction of the country has been positively impacted by all of these efforts. For post-conflict reconstruction, all cases showed a need for foreign financial aid.

Nevertheless, Rwanda and Kosovo have been able to increase their FDI share of their foreign aid inflows due to efficient reconstruction, which has reduced their need for ODA. In addition, Rwanda made progress from conflict to sustainable development. Both cases demonstrate Rwanda's successful reconstruction, which was accomplished through local ownership of the reconstruction process and a cooperative relationship with donors. Accordingly, post-conflict reconstruction is effective as long as the conflict-torn country owns the reconstruction process and donors collaborate with the reconstruction process. Moreover, the fact that social reconstruction was sequenced as a priority of reconstruction in Rwanda contributed to the success of the entire reconstruction effort. It is evident from the foregoing that Rwanda's reconstruction was successful due to a democratic, decentralized political system and anti-corruption efforts.

Overall, there are a few objectives that need to be addressed in order for post-conflict reconstruction to be successful in the future. To begin with, focusing on the causes of the conflict is crucial to the reconstruction process. Due to the fact that citizens usually have some grievances, a greater emphasis should be given to social reconstruction, and social reconstruction should be prioritized among the first efforts to reconstruct the country. As a result of social reconstruction, sustainable peace and national unity were created. Consequently, it is an important aspect of the reconstruction process. Second, as demonstrated in the case study of Afghanistan, corruption adversely impacts the reconstruction process. Hence, it is imperative to combat corruption in order to achieve a successful reconstruction.

Thirdly, donors should pay more attention to their role in reconstruction. If donors wish to ensure that ownership of the reconstruction is maintained in a conflict-affected country, they should take a cooperative rather than a controlling role. As a result of these suggestions, post-conflict reconstruction will be more efficient and sustainable.

Due to the nature of the conflict and contextual facts of Kosovo during the conflict, there was a political and administrative gap. Moreover, since Kosovo was in the socio-political process of independence the post-conflict reconstruction process could have posed difficulties. Thus, unlike Rwanda's and Afghanistan's cases, the case of Kosovo's post-conflict reconstruction presents a very unique experience in post-conflict reconstruction. The fact that the United Nations and NATO took over the majority of civil and military responsibilities respectively is

unprecedented. The UN's UNMIK and its other UN agencies' greater mandate to administer and build capacity during the post-conflict period gave a chance to smooth the transition. In addition to that most international, donors and financiers were able easily to collaborate, intervene and monitor the reconstruction process without bureaucratic delays and corruption like in Afghanistan.

All in all, though it is difficult to evaluate what could have been if the UN and NATO hadn't been involved in the post-reconstruction of Kosovo, the process of reconstruction was relatively smoother and faster than in other cases. Currently, Pristina is becoming a competitor as a hub city for service activities in the wider European market, aiming to become one of the "principal metropolises".

tial of becoming a service hub in the highly competitive European economy

Conclusion

In the lens of post-conflict urbanization and reconstruction, All three case study shows inherited contextual challenge and difference in the potential to mitigate it. Though the study might need further research on other unaddressed factors (their geopolitical location, cultural factors, and economy), the cases show relative experiences of post-conflict reconstruction and urbanization process. Moreover, the cases demonstrate the interdependence of social, political, and economic reconstruction; and how the priorities in addressing them can affect the overall process of reconstruction. On the other hand, all the cases showed the importance of financial assistance from the international community, however, miss management of aid and the destructive effects of corruption on the process of post-conflict reconstruction is also observed.



Image 6: The village of Melazat bears the signs of the Ethiopian army's sudden retreat from Mekelle, 15 miles to the east, on 28 June, as Tigrayan forces were fighting their way into the regional capital
Source: The Gardian | <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/gallery/2021/sep/13/retaking-mekelle-the-fight-for-tigray-in-pictures>

Chapter Four: Case Area Mekelle

In this chapter, the case area itself is analyzed with a brief assessment of pre-war official documents of policies and strategies, followed by a semi-structured interview with officials will be employed and triangulated by focused group interviews with residents, community representatives, and professionals; and experts' observation on the implication of the conflict and siege on spatial, social fabric, economic and political aspects in case of Mekelle city as a representation of major urban center in the region.

4.1 Pre-Conflict Context Over view

Ethiopia is a federation with a constitution of ten autonomous regional states, with eighty unique ethnic, cultural, and indigenous linguistic groups, and is the most populous landlocked country in the world. It is located in the horn of Africa and has a total population of 90 million (UNDP, 2015). Despite being the second-most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, it is the least urbanized. Nearly half of Ethiopia's Gross Domestic Product is derived from rain-fed agriculture. As a result of a military regime, Ethiopia implemented a number of successful strategies in the mid-1990s in order to promote economic growth and social progress and improve the well-being of its urban and rural populations. The Ethiopian economy has seen an average annual growth rate of 7.4 percent GDP during this period of reform (2004-2018). In addition, large government investments have been directed towards improving agricultural productivity as well as addressing the multiple needs of rural populations. As a result, between 2000 and 2016, improvements in national healthcare, education, infrastructure development, and poverty alleviation were witnessed. however, the unpreparedness of the central government for the ever-growing urban population (mainly the urban poor where unemployment is around 32% in the capital and secondary cities; and chronic housing shortage

according to UN-Habitat 70% of the urban population live in slums) coupled with diverse internal and external challenges, underserved and underrepresented growing generation of youth started to feel excluded; growing frequency, unmet expectations in quantity and quality of governance outputs across security, political, economic, and social sectors resulted in violence and growing manifestations of social protest which destabilizes the urban social and political order. In demand for economic and political reform, in 2016, Popular Public Protests in major urban areas of the two largest regional states broke out. Then after, the identity of a specific group (Tigriyan ethnicity which is considered the major ruling party's ethnic group) had been associated with economic, political, and social privileges and resulting in a heightened hatred of ethnic tension which led to conflict in many parts of the country. As a result of the violence against ethnic Tigrayans and their businesses in most regions of the federation, the majority of Ethnic Tigrayans fled back to Mekelle. This phenomenon caused demographic, economic, and sociopolitical changes in the city during that period. As a result, the influx of migration with the city's chronic deficiencies in housing, infrastructure, and municipal services caused challenges to the migrants and its residents. Subsequently, Mekelle experienced a relatively high influx of major urban-urban migration than any time before in its history. Following 2018 Ethiopia's reform, and prior experience of 2016's hate and ethnic-based violence very high number of Tigrayans have decided to relocate their residence and business to Mekelle. However, due to the conflict which happened afterward, the incidence and its implication are not studied and recorded.

Introduction and Background of the case area

Mekelle is the capital city of Tigray National Regional State, the northernmost first-order administrative entity of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia's administrative hierarchy, Mekelle is a "Special Zone" (second-order administrative entity) and comprises seven sub-cities. The fifth largest city in Ethiopia (after Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Adama, and Gondar), (Wilson, 2020) it is the economic, cultural, and political hub of northern Ethiopia. Historically, the region is home to one world's old civilizations, Deama't, and Axumit civilizations dating back to 4 century. The region has been the center of power for the Ethiopian empire and church for millennia. Since the 13 century, due to its location proximity to salt resources in the current Afar region, the city has long been a significant marketing and trading center

for the salt trade from the Danakil Depression to the Ethiopian Highlands. A few historical benchmarks regarding Mekelle,

- **Emperor Yohannes IV;** Mekelle, as part of Northern Ethiopia, had its peak during the late nineteenth century after Yohannes IV was crowned King during the late nineteenth century after Yohannes IV was crowned as King of Kings of Ethiopia and chosen Mekelle as the capital of his empire at that time for economic and military strategic reasons. During his reign, Mekelle had become an important religious, political and commercial center.
- **Emperor Minilik II;** In 1906, the political power shifted to Shoa (central part of Ethiopia) and the Mekelle had lost its capitalship, then after to Addis Ababa the current capital city following the fall of Emperor Yohannes IV.
- **Italian occupation;** It is (1936-1941), during the Italian occupation period, Mekelle had its first formal urban plan by Italian military engineers.
- **Emperor Haile Selassie I;** Though there were some efforts to continue with the Italian urban plan of the city; during this period the urban growth was stagnant for a number of socio-political reasons.
- **Military regime / authoritarian Derg government (1974-1991);** Due to political and ethnic divisions in Ethiopia, Tigray has been particularly neglected with respect to infrastructure improvement and government-led development projects. During the military (Dergue) period, the economic situation got worst. The city's economy almost collapsed, and rural-urban and urban-rural movement of people around the city became difficult due to the military barricades of the military junta completely paralyzing the exchange of goods and services between rural and urban and trade generally. This stagnated the economic situation of the city. The Military regime collapsed in Tigray in February 1989 and the TPLF occupied the abandoned capital of Mekele on 25 February.
- **After the fall of Dergue;** In the wake of the fall of the Dergue / military regime, Ethiopia established a new constitution and became a federation with a constitution of ten autonomous regional states, the ethnic federalism was established to

decentralize administration and economy to eighty unique ethnic, cultural and indigenous linguistic groups organized in nine regional states. It is then, Mekelle becomes the capital city of Tigray and starts to revive economically and culturally the northern block of Ethiopia.

The town is located at an elevation of 2,076 meters above sea level, at a latitude of 13° 29' N and a longitude of 39° 28' E. Despite its proximity to both subtropical highlands and semi-arid areas, its climate is tropical savanna. There are highs of 26.0° C in December and lows of 17.6° C in May and June. May and June have the highest mean temperature of 27° C, while December has the lowest mean temperature of 15° C. During the wet season of July and August, 705 mm of rainfall falls on 85 days of the year.

4.2 Pre-Conflict Urbanization in Mekelle

Mekelle has been one of the fastest-growing cities in Northern Ethiopia. Mekelle had a population of 96, 938 in 1994. The growth rate reached 215,914 by 2007 showing an increase of 122% (CSA, 2013). and In 2013, it increased to 313,332 with a 45% increase. Mekelle's population is estimated to grow by 5.5% annually by the Tigray Bureau of Urban Development in 2013. Since then it is expanding very rapidly, in 2016 it was estimated to be more than 415,000 with a 75% of increase in three years. Along with the natural population growth, together with the upgrading of all the infrastructures, has arrived at Mekelle in the last two decades. The socio-economic developments in the period have also attracted more people from rural and other smaller urban centers to Mekelle. According to (MCSP 2016.)

The following factors contribute to Mekelle's population dynamics:

- Change of boundaries: built-up areas that arose as a result of urban expansion and changes in political or administrative boundaries. For instance, recently 19 rural villages with an estimated population size of 95,530 have been annexed;
- Formal expansion of existing urban boundaries to incorporate nearby settlements, as a result of heavy demand for land for residential areas and establishment of manufacturing industries.
- Migration to Mekelle city (rural-urban migration), according to CSA (2007), the total of migrants that enter Mekelle city was estimated to be 113,030. This

indicates that almost 52.4% of the residents are migrants from different areas of origin and entered the city within the prior 10 years.

- Natural growth: TFR for Mekelle city has been estimated to be 3.9 in 1994 and 2.21 in 2007, which makes a decrease of 1.69 (CSA, 2007). On the other side, the mortality rate, according to CSA 2007, is 0.862 %.




Figure 7: Population growth of Mekelle From 1965-2007 showing how it was rapidly increasing prior to the conflict.




Figure 8 Evolution of Land use of Mekelle city from 1984-2014: Ayele A. Fenta (2017)

4.2.3 Challenges of Urbanization in Mekelle Prior to the conflict

Generally, urban centers and urbanization in developing countries are facing ever-growing complex challenges as the world itself is undergoing rapid change; the impact of the growing world population, globalization of market, climate change, and international politics becoming dominant in internal issues. Though the external issues will not be discussed here, however, it is important to note that the issues which will be discussed in the later part of this chapter are intrinsically connected and needs to be studied further. Similarly,

Ethiopia's urbanization is also affected by, regional, national and global factors. And during the last two decades, the country has been privileged by the merits and challenged by the demerits of what this century has brought. In parallel with rapid urbanization in Ethiopia, Mekelle has also experienced one of the highest economic development and urbanization in the country. However, the challenges are also evident that Ethiopia in general and Mekelle are experiencing from urbanization, demographic change, climate change, and economic transition. As these challenges are inherently intertwined, many studies suggest a comprehensive perspective is important to address them. According to (Ethiopia Urbanization Review a rigorous study prepared by World Bank), unpreparedness and passive response to Ethiopia's high urbanization and demographic transition posed exacerbating challenges. The study points, out that Ethiopia's urbanization has been short of meeting the employment, Housing, and infrastructure demands of the urban population. In return, These three demands have affected the social and political stability of the nation. Similarly, if not worse, Mekelle's rapid urbanization is also failing to meet its resident's demands.

- Mekelle has higher youth unemployment close to 40% (Arup 2016.) than the national average. Though, the reason behind such high unemployment needs further study; these are the most mentioned reasons by business owners and entrepreneurs, government's incentive to businesses, bureaucratic and lengthy process, corruption and lack of enabling infrastructures compare to the capital city.
- Inadequacy of infrastructure and urban services, Mekelle is suffering from a critical shortage of water supply and poor Sewer systems, unreliable electric power, lack, and poorly maintained road network, a major lack of pedestrian-friendly walkways and cycling paths, absence of public transport system, deprived drainage system, lack of institutional capacity to manage infrastructures and municipal services and lack of integration among offices in coordinating municipal services in the city.
- Lack of housing provision and poor quality of housing
- Mekelle is one of the major urban centers in Ethiopia with the highest cost of housing and land following Addis Ababa the capital city with a small margin. Considering a city with a high rate of unemployment and urban poverty, coupled with the absence of affordable housing made the city less inclusive to marginalized communities. As a result, most of the urban poor reside in peripheral settlements and urban villages. Mekelle's housing backlog is alarmingly mounting up to about 45,950 units (MCSPP 2016.)

Mekelle in inability to cope with its urbanization rate depends on three major aspects. (Ethiopia Urbanization Review 2015), discusses, in general, the drawbacks of Ethiopian urbanization policy and urban system which unable urban centers including Mekelle to proactively prepare and mitigate urbanization-related challenges and take advantage of its virtues. The review points out three essential urban institutions; Land Management, Municipal Governance, and Municipal Finance; and their relative position in the success and failure of urban centers in Ethiopia. These lenses are very important to see through the structural problems of urban centers and urbanization in Ethiopia, in a way it can give perspective to Mekelle's future challenges of urbanization.

Poor Land Management

A proper supply of land and management is fundamental to facilitate urbanization and grasp its fruits. urbanization processes became increasingly deficient and informal as increasing supply-demand gaps in land provision for the rapidly swelling urban populations led to uncontrolled urban growth through informal and often illegal developments. Mekelle's delivery of land for housing is far behind demand. According (MUSPP 2016.) the major causes for this were,

- Inconsistent and changing of directives on the modality of land delivery. The city does not take any effective and efficient remedial delivery strategies to cope with the housing deficit or plan.
- The city's projected land demand according to planning documents is inconsistent with the municipality's land delivery and implementation plan, rather the city has set its targets, based on its technical and financial capacities, regardless of the plan.
- Lack of financial and technical capacity of the city to deliver serviced land.
- Poor land management and administration. For instance, poor land information and property registration system.
- Lack of infrastructure provision for housing settlement areas especially in electric power.

The fact that the municipality has been unable to satisfy the demand for land and affordable housing, many residents and migrants have been pushed to informal housing options, particularly on the urban peripheries. This has been observed during ethnic Tigriyan origin fled Eritrea (during the Ethio-Eritrean war in 2009) migrated to Mekelle and settled informally in 'Gefih Ger-eb' peripheral village south of Mekelle. However, the regional government

deemed 1338 housing units, illegal and evicted them In 2011. This practice of forceful eviction continued in ‘Dingur’ and ‘Romanat’ informal settlements.



Image 7: Some remaining parts of the demolished houses at ‘Gefeh Gereb’ southern side of Mekelle. Eviction of the informal settlement of forced migrants of ethnic Tigriyans due to conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2009.



Image 8: ‘Dingur’ settlement south side of Mekelle, Another force full eviction informal settlement of forced migrants of ethnic Tigriyans during 2016’s protest in Ethiopia’s Oromo and Amhara regional states.

Lack of decentralized Municipal Governance

By principle, the Ethiopian governance system has three tiers of the constitution, Federal, Regional, and Urban Local Government (ULG). However, by practice, the federal government and regional government are the ones with determining financial, regulatory, and legislative power respectively. As a result, ULGs like Mekelle, regardless of their contextual challenges and potential are obligated to centrally developed approach by the feder-

al institutions. Overall, local governments lack autonomy and the capacity to manage their human resources, land, resources, operating practices, and organizational structure, as well as their municipal finance and revenue streams.

Municipal Finance

In order to render municipal infrastructure and services to their residents' municipalities are expected to generate revenue. On the contrary, in the case of Ethiopia, from total revenue collected at the Urban Local Government level (Mekelle City), 84% goes to the federal and state, and the remaining 16 % is municipal. This left the municipality with very limited resources to address its local challenges. In addition, every ULGs are tied to inflexible proclamations and regulation of municipal finance systems which are developed centrally by the federal government (mainly MUDHCo, in concert with MoFED) and redirected by the regional government. In general, the current financial capacity and administration system disable municipalities'/ULGs' to mitigate their contextual challenges; which defies the relevance of their role to the process of urbanization within a decentralized governance structure. In order to assess Mekelle's vulnerability to shocks, one has to see where it suffered the most.

4.3 Post-Conflict Urbanization in Mekelle

Introduction

Since the start of the war in Tigray, Mekelle, the Capital city of the region, has been an essential element in the conflict. Since both sides consider Mekelle as the Political gravity center, there has been tremendous pressure on the city and its inhabitants. Though there was relatively less active conflict than in other parts of the Tigray region Mekelle suffered from multiple aerial bombardments and artillery attacks. Its critical industrial sites, infrastructure, and residents have been targeted and sometimes were collateral. But still, it can be considered a much less direct victim of the ongoing two years conflict relatively to other parts. This is due to a number of factors; since the city housed several international NGOs and journalists; its visibility and connectivity to the international community; its assumed relevance and political acceptance of warring parties. Thus, the city became safe haven for a number of internally displaced people from many urban and rural area which were fleeing the conflict areas, which resulted highest ever

influx of demographic shift the city has ever experienced. The demographic shift coupled with unmet urbanization demand poses an unprecedented challenge to the city. Mekelle's future post-conflict urbanization challenges and proactively preparing strategies to mitigate will depend on understanding the situation. In order to have a clearer understanding of post-conflict urbanization characteristics in Mekelle, six lenses have been developed to frame the discussion and comparatively assess post-conflict urban challenges in Mekelle city. After reviewing the literature, the three carefully selected case and unstructured interview, and discussion with residents of Mekelle city the following lenses has been chosen to model the post-conflict urbanization trend; Demographic shift; Spatial implication; infrastructure, and service; economy; socio-cultural and political; urban governance.

Demographic shift

In almost all cases studied (Kigali, Kabul, and Pristina), and even from the broader literature review undertaken (Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2006., Ubongabasi E. 2018), the demographic trends in post-conflict urban centers show higher and consistent increase later which leads to pushed urbanization. In line with this, the two-yearlong Tigray conflict shows a similar urbanization trend in its major urban centers in regard to pushed migration during and after the active armed conflict and ongoing 12 months of siege. Since, most parts of the war took place in the countryside, pushing the rural population from livelihood to urban centers in search of a place of refuge for relative security as (Beall and Goodfellow 2014) stated in the case of the Angolan and Congolese civil war. Thus, the impact it had on major urban centers is easily observable. In General, due to the siege, most people are not able to migrate abroad or to neighboring regions, rather a handful of urban centers are housing almost all internally displaced people, estimated to be over 1.2 million. Such influx of IDPs if not managed properly, rural-urban migration is a potential driver of grievances and opportunities for violent mobilization.

The dispersion of internally displaced people across urban centers within the sieged region is determined by multiple factors, according to discussions with experts from the IDP centers; safety and distance from the conflict areas, in the absence of proper transportation proximity of destination, access to humanitarian aid, presence of relatives in the city, and cities opportunity to a job and economic activity. Accordingly, some of the towns, such as 'Shire', are accommodating IDPs from the nearby urban centers and villages which are cur-

rently occupied by the other warring parties, as result, the city has now doubled its population from nearly 250000 to more than half a million. In the case of Mekelle, the region's capital is now accommodating close to 300,000 IDPs (according to city administration reports), which would equal half of its estimated population before the war. These by themselves have brought unprecedented challenges both for the urban centers and their residents.

On the other hand, due to the deteriorating living condition in a blockaded substantial number of business people and skilled professionals along with many migrants are fleeing Mekelle and Tigray regions to neighboring regions and elsewhere. This 'depopulation' is partly objective of the other warring side, and sometimes they are facilitating in order to drain skilled professionals and business people from the city. As a consequence, the region in general and Mekelle are being depopulated of its important members of its community. Which will lead to a critical shortage of skilled professionals in healthcare, education, and other sectors, as well as business.

The spatial implication, in the wake of conflict generally cities expand or shrink as a result of pushed migration or depopulation. However, regardless of the high demographic shift cities' spatial growth can have different nature as it can be affected by a number of factors, including preparedness of the city, existing land management and administration, political, cultural, and physical nature of the urban centers.

At the moment Mekelle city and its annexed villages have become home to more than 300,000 immigrants, which is closer to half of its population. In a try to curve the housing crisis in the city, the city administration has transformed industrial shades, schools, and under-construction public buildings into make-shift shelters for displaced people. However, because of multiple reasons mainly security and privacy, there is a significant number of IDPs who are encroaching on religious facilities, public buildings, and open spaces.

However, regardless of the effort made, the lack of IDP centers coupled with already challenged housing provision in the city, the influx of migrants has become beyond Mekelle's control. Owing to this, and the absence of governmental institutions, the marginalized urban poor and land speculators in the city are informally settling in most of the annexed urban villages. Similar to the case of Pristina during the post-conflict period, the situation in Mekelle is leading to signs of informal settlement, usurpation of public-private property, and urban sprawl.

Which will significantly make regularization and infrastructure provision expensive and difficult for the municipality.

Infrastructure and municipal services,

In a deliberate and sometimes as collateral, most contemporary conflicts end up obliterating infrastructure inside urban centers and connecting to other parts of the country. As also confirmed in all case studies and focus group discussions; Mekelle's reality during the conflict and siege is not different. Thus, since the start of the conflict on the 4th of November 2020 all apparatuses of the region have become a target of all warring parties. Mekelle's urban and connecting infrastructure to the region and world have been deliberately targeted during the first seven-month active war in the region. To its worst possibility, during the siege, with an intention to paralyze the city and the region, all centralized infrastructure, including all transport, electricity, telecommunication and all roads remained shut down for residents of the city and the region. Mekelle's municipal services have stopped due to a lack of fuel and salary for its employees, and even the water supply system has been compromised due to lack of power and being understaffed.

Unlike most conflicts, this war has affected every level of society equally, making its impact on the city unique due to the siege and the situation affecting the citizens equally, lacking access to communication, banking, medical care, education, food, and Everyday use Items. Despite the dreadful aspects of the absence of fuel for critical services, like ambulances, electric generators in hospitals, and other emergency needs, due to the inaccessibility of private and public



Image 9: A secondary school in Mekelle, Tigray Region, which currently hosts 8,000 IDPs. Photo: IOM Ethiopia 2021
Source:



Image 10: People displaced by the recent Tigray conflict are pictured in crowded conditions at a makeshift camp for the displaced in a building in Shire, located in the northern region, on Feb. 23. (International Rescue Committee/The Associated Press)



Image 11 - CNN Shelters at a newly installed IDP camp in Mekelle in June.



Image 12: Children play in front of a house that was damaged during the fightings that broke out in Ethiopia's Tigray region, in the village of Bisober, on December 9, 2020
Source: Vice news



Image 13: Children look at books in the library of an elementary school that was damaged during the fightings that broke out in Ethiopia's Tigray region, in the village of Bisober. – AFP- AFP



Image 14: Youth affected by the war.
Source: Fitsum Brhane , Mekelle 2022

vehicular transportation, walking and cycling have become a trend on the main streets of Mekelle. But still, anyone can observe the city's pedestrian and cycling infrastructure is completely lacking.

Economy

Though there is a lack of quantitative data on how the city, region, and its residents' economic activities are affected due to the conflict, there is consensus on how nearly all citizens lost their businesses, 12 months' salary, and their savings. Different range of industries, once the largest employers and economic actors in the city and region were prime targets of the multi-layered attack. Almost all public and presumed party and government-related factories were looted and destroyed; Many private and public assets including cars, machineries, and raw materials were robbed or destroyed mainly by the armed forces and local gangs as a result of the power vacuum created during the conflict. Financial institutions have halted all services in the region, leaving the whole population without banking services and denied access to their savings. Complete blackout of banking, communication, electricity and severe mobility dysfunctionality because of fuel shortage left the regional economy in an unprecedented crisis. The economic and human resource loss during this war will leave reverberating scar on the city's economy and will be implicated in the municipality's revenue for years to come. As discussed in the pre-conflict urbanization challenges in Mekelle, the city's inadequate municipal finance will be extremely exacerbated which results in disruption of municipal and public services.

Socio-cultural and political,

Though, the very first attack was intended to destabilize the social fabric, all forms of government, and social institutions. Tigray's distinctive and high-context culture withstand the challenge, the social fabric remained stronger even in such times of conflict and despair. However, Mekelle as a city with more than 600,000 people has been a much more diverse city than the other towns in Tigray, the imminent displacement and overflow of migrants, which is close to half of its population, have brought diversity into the city. Unlike any time before residents of the city are helping each other, and communities have stood together against the siege in solidarity with their nation and community. In most neighborhoods, local communities have started to farm in their backyards, open spaces, and vacant areas to tackle the orchestrated starvation by the siege.

Regardless of the inexistence of all Government's financial and urban security structures, all tiers of regional administration are mobilizing the community in different activities. In the absence of municipal services, communities are taking care of their neighborhood's security, humanitarian aid distribution, and solid waste collection.

However, considering the youth majority, the economic crisis and dispersal of arms in the hands of youth as a result of the civil conflict pose critical security and safety issues. Due to that, urban violence and Crimes are on a rise; such crimes are causing many injuries and deaths (according to residents of the city). News of such incidences is causing insecurity, discomfort, and fragmentation of the social fabric. In addition to that, desperation, stress, and hopelessness is mounting among the majority of the youngest population exasperating the drinking culture even more. Moreover, Smoking has now become common, and a larger number of youngsters are becoming the future burden of the community.

Urban management

Though the municipality started to partially resume some of its activities in the last couple of months, it can be said that the municipality is currently dysfunctional. Firstly, the municipality itself was a target, with the aim to destabilize the City and incite civic conflict and shake the social order, warring parties and local collaborators damaged critical municipal documenters, residents' tenure documents, and other important files in the municipality and all levels of sub-city administrations. Secondly, most of its staff either left or are underpaid and functioning partially. This resulted in a number of gaps that will impose recurring challenges; the lack of urban land management, even in such time, the emer-

gence of the informal settlement will have high consequences and expensive to correct; public health and environmental degradation from unmanaged solid waste and sewerage.



Image 15: In the absence of reconstruction programmes for their destroyed city, the civilians in Raqqa begin repairing their houses and removing debris from the streets. Credit: Aboud Hamam
Source : Political Economy and Governance in Syria' conference in December 2018.

Chapter Five:

Conclusion and Discussion

To achieve sustainable post-conflict development, one must ensure a successful post-conflict reconstruction. For a war-torn country to achieve long-term development and peace, it needs a comprehensive reconstruction strategy. Reconstruction theories suggest that post-conflict countries should engage in political-economic-security-and social reconstruction. Moreover, since conflict-torn countries tend to suffer from high levels of fragility, foreign financial and technical assistance is essential to the rebuilding process. Despite the fact that theories that suggest how to make reconstruction successful exist, some reconstruction processes still fail. In this thesis, the success of post-conflict reconstruction is examined through an analysis of the post-conflict reconstruction theories and through different case studies. In its theoretical part, this thesis proposes a few hypotheses of why different reconstruction processes are successful. In particular, these hypotheses were that the reconstruction strategy was complex, the projects were arranged in sequence and foreign aid played an over-controlling role. In order to evaluate these hypotheses and the validity of the reconstruction theories, this thesis studied Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Kosovo's reconstruction strategies.

Researches in this special issue demonstrate that urbanization is a highly political process in an environment of instability and institutional fragmentation. In this regard, spatial perspectives of urban land, political mobilization of urban identities, and institutional diversity of urban institutions are useful for understanding how conflict dynamics and urbanization interact. Beal & Goodfellow (2013). Understanding these facets of violent megacities, state formations, identity politics, and forced displacement is crucial for applying an urban approach to humanitarian or policy-oriented conflict transformation mechanisms. Cities must be viewed as labo-

ratories of change where urbanization and conflict dynamics are intertwined. (ibid) In addition, while the cities can be a haven of safety during times of conflict, these areas are also often particularly vulnerable to the emergence of 'civic conflict' due to war. Cities are not naturally violent places, but they are vulnerable to continuing instability due to the pressures created by rapid urbanization. The assumption that urban populations will not be integrated into institutionalized politics is often misguided, leading to a failure to integrate them. Beal & Goodfellow (2013) also argued that a city's management of urbanization and growth requires both autonomy and sustained support from the central government. Nevertheless, if local autonomy is high but the center is weak, as in Goma, it is obvious that urban service delivery challenges will be difficult to meet. Kigali, however, lacks the autonomy to make its own decisions in the presence of strong central support, which compromises the city government's ability to respond locally. As a result of exacerbated tensions related to previous civil wars, urban spaces have a limited capacity to defer or suppress latent conflicts. In the wake of civil wars and post-war transitions, urban challenges require institutional innovation and coordinated strategies at the national and local levels. Parnell and Simon argue that urban policies and national urbanization are critical elements as part of planning for development. However, they are often overlooked. And in times of Post-civil war, these policies become more important. In post-conflict contexts, however, they are likely to remain absent because they believe urban challenges are only temporary or are not a priority. While policy coordination is one of the crucial prerequisites of adequate post-war urban stability, politics is another (even more problematic) factor. The key to moderate a broad range of political, ethnic, and socioeconomic interests in post-conflict urban spaces is to institutionalize political processes (Bollens 2007: 11).

Furthermore, post-conflict urban growth requires national and local leaders to work together in order to institutionalize mechanisms for residents to demand services from the state.

5.2 Reconstruction Strategies

It reveals that state-building, economic, security, and social reconstruction are the main goals of post-conflict reconstruction, each of which has multiple sub-strategies. Reconstruction projects seem to have a wide range of success, possibly due to many factors. The first reason for variation may be due to the dif-

ferent sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The variability of success may be explained by differences in sequencing since the reconstruction process is implemented in various ways. Secondly, it may be the case that the success of reconstruction projects varies because the strategies used for reconstruction are complex. It would be logical for the country to return to development if the focus were on the leading causes and consequences of the conflict. Alternatively, if different parties undertake their reconstruction projects without coordination, the reconstruction of the state could fail. This results in excessive complexity of the strategies used, which in turn may lead to failures in post-conflict reconstruction. Lastly, the success of post-conflict reconstruction may vary because donors play a significant role in these countries' reconstruction policies. Hence, donor governments ignore conflict-torn countries' agendas and do not consider the local opinion when giving aid. In this situation, local communities do not possess ownership of their development, which will lead to unsustainable development in the long run.

5.3 Based on the case reference analysis and theoretical framework have set a few priorities that need to be considered during the reconstruction period.

1. Social reintegration and justice are the main reconstruction strategies that help society move forward as one. Bringing people together and initiating a better democratic and inclusive system.
2. Ownership and initiation of a reconstruction project should be given to locals, and donors should have a supportive role, not an ownership role. Creating mechanisms that will allow the citizens to learn and develop skills and also be part of the policy in reconstruction. Therefore, for the reconstruction to be sustainable and more effective, the people should be involved and have an ownership stake in it.
3. Involving private sectors in post-conflict reconstruction is essential for having a successful post-conflict reconstruction or smooth transition towards development, however, one has to pay attention to the types of private sectors and their intentions. And the state has to support the positive, pro-poor aspects of the post-conflict private sector and has to tackle the negative, predatory aspect of the post-conflict private sector.
4. Post-conflict Privat Sectoral Development, therefore, involves working with a private sector that is characterized by high levels of informality, and

which suffers from the presence of predatory elements. Understanding the post-conflict private sector, and the way in which it differs from the private sector in other contexts is crucial for successful Privat Sectoral Development programming.

5. The cities or generally a country has to have a vision or goal that leads to sustainable development. Post-conflict reconstruction is a complex context that needs to be assessed carefully and pre-requisite and has to follow a strict prioritization.
6. Urban securitization' is an important concept when dealing with post-conflict city developments in order to attract investments, humanitarian aid, and donors and have a secured or healthy urban day-to-day life for the society.
7. The regulation of and utilization of all resources will contribute to the speedy reconstruction of the fragmented economy after conflict. However, the exploitation of natural resources is another sector that often contributes to the war economy. These valuable natural resources can be exploited for quick gains, and control over them can be a source of conflict. (Mierke 2006,). The unregulated private sector is not confined to illicit sectors and natural resources. Additionally, entrepreneurial activity in any sector can threaten peace if it is conducted in a way that intensifies horizontal inequalities. This exploitation behavior of the private sector will compromise long-term peace if it increases existing social divisions and enables those with power to exploit the poor. (Naudé 2007.)
8. Resolving post-conflict housing problems.

5.4 Important elements to have a smooth transition or postconflict reconstruction

- Strengthen urban resilience in conflict-affected cities
- Adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on the secondary cities in the region, in conflict-affected areas as a fundamental principle in order to balance migration and rapid urbanization in the capital city.
- Building urban resilience is crucial to equip the urban centers for, endure, and recover from future stresses and shocks, especially those relating to urban conflict and violence. Using urban resilience frameworks, humanitarian, development, and peace and security actors can jointly develop cross-sectoral, multi-faceted approaches and bridge the humanitarian and development sectors.

- It is crucial to address existing inequalities (economic, political, cultural, gender, security, justice, social services, etc.) that can have spatial dimensions and cause violence and conflict. Inequalities are a major contributor to urban conflict and violence, so reducing them is an effective way to build resilience.
- Be sure to involve all parties especially the ones who can be prone to urban violence and conflict.
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- The connection between sustainable urbanization, violence, and conflict must be more thoroughly understood and empirically supported.
-
- Invest in context-based academic research to better comprehend urban violence and conflict.
- Develop standard metrics and data regarding violence and conflict. Data regarding Tigray are scant and inconsistent.
- A multidisciplinary analysis involving urban, academic, humanitarian, peace-building, environmental, and development actors is required to address the causes of urban violence and conflict and to foster an environment that supports sustainable urbanization.
- In order to strengthen social cohesion, social planning and spatial planning should be integrated. Recognize urban planners as important stakeholders to support urban governance and recovery processes.
- Recognize that cities need support for inclusive and participatory decision-making systems and that humanitarians must collaborate with city authorities and community members.
- Ensure neighborhood-level data disaggregation in order to comprehend inner-city dynamics and horizontal inequality patterns in order to determine the most appropriate responses.
- Ensure that state and local governments have efficient conflict resolution mechanisms.
- The policy and research communities should ensure that they analyze non-metropolitan urban spaces in relation to urban violence and conflict and more.
- Assessing the environmental risks of conflicts should be a standard element of post-conflict reconstruction plans, and the international community should allocate enough expertise, capacity, and resources to address this issue.
- Following the armed conflict, donors, humanitarian organizations, and other relevant actors should incorporate the broader effects of conflict on the envi-

ronment, public health, and development into reconstruction plans.

- Utilize urban resilience as a guiding principle when implementing strategies that will ultimately assist the city in preparing for, enduring, and recovering from future shocks and stresses, with a particular emphasis on building resilience in the face of urban conflict and violence.
- Ensure urban population inclusion and participation in its response plans.
- Adopt a global perspective. To improve the preparedness and resilience of cities.
- Promote accountability toward all urban residents, regardless of citizenship, particularly those who are most marginalized, underrepresented, or displaced by violence and conflict.
- In crisis contexts, in cities impacted by large movements of migrants and refugees, expedite the implementation of a resilience-based approach to urban development that supports both displaced and affected host communities.
- Integrate spatial and social planning to enhance social cohesion. Recognize urban planners as key stakeholders with mobilization potential when developing programs to support urban governance and recovery.
- Recognize the significance of effective grievance mechanisms to the legitimacy of state and local governments.

5.5 Strengthen urban resilience in conflict-affected cities

- Building urban resilience is crucial to equip the urban centers for, endure, and recover from future stresses and shocks, especially those relating to urban conflict and violence. Using urban resilience frameworks, humanitarian, development, and peace and security actors can jointly develop cross-sectoral, multi-faceted approaches and bridge the humanitarian and development sectors.
- It is crucial to address existing inequalities (economic, political, cultural, gender, security, justice, social services, etc.) that can have spatial dimensions and cause violence and conflict. Inequalities are a major contributor to urban conflict and violence, so reducing them is an effective way to build resilience.
- Be sure to involve all parties especially the once who can be prone to urban violence and conflict
- .

5.5 Further Direction

A Study on human skill development and private sector development:

In post-conflict countries, the development of human skills and the private sector could contribute to the construction of a sustainable reconstruction, allowing urban centers to escape the vicious cycle of conflict and poverty.

Individual entrepreneurs and businesses are bolstered by systemic improvements to market or sectoral structures and the reform of the business-friendly environment and economic institutions. All of these diverse forms of intervention seek to alleviate poverty by fostering the growth of a robust and autonomous private sector.

This objective is of utmost importance in post-conflict situations due to the central role played by economic factors in both the initiation and maintenance of conflicts. There must be immediate, tangible benefits of peace – a “peace dividend” - in the short term. These benefits must persist over the medium and long term, promoting stability and reconciliation among factions and discouraging a return to violence.

Appendix

Experts observation and lessons learned from Tigray's Conflict impact in Mekelle city and its future.

Mekelle through the conflict and siege

- What is your understanding of the conflict? What are the unique futures of the conflict?
- How did the conflict affect the city and its habitants?
- How did the city reacted or performed during the conflict and siege? And why the city reacted that way?

Mekelle's vulnerability to shocks and the reason behind it

- What makes Mekelle city vulnerable? What are the permanent challenges the city is expecting from the conflict and siege?
- Was it possible for the city to avert the humanitarian crisis that happened because of the conflict and siege?
- How is the city preparing for the future after the conflict ends? What are the possible scenarios for the city and its habitants?

The way forward to

- What are the lessons you have learnt? What measures the city should take to mitigate future similar or other shocks ?
- The way forward to reconstruction and rehabilitation towards resilient and adaptable Mekelle?

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نبذة مختصرة

بعد حرب أهلية دامت عقدين في مطلع القرن الحادي والعشرين ، كان الاقتصاد الإثيوبي المسيطر من أسرع الدول نموًا ، مع متوسط نمو اقتصادي مزدوج الرقم. نتيجة لهذا التحفيز الاقتصادي، تم بناء التحضر والبنى التحتية الضخمة بسرعة وبقوة لتحفيز وتسهيل المزيد من النمو الاقتصادي في المنطقة. ومع ذلك ، في 4 نوفمبر 2020 ، تصاعد التوتر بين الحكومة الفيدرالية لإثيوبيا ودولة تيغراي الإقليمية إلى حرب أهلية واسعة النطاق تضم عدة جهات إقليمية (إريتريا والصومال والإمارات العربية المتحدة). بدأ الاقتصاد والسياسة المستقران على ما يبدو في مواجهة صدمات متعددة بسبب القوى الداخلية والخارجية ، وأبرزها الحوادث غير المتوقعة (كما أطلق عليها نسيم اسم „البجعة السوداء“، واحتمال وقوع أحداث غير متوقعة)؛ بدأ هذا بمطالب الدول الأعضاء والمراكز الحضرية المتزايدة باستمرار لمزيد من الاستثمار من الحكومة المركزية وتمثيل مجموعتهم العرقية في السلطة المركزية.

ومن ثم ، فإن هذه الأطروحة ستحاول في المقام الأول النظر في تأثير مثل هذه الصدمات المتوقعة وغير المتوقعة في المنطقة وحالات أخرى مماثلة ؛ وتقييم ما جعل الدول والمراكز الحضرية عرضة للخطر في أوقات الصراع والأوبئة والتغير المناخي وغير ذلك من الأزمات العالمية أو المحلية؛ ما هي عواقب هذه الأزمة والنهج للتخفيف منها في دراسات الحالة الدولية. أخيرًا ، ستركز الدراسة على إعادة الإعمار بعد الصراع وتطوير استراتيجيات أكثر مرونة وقوة من الصدمات للنمو الحضري والإقليمي المستقبلي (أطلق عليها نسيم „ضد الهشاشة“، وهي الأشياء التي تنمو من الفوضى). استنادًا إلى دراسات الحالة المختلفة والأطر النظرية، للمساعدة في تطوير استراتيجية هي الأنسب لحالة تيغراي. مع الأخذ في الاعتبار التهديدات والفرص المستقبلية الناشئة عن الصراع والصدمات المحتملة الأخرى.

سيستعرض الجزء الأول من البحث طبيعة وترابط الصراع والتحضر والمدن الخارجة من الصراع والدروس المستفادة في إعادة تطويرها ؛ مزيد من الدراسة للنزاع الذي سببه الصراع وصدمات الأزمات الأخرى واستراتيجيات الصمود المعاصرة. في الجزء الثاني، ستكون الورقة دراسة حالة استكشافية في ثلاثة سياقات مختلفة؛ بدءًا من قضية جنوب الصحراء الكبرى في كينغالي (رواندا) وقضية كابول في الشرق الأوسط (أفغانستان)، سنتبعها قضية بريشتينا من دولة كوسوفو الواقعة في شرق أوروبا. وأخيرًا، تضيق الدراسة نطاق التحقيق إلى مدينة ميكيلي باعتبارها مدينة أساسية في منطقة تيغراي وأكبر مستفيد من النازحين داخليًا. استنادًا إلى بيانات ثانوية من المكاتب الحكومية والمكاتب غير الحكومية وتقارير وكالات الأمم المتحدة والأوراق الأكاديمية حول النزاع وعواقبه على المنطقة والمراكز الحضرية وسكانها. يبدأ الجزء الثاني بتقييم موجز للوثائق الرسمية للسياسات والاستراتيجيات قبل الحرب، متبوعًا بمقابلة شبه منظمة مع المسؤولين سيتم توظيفها وتثليتها من خلال مقابلات جماعية مركزة مع السكان وممثلي المجتمع والمهنيين؛ وملاحظة الخبراء حول تداعيات الصراع والحصار على النسيج المكاني والاجتماعي والاقتصادي والسياسي في حالة مدينة ميكيلي باعتبارها تمثيلًا لمركز حضري رئيسي في المنطقة. أخيرًا، بعد تحليل البيانات الأولية والثانوية، ستختتم الأطروحة بتوصيات حول إعادة التطوير بعد الصراع من خلال استراتيجيات مقاومة الصدمات

إقرار

هذه الرسالة مقدمة في جامعة عين شمس وجامعة شوتجارت للحصول على درجة العمران المتكامل والتصميم المستدام. إن العمل الذي تحويه هذه الرسالة قد تم إنجازه بمعرفة الباحث سنة ...

هذا ويقر الباحث أن العمل المقدم هو خلاصة بحثه الشخصي وأنه قد اتبع الأسلوب العلمي السليم في الإشارة إلى المواد المؤخذه من المراجع العلمية كل في مكانه في مختلف أجزاء الرسالة..

وهذا إقرار مني بذلك،،،

التوقيع:

الباحث: مأكدا درار عكلم

التاريخ: ٢٠٢٢/١٠/٠٨

التنمية في مرحلة ما بعد الصراع، نحو استراتيجيات التحضر المستدام

التحضير للاستراتيجيات المحتملة لإعادة الإعمار في مرحلة ما بعد الصراع
لميكل من خلال التحقق من الحالات الموجودة ومجموعات الأدوات ووضعها
في سياقها

رسالة مقدمة للحصول على درجة الماجستير في العمران المتكامل والتصميم المستدام

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الدراسات العليا

أجيزت الرسالة بتاريخ:
موافقة مجلس الجامعة .../.../...

ختم الإجازة
موافقة مجلس الكلية .../.../...

جامعة عين شمس



جامعة شتوتغارت



MM/DD/YYYY



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من خلال التحقق من الحالات الموجودة ومجموعات الأدوات ووضعها في سياقها

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