Paradigms of Development in Cairo
Mobilization Patterns of Civil Society Organisations

A Thesis submitted in the Partial Fulfillment for the Requirement of the Degree
of Master of Science in Integrated Urbanism and Sustainable Design
by
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(2013)
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Disclaimer

This dissertation is submitted to Ain Shams University, Faculty of Engineering and University of Stuttgart, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning for the degree of Integrated Urbanism and Sustainable Design.

The work included in this thesis was carried out by the author in the Year 2013.

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

31/07/2013

(Ebtihal Mohamed Zakaria Rashad Abbas)

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Abstract

The fast pace with which urbanisation increases in Cairo adds to the severity of its urban planning issues. Despite the excessive centralization, lack of transparency, minimal urban planning intervention, communication failures between the various administrative institutions and a doubled population since the 1960s, Cairo does continue to function. Civil society has become increasingly important as an actor in harnessing urbanisation and finding solutions to poverty and urban problems, partly an effect of neoliberal reforms over the past decades that have decreased areas of state responsibility in dealing with urbanisations issues and have left more space for private actors and civil society organizations to intervene.

Definitions, roles and contexts for civil societies are changing dynamically in developing countries and countries in transition. The thesis will explore the causes and the evolution of different paradigms in the state-society relations that are active in shaping the urban environment in Cairo and their mobilization patterns, focusing mainly on the civil society's role in harnessing urbanisation issues. One of the consequences neoliberalism and urbanisation is the increased demand on service provision which was particularly felt by poor people in urban areas who were unable to pay for much needed services due to the withdrawal of state from its role in providing services. The thesis will focus on a neighbourhood in Cairo, Ard Al Liwa‘ that has been subjected to rapid urbanisation in the 1970’s and will analyse three different micro-projects for civil society to illustrate the processes for dealing with the shortage of service provision in the neighbourhood and represent how the city is shaped according to everyday’s needs by its residents especially post 25 January 2011 revolution.

Civil society, state, neoliberalism, urbanization, service provision, processes
Contents

Chapter 1  | Introduction ............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2  | Literature Review .................................................................... 7
  2.1. Neoliberalism .................................................................................... 8
  2.2. Neoliberal Urbanisation ................................................................. 11
  2.3. Neoliberal State and Civil Society .................................................... 15
  2.4. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 24

Chapter 3  | Research Methodology .................................................................. 27
  3.1. Research Strategy ............................................................................. 27
  3.2. Case Study Selection ....................................................................... 28
  3.3. Research Tools ................................................................................. 29
  3.4. The Methodology .............................................................................. 31

Chapter 4  | State & Civil Society in Egypt  | Urbanomics Timeline .... 35
    4.1.1. Role of the State ................................................................................. 40
    4.1.2. Role of Civil Society ........................................................................... 42
  4.2. Economic Liberalisation: 1974 – 1990 ........................................... 43
    4.2.1. Role of the State ................................................................................. 45
    4.2.2. Role of Civil Society ........................................................................... 50
    4.3.1. Role of State ....................................................................................... 54
    4.3.2. Role of Civil Society ........................................................................... 56
    4.4.1. Role of State ........................................................................................ 57
    4.4.2. Role of Civil Society ........................................................................... 60
    4.5.1. Role of State ....................................................................................... 62
    4.5.2. Role of Civil Society ........................................................................... 65
4.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 73

Chapter 5 | The Case Study of Ard Al-Liwa’ ................................................................. 77

5.1. Area Profile ....................................................................................................... 78

5.2. Civil Society Micro-Projects ............................................................................ 83

5.2.1. Project 1: Railway Crossing in Ard Al-Liwa’ ........................................... 83
   i. Urbanisation Issue .................................................................................... 84
   ii. Policies and State Intervention ............................................................... 84
   iii. Civil Society Initiative ....................................................................... 85
   iv. Current Situation ................................................................................. 88

5.2.2. Project 2: Ard Al-Liwa’ Park ................................................................... 89
   i. Urbanisation Issue .................................................................................... 89
   ii. Policies and State Intervention ............................................................... 90
   iii. Civil Society Initiative ....................................................................... 91
   iv. Current Situation ................................................................................. 94

5.2.3. Project 3: Ring-Road Ramps Construction ............................................. 95
   i. Urbanisation Issue ..................................................................................... 95
   ii. Policies and State Interventions ............................................................. 96
   iii. Civil Society Initiative ....................................................................... 96
   iv. Current situation ..................................................................................... 98

5.3. Reflections ......................................................................................................... 99

Chapter 6 | Conclusion ................................................................................................... 103

6.1. Emergence of CSOs Concerned with Urbanisation Issues ......................... 104

6.2. Mobilisation Patterns of Civil Society Organisations ............................... 106

6.2.1. Railway Crossing in Ard Al-Liwa’ ......................................................... 106
   i. Political or Religious Affiliation ............................................................... 107
   ii. Involvement of other CSOs ................................................................. 107
   iii. Contribution to the Community ......................................................... 107

6.2.2. Ard Al-Liwa’ Park ................................................................................. 108
   i. Voicing Community Needs ................................................................... 108
   ii. State Representation ........................................................................... 109
iii. Coordination with Relevant State Institutions ........................................ 109
iv. Responsibility without Power ................................................................. 109
v. Conflict of Interests ................................................................................ 109

6.2.3. Al-Mi'timidya Cairo Ring Road Ramps ............................................. 110
i. Cost and Effectiveness .......................................................................... 110
ii. Public interest ....................................................................................... 110

6.3. State-Society Paradigm in Cairo ......................................................... 111

6.4. The Way Forward ............................................................................... 114

References .................................................................................................. 119

Appendices .................................................................................................. 144
List of Figures

Figure 1: Levels of Authority and Action .......................................................... 3
Figure 2: The Inter-Dimensional Analysis of Urban Planning ....................... 12
Figure 3: Neoliberal State and Civil Society ................................................... 18
Figure 4: Methodology .................................................................................... 31
Figure 5: Urbanisation of Greater Cairo ......................................................... 37
Figure 6: Vision for the 1952 Era ................................................................ 39
Figure 7: Nasr City, first blocks of apartment cooperatives .......................... 41
Figure 8: The Open Door Policy in Al-Yassar Al-Arabi 1980 ....................... 43
Figure 9: The informal settlement boom in Cairo ........................................ 46
Figure 10: Privatization of Urban Development .......................................... 48
Figure 11: Cairo Ring Road Growth Strategies ............................................ 49
Figure 12: A map showing the ring road around Greater Cairo ................. 50
Figure 13: A poster campaigning for the food riots ...................................... 51
Figure 14: Framework for a Housing System .............................................. 59
Figure 15: Egyptian Civil Society Diamond ............................................... 61
Figure 16: Governance Indicators in Egypt ...............................................  63
Figure 17: Modes of Professional Engagement ........................................... 67
Figure 18: Examples of Civil Society Initiatives in Cairo ............................. 68
Figure 20: Urbanomics Timeline .................................................................. 73
Figure 19: Urbanomics Timeline .................................................................. 73
List of Abbreviations

CDA Community Development Association
CSO Civil Society Organisation
EGP Egyptian Pound
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GOPP General Organisation of Physical Planning
ISDF Informal Settlements Development Fund
MOSSA Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
UN United Nations
Chapter One | Introduction
Civil society is not only longer regarded as a provider of philanthropic services or charity to the less fortunate communities and an advocator of human rights but also as an enabler for social equity and a catalyst to unearth interventions that could solve growing urbanisation issues. In Cairo, the notion of civil society engaging in harnessing urbanisation impacts has rapidly sped up post 25 January 2011 revolution. It has shifted from its traditional roles to actual hands on projects, and the adoption of more developmental approaches to their work even though charity continues to be the main form of most of their work (CIVICUS, 2005). Civil society organisations involve the consolidated efforts of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ interventions of groups or individuals in a complex framework of coordination and collaboration to upgrade living premises perhaps with the installation of certain infrastructure and services, providing expertise on certain technical issues, and advocacy or negotiating with the administrative municipal units. People are building their own ‘city within the city’ (Nowak, 2013, p. 10). They are the reinvention of areas that planners label as slums, squatter settlements, unplanned areas, unsafe areas and ashwa‘iyyat and

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1 Formal in the research refers to civil society organisations that are registered with the MOSSA and informal refers to those that are not.
they have too much to offer in the reinvention of places. Some say this is because cities have become way too complex to be governed from a centrally located hall and that “people, in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace, don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities” (Kisby, 2010, p. 484). Others say that, communities have reclaimed their cities and occupied new roles as significant actors within the systems of power that influence the development practices. They demand the type of interventions needed and redefine their own right to the city as opposed to the ‘development from above or below’ models that have been carried out by the state or by international development cooperations. It is not comprehensible however, “how the complex governance mechanisms, bargaining processes and discourses of these new heterogeneous types of social organisations forms are influencing the development dynamics in the cities” (Kraas, 2009). According to the World Economic Forum Report for the year 2013, on the ‘Future Role of Civil Society’, three changing paradigms have been defined for the future of Civil Society (World Economic Forum, 2013, p. 05):

1. Definitions: civil society includes a wider range of formal and informal networks than just the non-profit sector rule by the NGO community.
2. Roles: civil society actors are demonstrating their value as facilitators, innovators, service providers and advocates.
3. Economic and Geopolitical Context: political pressures and traditional funding models are restricting the space for many civil society activities hence changing and shifting the rules of social engagement.

New civil society actors blur the boundaries between sectors and experiment with new organizational forms. Such mobilisation patterns and organisational forms should be part of urban planning and not excluded. “If
we want to reinvent cities in the twenty-first century, this means returning to the roots, linking urban planning with community initiatives in order to learn from each other.” (Nowak, 2013) Urban planning is ostensibly “intentional development in the form development projects, programs, and policies with specific ends implemented by international aid: public and other agencies” (Bebbington, 2004, p. 726), this research will study both the intentional and ‘unintentional’ city that is reinvented by society other than the state and market in an attempt to discover other actors, their social organisation forms and power structures (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Levels of Authority and Action
Source: (Borham, 2012)

Civil society organisations referred to in this research focus on the role of a specific range that engage in finding solutions for the rapid urbanisation occurring in Cairo. To understand the mobilisation patterns of civil society organisations in harnessing urbanisation, one has to first research into the urbanisation issues, investigate their evolution and explore the state’s policies for dealing with such issues beforehand. This is why in Chapter 2 the literature review sets some broad lines towards theorizing and exploring definitions that make up the boundaries of the study; urbanisation, the role
of state and the shifting role in the civil society. Simultaneously, the discussion on the changing roles of state and civil society cannot be made without the linkage to the debates on the impacts of the current neoliberal economic system. Some authors, although a few, argue that the active roles for civil society and the transparency of government to its citizens are the positive product of emergent mobilizations that was brought about by neoliberalism. (Kaldor, 2001) while some others argue that the withdrawal of the state in the neoliberal paradigm forces people to act in these ways and concepts of empowerment and choice are rarely acknowledged and that poverty, pollution of the environment and economic disparities occur beneath the banner of neoliberalism (Mitchell, 1999) (Klein, 2007) (Giroux, 2005), while some others recognise that the process of neoliberalization is a process “not an end-state neither monolithic in form nor universal in effect” (Peck & Tickell, 2002) (Larner, 2003) (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).

Chapter 3 describes the methodology and research structure. It describes the phases of building up the research, selecting the case study and the micro-projects within it, the data collection process including the tools and methodologies used and finally, the data analysis.

Chapter 4 tries explores the state-society relations that are have occurred in Cairo since (1952) to the post-revolution times in (2011) to discover the causes of the rapid urbanisation, the changing economic policies, and different societal actors to comprehend the reason of their broad existence in Cairo post-revolution. It will mainly research the urban and economic policies -urbanomics- and the shifting paradigms in the state-society interventions as a response to those ‘urbanomics’ measures. In parallel, it will try to link those major changes with the evolution and the current prodigious approaches taken by those civil society organisations.
Since the research is about decoding a dynamic city that has been shaped, altered, modified, amended and sometimes destructed according to everyday’s needs by its residents, which has all together changed every mode of its life in both the formal and informal parts of the city, therefore the argument will not be about formality and informality in Cairo. It is not about the categorization of housing sector. This is because “disentangling informality from formality is almost impossible” (Marx, 2009) cited in (Lombard & Huxley, 2011). In the context of rapid urbanisation, formality and informality has moved beyond built structures into the mode of life and relationships among institutions and personalities. Nowadays informality is omnipresent even in the most well planned and established areas in Cairo. Informality is not only outside formal structures but is sometimes created as a result of the same formal structures which label them as informal. This is because not only does informality include illegal housing construction but it also includes other occurrences such as construction of extra floors on existing buildings without legal permits, street vendors who function without any legal structures or protection, encroachment of kiosks and shops on sidewalks, unregulated labour force, cemeteries’ dwellers, encroachment on agricultural land, claiming rooftops on buildings and, and the absence of a national vision in formal institutions (Porter, 2011, p. 116) (AlSayyad, 2004, p. 18).

“Given this complexity, viewing informal settlements as modes of urbanisation as other occurrences and not cases of abnormality, offers a better prospect for engaging with their lived reality beyond simplistic dualisms” (Porter, 2011, p. 124) and “enables planners and policy makers to gain a greater understanding of urban processes” (Lombard & Huxley, 2011, p. 124).
Furthermore, informality in Cairo is not all diseases, shacks and messy neighbourhoods. On the contrary, the so-called marginalised groups who live in those cancerous informal areas are socially well organized and economically hard working” (E.Perlman, 1976). Nevertheless, the modes of urbanisation of the both the formal and informal will sometimes be explained separately from each other “to explore the nature of their relations more clearly” (Porter, 2011, p. 116).

Chapter 5 will explore a neighbourhood that was subjected to rapid urbanisation in the 1970s where the multidisciplinary role of civil society was a notable feature especially in post-revolutionary Cairo. The case study selected was Ard Al-Liwa’ because it is “a representative neighbourhood of contemporary Cairo which has developed independently of state intervention and with other similar neighbourhoods such as Imbaba and Basateen make almost three-quarters of established housing units” (Sims, 2012). 3 micro projects for civil society projects in Ard Al-Liwa’ will be analysed to investigate the social processes and power structures of their works.

**Research Questions**

- Why is there an increased emergence of civil society organisations concerned with urbanisation issues especially in post-revolutionary Cairo?
- What are the mobilisation patterns, social processes and power structures between state and non-state when shaping the city?
- What are the advantages and deficiencies in the state-society paradigm in the neoliberal development model?
Chapter Two | Literature Review
Chapter 2 | Literature Review

The world’s urban population for the year 2011 which was 3.6 billion was greater than all of the world’s total population for the year 1960 and is expected to increase by 72% to reach 6.3 billion by 2050, which will approximately be the same size of the world’s total population in the year 2002. The earth is urbanizing fast and cities in the global south, especially, account for most of most of this urbanisation. All of this expected growth will be concentrated in the urban areas of the third world, whose population is projected to increase from 2.7 billion in 2011 to 5.1 billion in 2050 (United Nations, 2012). “Third World urbanisation continued its rapid pace (3.8 % annually) from the 1980s to the early 1990s in spite of falling real wages, soaring prices and skyrocketing urban unemployment” (Davis, 2003, p. 09).

Throughout history, authors relate urbanisation and populations growth to several reasons; such as the normal increase between birth rates and death rates within cities, the rural to urban immigration influx2 (M.Ibrahim, 1975), industrialization (Davis, 1955), the global political situation such as “the debt crisis of the late 1970s, the neoliberal reforms, the IMF-led restructuring of Third World economies in the 1980s in the sub-Saharan

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2 See also (Wahba, 2009) for an overview of internal and international migration in Egypt
Chapter 2 | Literature Review

Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and parts of Asia” (Davis, 2003, p. 09) and foreign investments, external debts, and land shortages (W. Bradshaw & J. Schafer, 2000). This chapter will research into the definitions of the two phases of neoliberalism namely ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism, their repercussions on urbanisation and the role of state-society in the neoliberal era in harnessing urbanisation issues.

2.1. Neoliberalism

“I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand “I have a problem, it is the Government’s job to cope with it!” or “I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!” “I am homeless, the Government must house me!” and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first.”

Margaret Thatcher, interview in Women’s Own magazine, October 31, 1987.

As a set of political economic strategies, neoliberalism is envisaged as a continuous process and not an end-state (Peck & Tickell, 2002) a form of urban governance (Brenner & Theodore, 2005) which releases freedom of entrepreneurial skills (Harvey, 2005) in open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from almost all forms of state intervention (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). In an attempt to explain the development of the neoliberal policy, (Peck & Tickell, 2002) established two phases of neoliberalism, the ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism. The ‘roll back’ neoliberalism which was prevailing in the 1980s and whose ideological home was provided by the governments of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US,
is characterised by a form of partial state withdrawal or roll back in its relationship with the state as and depends on “the purposeful consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 384).

The basic outlines of this form of neoliberalism in (Brenner & Theodore, 2002) (Larner, 2003) (Brenner & Theodore, 2005) (Harvey, 2005) (Barnett, 2009) include:

- A paradigm shift of state-economy relations in which state institutions promote market-based regulatory arrangements to actively mobilize freely functioning markets’ institutions and free trade;
- Operative at various spatial scales; (cities, regions, nations, regional groupings);
- Individuals are responsible for their own actions and well-being which includes spheres of social welfare, education, health care, and pensions;
- Displacement of welfare provision models through policies of privatization and deregulation either with minimal state intervention or excluding any state interference;
- Privatization of assets through clear private property rights to protect against the “the tendency for individuals to irresponsibly super-exploit common property resources such as land and water otherwise known as the tragedy of the commons” (Harvey, 2005, p. 65);
- Protection of freedom of action, expression, and intellectual property rights even if it requires use of state’s monopoly through violence;
- Competition, private enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are keys to innovation and wealth creation; and
- Free mobility of capital through international agreements between states guaranteeing freedoms of trade by removing impediments such as
tariffs, taxes, environmental controls except in areas of ‘national interest’.

“State after state, from the new ones that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states has embraced, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some of their policies and practices accordingly. Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse and has pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world.”

Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction - (Harvey, 2007, p. 23)

The ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism was a response in the 1990’s to the failures of the previous phase that was initiated by neoliberalism itself. This phase of neoliberalism called out for other responses to those failures outside the abstract policies of deregulation and marketization (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The basic outlines of this form of neoliberalism in (Reid-Henry, 2012) (Peck & Tickell, 2002) (Aguirre, et al., 2006) include:

- Creation of new trade, financial regulations and corporate institutions known as the Washington Consensus\(^3\) such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt, now World Trade Organisation);
- Incorporation of local governance and partnership models in development such as in urban regeneration programs and social welfare;

\(^3\) “A term coined by John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for International Economics to describe a set of economic reforms that countries should undertake if they wished to stabilize their economies and generate sustained economic growth” (Khan & Milbert, 2012).
• Mobilisation of development associations in the form of local voluntary and faith-based organisations that support the neoliberal goals;
• Penetration of socially excluded and deeply impacted poverty zones that weren’t considered by the neoliberals during the 1980s, in fear of issues related to crime, unemployment, and social breakdown.

2.2. Neoliberal Urbanisation

“Urbanisation does not only mean the process by which persons are attracted to a place called the city and incorporated into its system of life but refers to the cumulative accentuation of the characteristics distinctive of the mode of life which is associated with the growth of cities, and finally to the changes in the direction of modes of life recognized as urban which are apparent among people, wherever they may be, who have come under the spell of the influences which the city exerts by virtue of the power of its institutions and personalities.”

Urbanism as a Way of Life - (Wirth, 1938, p. 5)

To pinpoint urbanisation one must try to draw out explicit lines from the most recognizable overlapping crossroads at the centre of the complex urban planning web that covers a broad territory of interconnected sectors and professions, and that grows bigger by the historical evolution of social processes and spheres of human interaction and effort (Barclay M. Hudson, 1979). Since cities are multi-dimensional rather than single-dimensional in character and are inter-related in a complex web of dynamic system (Figure 2) resulting from interdependent parts (Safier, 2003), this reflects on the complexity of planning. The taxonomy is even more complex and intangible when it comes to urbanisation. A country is over-urbanised when it has insufficient needed resources, economic growth and basic services provision to support its growing urban population.
In the Arab world as (Deboulet, 2009, p. 213) explains, urbanisation is; ‘a by-product of housing’ and that the self-generated layout is generally considered residual. She goes further to explain that in the Arab world, some researchers have tried to discover the inner logic of self generated cities (buildings and urban design) that they want to regularize and re-impose as the ordering principle of the community. In calling for the ‘rediscovery/re-imposition of the norm, they produce the moralistic or disciplinary social restructuring ideology of modernist urban planning. She cites (Maizia Mindjid, 1998) who states that in rediscovering the plan, one should not forget to consider that the layout embodies spatial features of the
community, including its contradictions and conflicts. This approach is further solidified by David Harvey in his article, ‘From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism’ where he states that urbanisation is “not end-product but a set of social processes that produce a built form, spaces and resource systems organised into a distinctive spatial configuration and involves institutional arrangements, legal forms, political and administrative systems and hierarchies of power” (Harvey, 1989, p. 06).

An article written by Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore in 2005 presented some conclusions, based on preceding contributions of other authors, who provided some insights on the consequences of neoliberalism on urbanisation patterns in some detailed case studies in cities in Canada and the United States. According to the study, in terms of urban governance, neoliberalization projects have initiated new models of empowerment by triggering new forms of elites in key state institutions such as economic development and regulatory spheres. In national immigration policies, political actors made use of the nationalist principles to justify shrinkage of the public sector, low paid labour force and stricter rules on welfare provision depending on citizenship as opposed to residency or employment. After the ‘war on terror’ national movement in the post- September 11th era, new urban security measures were applied, several of them reflected on the urban space, such as the promotion of de-concentrated settlement patterns for maintaining public safety which led to an increase in urban sprawl and the increase in militarization of urban spaces. The promotion of the prioritization of private-sector as a best practice in governance led to a loss of transparency within the state institutions’ policy processes.

Another case study represents that welfare-state cutbacks shifted spending priorities for public services that were crucially needed by the poor city residents to public-private partnerships which resulted in a underinvestment in the services upon which most low-income groups are
dependent such was the large-scale investments in transportation infrastructure that only benefit the interests of suburban commuters, while low-income, mass-transit-dependent residents in the city centres are subjected to cutbacks in transit funding. “Not only that, but in many of the instances of public–private partnerships, at the municipal level, the state bears risk while the private sector takes profits” (Harvey, 2007, p. 77).

“Neoliberalism has been able to make a virtue of uneven spatial development and continuous regulatory restructuring, rendering the macro power structure as a whole partially insulated from local challenges. In addition, progressive local alternatives are persistently vulnerable, in this turbulent and marketized environment, to social undercutting, institutional overloading, and regulatory dumping.”

Neoliberalising Space - (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 401)

“Between 1987 and 1993, the number of people with an income of less than US$1 a day increased by almost 100 million to 1.3 billion people, one-third of the population of the ‘developing world’. Yet, between 1989 and 1996, the number of billionaires increased from 157 to 447” (Pearce, 2006, p. 16). This is because the competitive nature of neoliberalism excludes states, settlements and individuals that fail to meet the international standards of competitive urbanism through tough measures such as social exclusion, gentrification, and banning of funding. Some states that couldn’t keep up with the competition were subjected to bankruptcy and debt and were bailed out by international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Forced in bankruptcy, some countries had no choice but to accept the conditions of such institutions. Conditions imposed structural adjustment programs on those countries such as, “cut spending and subsidies on social services, relax price controls, deregulate and privatize industries, target inflation, and liberalize capital flows.” (A.Hassan, 2010, p. 325)
Naomi Klein referred to that in her book ‘The Shock Doctrine’, saying that it was the debt crisis that forced countries to be “privatized or die”. She argues that governments accepted "shock treatment" in the form foreign loans that came with demands, on the promise that it would save them from deeper disaster. Furthermore neoliberal policies are in fact pro-corporatists policies that “promote and normalize a ‘growth-first’ approach to urban development and social welfarist concerns can only be addressed after growth, jobs, and investment have been secured” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 394) which makes neoliberalism in fact an economic program of capitalism. Hence, the excessive funding of the market sector and investment was directly connected to the underfunding of the labour rights, the right to organise, and the disappearance of the public sphere (Klein, 2007). Furthermore, in any conflict the typical neoliberal state will side with any “good business climate” since one of the mandates of neoliberalism is creating a good investment climate, consequently favouring the integrity of the financial systems and institutions regardless of the collective rights, well being of the population and quality of life for the environment and the society. (Harvey, 2005, p. 70)

2.3. Neoliberal State and Civil Society

In the view put forward originally by Weber (1968) cited in (Mann, 1984 , p. 187) the state “contains four main elements; a set of institutions and personnel, centralized political relations, a territorially-demarcated area, authoritative rule-making, and a monopoly of the means of physical violence”. ‘Non-state’ on the other hand is a term that refers to any actor or institution other than governmental ones, which some authors divide into as ‘economy market’ and ‘civil society’. This doesn’t mean that the world is efficiently divided into market, state and civil society nor that society has any internal power structures, therefore it is practically impossible to understand civil society and economy as spheres of human activity that are
separate from the state even though they might not be state-controlled, but they are affected by the state in a some way or other (Painter, 2003, p. 362).

“Civil society remains an ambiguous concept with miscellaneous interpretations; nevertheless it is interpreted as a kind of society that was identified with certain ideals. There are three schools of thought; civil society as an associational life, civil society as the good society and civil society as the public sphere. In all three schools of thought, civil society as a collective action provides a counterweight to individualism; civil society as creative action, provides an antidote to the cynicism that infects contemporary politics; and civil society as values-based action, provides a balance to the overbearing state authority and market temptations, even if those values are contested, as they often are”.

'Civil Society', (M. Edwards, 2005)

The concept has been evolving since the Greek philosophers wrote about the ‘good society’ and ‘societas civilis’ as opposed to a barbaric society. According to Socrates, civil society was how individuals and society reconcile their different needs. According to Plato, society was ruled by enlightened philosopher leaders in a totalitarian form of governance where citizens dedicated themselves to the common good in a just society. Aristotle on the other hand argued that governance must be for the common good in which all citizens participate (Ehrenberg, 1999) (V. Broekhoven, 2009). It was first made famous as a Western idea by Alexis de Tocqueville on the nature and significance of civil society in his analysis of American democracy where he argues that civil society and democracy are assumed to complement each other. Thus, civil society concept is not new. “What is new is the increasing emphasis on the concept in the last two decades” (World Bank, 2013).
In the wider literature most writers locate civil society as the space between the state with its economy, law and monopoly” (Gramsci, 1971) cited in (Katz, 2006), and that it is usually taken to mean the associations that constitutes non-state and non-market structures. Such associations are voluntary and may range from, for example, churches, cultural associations, port clubs and debating societies to independent media, academies, groups of concerned citizens, grass-roots initiatives and organisations of gender, race and sexuality, all the way to occupational associations, political parties and labour unions (Habermas 1992) cited in (Flyvbjerg, 1998) (Gramsci, 1971) cited in (Katz, 2006) (D.Lewis & N.Kanji, 2009, p. 121). Foucault however considers civil society as a dependent entity as opposed to a separate one, founded on disciplinarian mechanisms and offers a diffuse network of normalization. Foucault is also critical in terms of defining civil society as a separate entity. It is dialectically where the existing hegemonic social order is maintained but also the realm of social creativity, where a new social order can emerge (Flyvbjerg, 1998).

Sarah Ben Nefissa in her book ‘NGOs and Governance in the Arab World’ defines civil society as “the self-organisational capacity of different social groups defending and protecting common interests before the public authorities or other groups promoting different ideas and is composed of numerous organisations including NGOs and associations”. (Ben Nefissa, et al., 2000). The Institute of National Planning in Egypt and the Civil Society Index Report for the Arab Republic of Egypt, define civil society as the space between the sets of organisations such as the social space and family, state and market, where people come together voluntarily to promote common values and pursue interests distinct from family, state and profit-seeking institutions. (CIVICUS, 2005) (Institute of National Planning, 2008). The Institute of National Planning in Egypt categorizes Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) into voluntarily formed social organisations, “ranging
from formal to informal organisations within civil society: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs), indigenous peoples’ organisations (IPOs), academia, journalist associations, faith-based organisations, trade unions, and trade associations” (INP, 2008, p. 62).

Civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged in the 1990s as increasingly influential actors in national development (Clayton, et al., 2000). The withdrawal of the state from providing basic services in the “roll back” neoliberalism and the involvement of market sector has left a space for the shifting role of civil society in advancing development in the “roll out” neoliberalism and has become an increasingly important reality within

4 “Until 1993, UNDP used the term non-governmental organization (NGO) to describe all the non-state/non-business organisations it worked with.” (Institute of National Planning, 2008, p. 62)
contemporary society as a third sector (Figure 3). Organizations associated with the third sector are involved in delivering much needed social, health, educational, economical, cultural, research, funding and advocacy services (Eade, 2006).

“The character of the debates within development studies seemed to have shifted from theory to paradigm. Formerly, debates discussed the specific role the state should play in the development process. They disagreed on that but were in agreement on a paradigmatic level that the state was an important developmental actor. Nowadays, discussions have shifted to whether the state should play a role after all in development. At the same time, civil society supposedly seems to have evolved from a rather indeterminate societal container of economic classes and disparate social movements to a fully-edged, articulate actor with synergetic developmental potential.”

Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? - (J.Schuurman, 200, p. 08)

There is a substantial amount of literature on the debate of involvement of civil society in development and the advantages of involving civil society in service provision specifically. CSOs play the critical role in mobilizing social capital as they have a better insight into the cultural and social resources of any community that comprise social capital and are much aware of it as organisations originating from below as opposed to those imposed from above which are unable to mobilize social capital as effectively as local CSOs (Krishna & Prewitt, 2000) (Fukuyama, 2001). The organisational strength of the CSOs influences the balance of power relations between state and society and constrains political decision making (Huber, et al., 1997). Due to their size, CSOs are more efficient when it comes to providing small projects in specific sectors. A benefit of implementing small-scale and pilot projects
is the flexibility of developing fast interventions and innovative solutions. State agencies become bureaucratic over time and develop standardized solutions that are implemented with relatively varying adaptation to the local contexts (Krishna & Prewitt, 2000). CSOs act as a catalyst, link democracy to development and service provision. And hold governments accountable by performing monitoring and watchdog functions (Huber, et al., 1997).

“The claim that civil society is effective and able to attain stated goals is of course, an empirical question. On the other hand, civil society also suffers from a set of basic organizational weaknesses that inhibit their impact. Their projects are often isolated from one another and from planned government interventions, and are difficult to replicate in dissimilar settings. Moreover, small is usually expensive, and while micro projects may be relatively effective, they are also usually inefficient.”


According to a report written by (Clayton, et al., 2000) and published by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, the civil society sector is an influential actor in service provision in many parts of the world, vary in nature and composition based on differing conceptual paradigms, origins, and context. The report states that there are two paradigms for that; in industrial countries, civil society was allowed a greater role to assist in reforming the welfare state, while in parts of the developing world since there is often no welfare state to reform, civil society organisations struggle to provide minimum basic services for the majority of the population (Clayton, et al., 2000, p. 01). The study argues that there are a number of deficiencies when the civil society organisations take over the role of the welfare state. Their study was based on several reports (Biekart, 1999)

Other literature offer a significant insight into other deficiencies such as (M. Eikenberry & D. Kluver, 2004) in their study on ‘The Marketization of the Non-profit Sector: Civil Society at Risk?’ and the book ‘Disrupted cities: When infrastructure fails’, in which McFarlane argues in his section ‘Infrastructure, Interruption and Inequality: Urban Life in the Global South’ about the “the experience of the city, of the commons and of others is severely compromised and produces solidarities when the basics of shelter, sanitation, sustenance, water, communication and the like are missing” (McFarlane, 2010, p. 132). Deborah Eade and Jenny Pearce in the book ‘Development, NGOs, and Civil Society’ address other deficiencies as well. Other writers such as (Sanyal, 1998) in ‘The Myth of Development from Below’ and (Bratton, 1989) in ‘The politics of government-NGO relations in Africa’ offer some insights into civil society and NGOs effectiveness.

Advantages, challenges and deficiencies collected from the above mentioned literature include the following:

**Equity of Services:** The withdrawal of the State from the provision of equitable public services and infrastructure and becoming an investor like any other investor converted those essential services to be bought like any other service and restricted it to a segment of the society that could afford it. Consequently is the dilemma because equality and diversity are integral to the urban planning practices, infrastructure provision is one of the substantial services in urbanisation which is inevitable and ensures equity.

**Limited Coverage:** The scale of operation for CSOs is limited even though they aim to deliver service to poor people and consequently many people do not benefit from them.
Quality of Provision: CSOs are more efficient when it comes to providing small projects in specific sectors or in single subsectors than undertaking complex interventions such as integrated rural development projects. This is due to a number of issues critical to the delivery and quality of services such as funding, technical capacity and motivation of staff.

Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness: CSO projects can be more cost effective than large scale ones due to their size and scope. On the other hand, they are linked to external funding and sometimes expatriate staff, often available only for limited periods and for specific projects which sometime jeopardises their continuity and efficiency. Some also focus on a theme or certain geographical area.

Sustainability of CSO Services: CSO projects dependence on external funding makes them rarely sustainable. Their disconnection from the absent or poor national welfare services adds more to their lack of sustainability.

Linkages with Government Provision: CSOs are incapable of providing an overall framework in which to operate at both national and regional levels. This can only be done by the state through developing effective working relationships between both based on utilizing the strengths and responsibilities of each. “To be successful, the government alone can create the policy environment necessary for maximizing a civil society’s effectiveness; and only the government has the administrative machinery for large-scale implementation of projects and policies” (Sanyal, 1998).

Contracting CSOs: When contracting CSOs for a certain project, the CSO meets the objectives of the donors rather than adapting their own values in response to local situations that are necessary to ensure sustainability in the local context which emphasizes the competitive nature of the neoliberalism
policies between CSOs for contracts, rather than ascertain cooperation within the sector.

**Political Influence:** CSOs may use their reputation in their working contexts to exert a political influence at the local level; be it a positive one with the potential to be a part of the democratization process or a negative one confined in struggles over resource allocation.

**Public Interest:** CSOs are a convenient channel through which official agencies can promote political pluralism and claim to represent the unfortunate. Sometimes these diverse groups represent the interests of their members only. “Only an effective and open state can protect the rights of all citizens, where these might otherwise be trampled upon by others” (Eade, 2006). “Not only is there very little consensus, but the real world of development CSOs and official donors is characterised by mistrust, and by fierce competition over resources, all of which are very damaging to the anti-poverty cause” (Pearce, 2006). “One person's civic engagement is another's rent-seeking; much of what constitutes civil society can be described as interest groups trying to divert public resources to their favoured causes” (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 12).

**Marketisation of the Non-Profit Sector:** Insufficient and lack of funding has influenced the need for CSOs to use market strategies such as commercial revenue generation to deal with resource constraints by embracing values of the free market such as, compete for contracts or practice social entrepreneurship. This again ascertains the competitive nature of the neoliberalism policies between CSOs, rather than cooperation within the sector.
2.4. Conclusion

Of the current political processes and administrative powers that have done significant shifts in how urbanisation in cities has developed is the neoliberal economic paradigm that has been deployed since the late 1970’s and early 1980’s and whose thinking has become dominant in a majority of the countries of the world and its effect on urbanisation and the relation between state and civil society in the neoliberal era. The repercussions of neoliberalism according to the literature investigated are not negligible. The competitive nature of neoliberalism excludes segments of society that fail to meet the international standards of competitive urbanism through tough measures such as social exclusion, gentrification, and banning of funding. Add to that the severe conditions imposed by international financial institutions such the IMF and World Bank which bailed developing countries out of bankruptcy through structural adjustment programs such as cutting spending and subsidies on social services, deregulating free market, privatizing industries and liberalize capital flows. This resulted in many urbanisation issues such as shrinkage of the public sector, inequity distribution of service such as education or health and infrastructure such as mass-transit, roads and lack of state affordable housing, disempowerment of certain segments as opposed to new forms of elites in key state institutions, low paid labour force, vanishing of urban space, promotion of de-concentrated settlement patterns for maintaining public safety, increase in urban sprawl and the increase in militarization of urban spaces and loss of transparency within the state institutions’ due to the promotion of the prioritization of private-sector. The main issue of the thesis is the underinvestment in the services upon which most low-income groups are dependent, which aggravated the situation for the urban poor who couldn’t join the neoliberal race of competition, entrepreneurs and free capital,
simultaneously being unable to provide for their own social well-being and much needed public services.

The underinvestment caused by the neoliberal policies was substituted by the collective actions and value based good of civil society organisations who struggled to provide minimum basic services that were crucially needed for the majority of the population in the absence a welfare state. Even though civil society promotes different ideas and interests, this doesn’t always necessarily mean that all of them might contribute positively to equity and justice to build a good society as elaborated earlier. Challenges are met. This is explained by two basic approaches when comes to development and civil society, which can be defined as the ‘liberal’ and the ‘radical’ (Clarke 1998) cited in (D.Lewis & N.Kanji, 2009, p. 127). In the liberal view, civil society is seen as equilibrium with the state and the market and contributes to keeping the state accountable to its citizens (B.Nefissa & others, 2000) (D.Lewis & N.Kanji, 2009). In the radical, there are negotiations and conflicts based on struggles for power in blurred boundaries between civil society and state. The radical view of civil society therefore emphasizes and acknowledged in discussions of civil society the idea of power structures, conflicts and equity. (Flyvbjerg, 1998) (D.Lewis & N.Kanji, 2009). Nonetheless, civil society networks are growing and seem to hold much promise in the areas of development, upgrading and advocacy and in the realm of social creativity, where a new social order can emerge as will be investigated in (Chapter 4).
Chapter Three | Research Methodology
Chapter 3 | Research Methodology

This chapter outlines the details of the research undertaken to address the questions posed in Chapter One. It describes the phases of building up the research, selecting the case study and the micro-projects within it, the data collection process including the tools and methodologies used and finally, the data analysis. This research was designed to generate qualitative data by exploring the definitions of civil society and the context where multidisciplinary working was in place; their roles including the way they worked and the changes they had caused in themselves, others and the community as a whole.

3.1. Research Strategy

The first phase of the research is descriptive and explanatory. It depends mainly on the collected background literature concerned with the topic of the thesis. The second phase is interactive and involves the selection of a case study (Figure 4). “The need to use case studies arises whenever an empirical inquiry must examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1981, p. 98). In order to investigate such a contemporary approach in Cairo and look into civil society’s role and
mobilization networks in urban development, the single-case study approach was used for explanatory and analytical purposes. It also allows the investigation of dynamic constantly changing multiple variables and not from the perspective of a single variable. “Single-case designs, in brief, may provide valid tests in the same sense as can critical experiments” (Stouffer, 1941 cited in (Yin, 1981, p. 100). Three micro-projects were selected in the case study. The third phase is analytical and concluding for the previous phases. The main topics covered by the case study were the categories of civil societies, both formal and informal and their roles. The research will analyze the mobilizations patterns in the three micro-projects, power structures and networks that reveal modes of spatial organisations on site, their potential as well as their impact and innovation. It will try to make sense of the patterns through mapping of social processes and power structures to as a means to produce spaces and investigate social relations (UCL, 2012). “Mapping can be used as a research tool for exploring social relationships through mapping social networks and eliciting data from research participants as an interactive approach to interrogate qualitative research questions" (Emmel, 2008: 1). “The aim of mapping is not affecting change and/or challenging power relationships but can, unlike some other data collection methods (e.g. questionnaires), start to build more extensive dialogue and relationships” (Pathways, 2010).

3.2. Case Study Selection

The case study selected is Ard Al-Liwa’ in Giza Governorate. It is an informal area built up of self-made unregistered housing, which has grown to encircle part of the chic neighbourhood of Mohandeseen and merge into the working class of Imbaba, Bulaq and Mit ‘Uqba. It was originally formed from farm land within the village of Mu’tamidya. People started living in it during the 1970s during the ‘Infitah’. Ard Al-Liwa was selected on the basis not of representativeness but of illustration.
The criteria for selecting the case study:

1. In 1999, Ard Al-Liwa’ became an autonomous administrative unit and an independent local unit even though it’s an informal area (Ben Nefissa, 2009, p. 188).

2. The neighbourhood was officially recorded as part of a farm zone but now transferred to be a part of the Agouza District (Youssef, 2013).

3. There was no development plan for Ard Al-Liwa’, that is why there is no planned public land for state services. There are insufficient public schools or hospitals, and there are no police offices (Salem, 2013) (Gad, 2013).

4. The roles of civil society were evident and roles where multidisciplinary working was a notable feature. Several local initiatives that have been implemented and others are still being negotiated.

3.3. Research Tools

For the first descriptive and explanatory phase:

- Local statistical information and records
- Data collection
- Site visits

For the second interactive phase:

- Recording face-to-face semi-structured interviews with key informants such as the initiators of the civil society projects, officials working in state institutions who assisted in the projects and professionals who provided their expertise on the projects
- Direct observations from on-site visits

For the third analytical phase:

- Mapping of social processes and power structures
3.4. The Methodology

analyze CSOs mobilisation patterns in 3 projects, power structures & networks to reveal modes of organisations on site, their potential as well as their impact to try to make sense through mapping of social processes and power structures.

"if you're looking for a representative neighbourhood of contemporary Cairo, you'll need to look beyond the traditional urban core. Look instead to places like Imbaba, Arid Al-Liwa' and Basateen, which have developed not only independently of government intervention but usually in defiance of established government laws, and are now home to three-quarters of all new housing units established." (Sims, 2012)

"the need to use case studies arises whenever an empirical inquiry must examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." (Yin, 1981)

the fast pace of urbanisation moves adds more to severity of urban planning issues, urbanisation is not end product of an action but is also an occurring set of social processes that produce artefacts - a built form, spaces and resource systems organised into a distinctive spatial configuration involving institutional arrangements, legal forms, political, administrative systems state and non-state besides power hierarchies" (Harvey, 1989)

debates about the changing roles of state and civil society are closely related to questions about the impacts of neoliberalism in urban planning. Some authors argue that poverty and economic disparities occur beneath the banner of neoliberalism. Others argue that the roles for civil society are the product of emergent mobilisations brought about by neoliberalism

why is there a sudden emergence of civil society organisations concerned with urbanisation issues? what are the social processes and power structures between the state and non-state and who has a say in shaping the city?

Figure 4: Methodology
Source: Adapted by author
Chapter Four | State & Civil Society in Egypt
The fast pace with which urbanisation moves in Cairo adds more to the severity of its urban planning issues. Modernisation brought about further rapid urbanisation. Going back to the broad policies and state interventions in urban planning in Cairo since the 1952 revolution, one finds out that the contemporary Cairo has been radically transformed by urban processes shaped through time by a lot of interchanging structures and economic policies which have formulated its urban planning policies and which have reflected on the role of the state and on its relation with civil society.

Urbanisation processes in Cairo, because of its growing population have led to the emergence of numerous phenomena, such as innovative forms of housing production, be it legal or illegal, whole self built cities, new forms of infrastructure provision and new forms of governance and noticed societal changes. A prominent societal change is the emergence and involvement of civil society organisations as a significant stakeholder to assist in finding solutions for the rapid urbanisation taking place in Cairo as well as an enabler for social change that work on promoting equity in distribution of resources and economy, delivering services, advocacy, etc.
In Egypt, the population of the urban agglomeration in Cairo exceeded accounts for 43.5 percent of the total urban and rural population and is expected to reach 14.7 million by the year 2050 (Table 1) (United Nations, 2012). The effects of urbanisation and population growth are due to some factors, for example; in all the total area of one million square kilometres of Egypt, only 4% is inhabited; population is unevenly distributed between the various urban centres and is concentrated on a very small, and fertile, part of the country, which is eating up precious agricultural land (Arandel & El Batran, 1997, p. 01); and informal urbanisation processes, repositioned as a mode of urbanisation of equal importance among other forms, is one of the noticeable challenges in Cairo which have picked up pace during the 1960s, in addition to the substantial increase of rural-urban migration to Cairo (Figure 5) (Séjourné, 2009, p. 17). Between the 1970s and the 1990s approximately 80% of the new housing units in Greater Cairo were built informally (Sims, 2012). The urban planning policies in Cairo that have been selected from the wider literature are the ones that involved a complicated set of politics and policies reflected into a distinctive spatial configuration in Cairo and that have led to Cairo’s rapid urbanisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>GCR</th>
<th>Cairo</th>
<th>Giza</th>
<th>Kalyoubya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>18,967,000</td>
<td>3,011,000</td>
<td>2,062,000</td>
<td>668,000</td>
<td>281,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>26,085,000</td>
<td>4,910,000</td>
<td>3,358,000</td>
<td>1,118,000</td>
<td>434,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>30,076,000</td>
<td>6,212,000</td>
<td>4,232,000</td>
<td>1,420,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>36,626,000</td>
<td>8,090,000</td>
<td>5,074,000</td>
<td>2,137,000</td>
<td>879,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>48,254,000</td>
<td>10,861,000</td>
<td>6,069,000</td>
<td>3,332,000</td>
<td>1,460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>59,313,000</td>
<td>13,107,000</td>
<td>6,789,000</td>
<td>4,237,000</td>
<td>2,081,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>72,798,901</td>
<td>17,748,000</td>
<td>7,968,000</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>3,980,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>81,396,000</td>
<td>20,497,000</td>
<td>8,763,000</td>
<td>6,980,000</td>
<td>4,754,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Population Census for Egypt and the Greater Cairo Region
Source: (CAPMAS, 2013)
Figure 5: Urbanisation of Greater Cairo
Source: (Hafez, 2010)
Egypt has a long history of non-governmental social activity, which was enabled by the endowment system of charity in Islam (waqf\(^5\)) (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 05). “Despite the highly restrictive nature of its civil society laws, Egypt has one of the largest civil society sectors in the entire developing world” (Anon., 2012). “Egyptian civil society has more than 200 years of history and more than 35,000 Egyptian and 83 foreign NGOs operate in it” (Aboulnaga, 2012). The emergence of the first civil society organisation in Egypt can be traced back to the year 1821. Most of the civil society organisations that grew in the middle of the 19\(^{th}\) century were mainly concerned with either culture or science. The faith based organisations appeared only after 17 years later (Kandil & Ben Nefissa, 1999) (M.Abdelrahman, 2004) (CIVICUS, 2005). In 1923, the constitution that was based on a secular approach acknowledged the right of Egyptian to formulate organisations/associations (Gameiat). There was a clear distinction at that time between 3 types of organisations: Organisations with a military air which worked for a particular political party which were later banned in 1938; the second were civil societies that had the right to practice any legal activities as long as they were ‘non-profit organisations’; and the third were charity organisations and institutions (such as orphanages) which dedicate their money for charity and public benefit for a period of time (Kandil & Ben Nefissa, 1999, p. 55).

The Muslim Brotherhood, an example of a nationally organised Islamic PVO was founded in 1928 and registered as a society in 1929, promoting the cause of charity, development and philanthropy on one hand and nationalism, Islamism and independence on the other (Sullivan, 1994, p. 82). In 1939, a separate entity was established for governing civil society

\(^5\)“The waqf is, in Islamic law, the act of founding a charitable trust and hence the trust itself. The essential elements are that a person, wanting to commit a pious deed, declares part of his or her property (i.e. land, a commercial activity, estates, etc.) to be henceforth inalienable and designates persons or public utilities as beneficiaries of its yields.” (Pioppi, 2004)
organisations, previously called Ministry of Social affairs now named Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs (MOSSA).

“According to the MOSSA estimate, there were over 15,000 registered NGOs in 1996. An independent estimate (Weiss and Wurzel) put the figures at 28,000. However a more recent study (Assad and Rouchdy) reports there are nearly 20,000 NGOs, of which 14,000 are officially registered with MOSSA while the rest are either not registered or registered under another legal category.”

Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt, (M.Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 121)

Civil society organisations in Cairo have become embedded within international development amplifying in the last two years as a force to reduce poverty, promote democracy and achieve development. For this reason, functions of civil society in Cairo have created a massive debate about what civil society is and how civil society influences or is influenced by government.

4.1. Arab Socialism: 1956 – 1967

From the late 1950s to the early 1960s Gamal Abdel Nasser consolidated a new social-economic system known as Arab Socialism (Figure 6). “All
foreign based enterprises and large and medium-sized Egyptian enterprises were nationalized” (Solidarity Center, 2010). The government was the sole provider of services. Planning was totally top-down - government says, government does. State functions were set up in formerly constructed villas of the aristocrats. Public-sector workers received extensive social benefits, such as health care; access to consumer cooperatives, which sold subsidized food and other basic commodities; subsidized housing; and pensions. At the time as well, industrialisation sector⁶ was booming and migration accelerated to the city by 1960 to provide employment for the industrialisation process.

4.1.1. Role of the State

“In line with its socialist ideology, the state became involved in large-scale provision of welfare functions and large-scale development projects” (J. Stewart, 1999). This era witnessed massive trends of social housing as it was a national priority. In addition the construction of housing remained under state control. As David Sims puts it the 1950s witnessed Egypt’s earliest experiments in what was to become a long and continuing love affair with state-subsidized public housing with the issuing of the first law governing it Law 206 for the year 1951 (Sims, 2012, p. 50). “The government created a public company which built thousands of apartments in poor areas of Cairo, such as Zeinhom, Helwan, Imbaba and Shubra al Khima” (Mabro, 1974 cited in (J. Stewart, 1999, p. 138). Housing projects were constructed in vacant lands between existing settlements.

A Master Plan of Cairo was published in 1956, which foresaw the need for east-west expansion into the desert borders. This led to the construction of new cities such as ‘Madinet Nasr’ (Figure 7) and ‘Al-Muhandiseen’ which were very close to the main core, Cairo and which later amalgamated to it

⁶ Large industrial areas such as cement factories in Helwan and textile and heavy industries in Shubra Al-Khyma gathered momentum.
(K. Shehayeb, et al., 2010). Madinet Nasr was a prototype of a large scale development at that time “developed to be a centre for major planning functions, such as National Institute for Planning, CAPMAS (Central Agency for Population Mobilization and Statistics), large-scale public recreation facilities, such as the stadium and clubs, high-rise apartment blocks which included extensive housing for the ‘technocrats’, civil servants who worked for the new government”(J. Stewart, 1999, p. 139). In July 1965, the formation of the Higher Committee of Planning for the Greater Cairo Region was decreed.

![Figure 7: Nasr City, first blocks of apartment cooperatives](image)

By 1967 till 1973, a halt was brought to Cairo urban expansion that was being provided by the government because all state investments going into public housing construction shifted to the military during the wars. “Most public funds were allocated to the war efforts and so public units and services were massively” (Séjourné, 2009, p. 18). Without a strong organized political force that could back the regime after the 1967 defeat, Nasser left the state vulnerable to policy transformation after his death in 1970 (Hinnebusch, 1990). The two wars had disastrous effects on the Egyptian economy.
4.1.2. Role of Civil Society

In the 1960’s, the role of civil society organisations was diminishing after its active formation and movements against British colonialism. This was because of two things; “the restructuring of civil society organisations was an ongoing process under Nasser and the suppression of political dissent on both the right and the left since Nasser has established a one-party system as a means of reforming political life” (A. Hassan, 2010, p. 320) (M. Abdelrahman, 2004, pp. 94-95). The state dominance on welfare activities at that time made a gradual decline of non-governmental voluntarism. This was pushed further through a couple of laws which were a milestone in the changing of state-society relations, such as the 1956 decree that annulled some articles in the civil code concerning the right of association after which all associations and NGOs were dissolved and forced to reapply for licenses to the authorizing bodies, (Ministry of Social Affairs at the time).

Another law, Law 32 issued in the year 1964, gave more control to the Ministry of Social Affairs and local governments over the licensing and regulation of the civil society. As government began to regulate the activities of civil society, especially the legislative restrictions governing fund-raising, donations to the organisations declined as well as private participation. Moreover, when the Islamic endowments system (waqf), was brought under government control, this discouraged many from making philanthropic contributions to civil society organisations and donated to the waqf system instead (CIVICUS, 2005, p. 18). “Even though the centralized state crucially restricted the activities of other political actors in civil society

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7 There were 650 Private Voluntary Organization (PVOs), eight political parties, 34 labour unions, nine professional associations, seven chambers of commerce and one industrial union (CIVICUS, 2005, p. 17)
8 The state authority over civil society in Law 91 of 1959 and Law 32 of 1964 brought the labour unions under heavy government control as well. (CIVICUS, 2005)
it revived certain organisations to help consolidate its ideological hegemony and to help the poor and other needy groups” (M. Abdelrahman, 2004, pp. 94-95). Those agencies were entirely government dominated. For example, the ‘social unit’ was promoted by the state in an attempt to assist the state in healthcare, education and social development throughout Egypt. “In order to encourage more people to become more involved in self development, the social unit eventually emerged into a community development association (CDA) which is a type of an NGO” (Sullivan, 1994, p. 37). The Community Development Associations (CDA) worked in parallel with the government to endorse its national development agenda. Currently CDAs, which must be sanctioned by the Ministry of Solidarity and Social affairs, are more prevalent and more active in rural than in urban areas (Sims, 2003, p. 03)(Sullivan, 1994, p. 38).

4.2. Economic Liberalisation: 1974 – 1990

Figure 8: The Open Door Policy in Al-Yassar Al-Arabi 1980
Source: (Graduate Institute, 2010)
Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) reversed Nasser’s economic and political orientation. “The Egyptian regime shifted away from the state socialism and post-colonial nationalism” (Singerman, 2009, p. 04). Sadat’s 1974 “Open Door” economic policy encouraged foreign direct investment and local entrepreneurs, and cut back subsidies on the public sector following the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ economic policies whose ideological home was promoted by the U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (Maher, 2011) (Solidarity Center, 2010). The principles of the new strategy that were put by Sadat in the “October Working Paper”, the policies for Egyptian liberalization and the Law 43 of the Economic Liberalization for the year 1974 were the cornerstones for this shift.

“The goals of this strategy were to attract Arab money as Foreign Direct Investments, to attract western technology by providing opportunities for joint-ventures with the Egyptian private sector, to promote Egyptian exports by boosting the private sector; to level out Egypt’s balance sheet; to increase the efficiency of the public sector and to encourage commercial activities, particularly importing advanced technology and stimulating exportation”.

The "Soft State" and the Open Door: Egypt's Experience with Economic Liberalization, 1974-1984 - (Waterbury, 1985)  

These laws provided for the opening up of the Egyptian economy to capitalism, protection of foreign investment against nationalization, tax exemption for new investment, exemption from labour regulations and the permission to import material necessary for the construction of operational facilities (Ateş, et al., 2006, p. 63) (Solidarity Center, 2010, p. 12). This laws and transformation in state policy resulted in a debt crisis that will be
explained in the next phase and economic dependence on the United States and international financial bodies, which widened domestic inequality and deepened the polarization of the society (M. Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 97).

4.2.1. Role of the State

The State's overall role in the economy has shifted from a developmental to a producer and opened up fields to foreign investment and this was seen in the various economic sectors of the state as follows:

**Industrial Policy:** The state shifted from a role where industrialisation forms a major pillar in the comprehensive national development plan of the state to one where it is an industrial investor, the largest one among others seeking profit. It also supported commercial activities, particularly those promoting advanced technology and stimulating exportation (N. Ayubi, 1989, p. 68) (Ateş, et al., 2006, p. 63).

**Agrarian Policy:** There was no national agrarian plan but foreign capital was encouraged to invest in agriculture sector such as land reclamation, vegetable and export crops (Ateş, et al., 2006, p. 63).

**Construction and Housing Policy:** “The State chose to sacrifice its developmental role than its welfare one, since the maintenance of a certain minimum of the State’s welfare function is necessary for the survival of the regime” (N. Ayubi, 1989, p. 68). The state again encouraged foreign capital, particularly the ones in the neighbouring oil-rich Arab countries, to invest in housing (Ateş, et al., 2006, p. 63). The market responded to the high purchasing power of returning Egyptian workers in the Gulf States with luxurious housing units, which most regular Egyptians could not afford (El-Batran & Arandel, 1998, p. 221). As the state shifted away from its

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9 “Private sector companies were the main beneficiaries of such policies which approved various tax exemptions on construction for periods varying from five to eight years, tax exemptions of 10 to 15 years for construction and land reclamation projects, and new communities outside the city limits.” (El-Batran & Arandel, 1998, p. 221)
developmental role, and foreign capital was encouraged to invest in housing. People were forced to take urban development into their own hands. Settlements evolved with a lack of services and utilities. People built their own affordable housing due to rising costs of construction labour, invested in the infrastructure of their new neighbourhoods, appropriating public utilities, setting some land for roads and markets and launching transportation systems to connect them with the rest of the city and their workplaces. Vacant sites around Cairo were illegally occupied and then developed into housing due to the increasing prices for owning houses or renting houses for the matter (Figure 9) (Deboulet, 2009) (Sims, 2012). This type of urbanisation has been considered informal as it was not regulated and illegally constructed on either state or agricultural lands, ignoring zoning laws and construction regulations. Most of them lacked basic services such as health or police units and have poor infrastructure. “Urban growth expanded as well over agricultural land around the cities as the price of land on the periphery was affordable compared to other land in the city” (El-Batran & Arandel, 1998, p. 221).

Figure 9: The informal settlement boom in Cairo
Source: (Hassan, 2012)

During the open door policy, the government has tried to involve other international cooperation actors in the upgrading effort, in an effort to
attract new external financing for urban development projects (Piffero, 2009). By the end of 1970’s the influx of development organisations working on urbanisation began. There was an economic dependence on international financial bodies and development cooperations for urban development. According to the World Bank Audit Report of 1986, “the chief problem in Cairo at that time was an acute shortage of housing and urban services resulting from the rapid increase of the urban population and exacerbated by the Government’s sector policies, such as rent control, subsidized public rental housing, and uneconomic utility pricing” (World Bank, 1986).

Hence, the government of Egypt\(^ {10} \), the World Bank and international donors supported various pilot projects in Cairo; in Helwan (1978), in Manshiet Nasser (1979), the Zabaleen Environmental Development Programme (ZEDP) in the Muqattam (1981), (Dorman, 2009) (El-Batran & Arandel, 1998). The programs went on for more than ten years and had been the recipient of significant financial resources from international donors. In Dorman’s section in Cairo Contested, ‘Of Demolitions and Donors’, he states that those two programs have failed because “any comprehensive approach to urban informality requires giving such neighbourhoods a measure of legal recognition and allowing them to develop a measure of social autonomy. Their efforts had only a limited impact on state housing and urban servicing policies but neither had any demonstration effect nor where they subsequently replicated elsewhere in Cairo” (Dorman, 2009, p. 282).

There have been efforts of state intervention to address unplanned growth and urban expansion through urban plans, zoning and laws, such as the

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\(^ {10} \) The decision to establish the General Authority for Physical Planning had been issued by a Presidential Decree No. 1093 of 1973 to follow the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and be subjected to the Ministry’s supervision, control and guidance. The General Authority for Physical Planning is the body responsible for public policy planning and sustainable urban development, and the preparation of plans and programs of development at the national and regional levels. It also review and approval urban plans at the local level in the framework of the objectives and policies of national, regional and local planning and sustainable urban development. (GOPP Website)
construction of new towns. The Master Plan of 1974/1975 outlined the creation of 18 new towns (Figure 10) in the desert surrounding the Cairo Metropolitan Region to draw people away from Cairo and de-concentrate population (El-Batran & Arandel, 1998)(Singerman, 2009, p. 13). Beginning in the 1980s, New Towns began to be planned and after Mubarak took over, he reaffirmed the construction of satellite towns. A number of these satellite cities have been built, but despite the hopeful vision that they would attract a part of Cairo’s population to relocate, they have not flourished as they were envisioned to. “Housing in the New Towns was and still is unaffordable for the majority of Egyptians” (Kipper, 2009). This is quite paradoxical because about 6 million Egyptians are ultra poor, that is, they have an income lower than a third of the national average and live on less than quarter of a dollar per day (Mobarak, 1996).

The planning for Cairo’s metro system was also carried out in the early 1970s by the Ministry of Transport with French assistance and the detailed design study published in 1973 (Sims, 2012, p. 233) and a series of elevated
roads and tunnels were constructed to resolve the exploding traffic congestion that resulted from the population growth and urbanisation such as the Ring Road which was in the 1956 and 1970 master plans was completed in 2001-2002 (Figure 11).

![Figure 11: Cairo Ring Road Growth Strategies](image)

Even though the Ring Road was containment strategy for the growth of Cairo (Figure 12), it has boosted housing development around it. “Much of this ring-road-associated housing development has been private rather than public and higher class rather than lower class and has segregates inner Cairo from the outer fringe areas of higher class residences” (Sutton & Fahmi, 2001, p. 147). In addition the road has swallowed up the agriculture land pockets within it, and “polluted many irrigation canals as they have been degraded or even cut by the Ring Road construction. Many canals and drains have been blocked with construction refuse coming from public works and private activities” (Denis & Séjourné, 2002). (Deboulet, 2010) in her article ‘Urban Highways as an Embodiment of Mega and Elite Projects’, argues that, because state interventions in developing countries are uneven and weak in fundamental major sectors such as social and economic, their neoliberal agendas and internationalization are compensated in huge investments in fast roads. “Hence urban highways and freeways are surrounded by another vision of the city, where it strives to appear as a part of a global world order” (Deboulet, 2010).
Figure 12: A map showing the ring road around Greater Cairo
Source: (El-Araby, 2002)

4.2.2. Role of Civil Society

After the declaration of the Open Door Economic Policy, in order to assure the US of his commitment to economic and political liberalization, Sadat relaxed the control of the state over society. This was allowed on the condition that their activities did not challenge the basis of presidential authority. This gave a chance to other NGOs to have more freedom to exercise more autonomy than they had under Nasser. (M. Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 98) This control on civil society organisations remained until 1977 and before the food riots¹¹. “After the food riots and demonstrations against Sadat’s economic policies engulfed the entire country, Sadat applied by a

¹¹ A popular uprising that took place in Egypt on the 18th and 19th of January 1977 against the increased prices of basic food items, such as bread
series of decrees, “which repressively curtailed political freedoms, and civil liberties, which had grown slowly, but steadily during his previous years in power” (A.Hassan, 2010, p. 321). Only Businessmen’s Associations grew during that time, as they were in pace with the mandates of the policies.

As mentioned in (Chapter 2), informal communities have organized themselves to provide most basic public services in the absence of any government intervention. During the seventies, that effort was mostly led by organisations affiliated to strong fundamentalist Islamist ideologies. Many private mosques started to provide social and charitable services in the form of charitable associations (al-jama'īyyat al-khayriyya) to their surrounding communities especially in the fields of education and health. These later became the spark for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and were in many cases linked to the rising Islamic political groups especially since

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Figure 13: A poster campaigning for the food riots
Source: (Marefa, 2012)
Sadat appeased religious followers by instituting ‘Sharī’ah’ (Islamic) law in the Egyptian constitution which has been a long hoped goal for Islamist movements (El-Batran & Arandel, 1998, p. 227) (Pioppi, 2004, p. 04).

“This Sadat appealed to mounting Islamic sentiment, which was partly a reaction to changing socio-economic realities, and encouraged certain Islamic factions to become active in order to counterbalance leftist and Nasserists groups, which he thought, posed a main threat to his regime.” Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World, (E.Jreisat, 1997, p. 98)

This explains the increase in the numbers of Islamic NGOs as a percentage of the total number of registered NGOs registered with the Ministry of Social affairs, from 17.33 % in the 1960s to 31.02 % in the 1970s (M.Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 99). In the eighties, the charitable sector was transformed from the seventies into a more governmental policy in the form of Ministry of Religious Endowments. This state institution aimed to control, regulate and enlarge the entire charitable sector in the general framework of the government. A most representative strategy of the government’s policies at that time was ‘al-majhud al- dhati’ (self-help) strategy which is a type of collective or individual self-help where communities organized themselves for the provision of the most basic services such as health care, water, and mosques without relying on the state (Ben Nefissa, 2009, p. 179) (Pioppi, 2004, p. 05). In this neoliberal form, inhabitants must pay both politically and financially to have access to public services and resources that used to be a state obligation, and struggle to obtain formal recognition from the state (Ben Nefissa, 2009, p. 179). In the absence of any government intervention, this effort and social aids has sometimes been led by organisations with a religious affiliation, for example “in Istabl’Antar, such an organisation was created from a mosque which offers classes
and social services to the areas' inhabitants” (Deboulet 1994 cited in (Arandel & El Batran, 1997, p. 22). Such aids encouraged the Islamists to confront the state more boldly, which were beyond the state's “limited capacity for political pluralism and freedom of expression” (Singerman, 2009, p. 114). The fact is that on a state level, the scale of neoliberalism politics gave more potential for international corporations to gain power without a lot of responsibility as opposed to local institutions and civil society that were given responsibility without power (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 386) and once this power opposes the state ideology, counteract occurs.


A major shift which occurred during that time was the economic liberalization process; economic reform and structural adjustment programme signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)\textsuperscript{12} in 1991. The Egyptian economy from 1982 to 1990 was in debt crisis. After years of partial reforms, by 1990, the Egyptian economy was no longer able to “support loss-making public industries, an overvalued currency, profligate government spending, an inflationary printing of money to cover the budget gap, and astronomical levels of foreign debt” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 457). The debt crisis forced Egypt to go to the multinational Paris Club to restructure its debt. In 1990-91 the government adopted the IMF stabilisation plan, which imposed a neoliberal structural adjustment program as a mandate for continuing the flow of credit (Mitchell, 1999, p. 457)(Maher, 2011) The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program policies were implemented through Law 203 of 1991.

\textsuperscript{12} From the 1980s, Egypt has had four economic programs that were supported financially by the IMF, totalling SDR 1.1558 billion ($1.850 billion at end-May 2011 exchange rate). However, only about one fifth of the available amount was actually disbursed (SDR 263.2 million/ $421.3 million at end-May 2011 exchange rate.). The last of these programs ended in 1998. (International Monetary Fund, 2013)
4.3.1. Role of State

A main reason stated by many authors for the state weakness at that time was the structural adjustment programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other financial institutions (Bayat, 2000) (Maher, 2011) (Mitchell, 1999). This is because structural adjustment policies have reduced state spending in health, education, and other social services.

“Subsidies on basic food stuffs such as rice, sugar and cooking oil have been removed; and on items such as fuel, electricity and transport, subsidies have been reduced. Rent control has been reconsidered, a new land law ended farmers land tenure, and public sector reform and privatization continued, all with significant social costs.”

Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the Middle East, (Bayat, 2000, p. 02)

These policies had a significant effect on the disparities in the economic and social sectors. “The increment of people below the poverty line increased between 1990/91 and 1995/96 from about 40% (urban and rural) to 45 % in urban areas and over 50% in rural” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 463). The agrarian reform Law 96/1992 raised agricultural rents and allowed for the eviction of tenants by landowners. A lot of Egyptians were unable to conform to this law and had to evict their lands and stream into the informal sector of urban centres. Later when some of these poorer urban areas were perceived as breeding grounds for Islamic fundamentalism, the government launched a programme in 1992 to improve informal areas throughout Egypt.

A U.S-Egypt Partnership for Economic Growth and Development was formed in 1994 as a new model for U.S.-Egyptian relations. After the cold war ended, the U.S needed to dispense its investments elsewhere. The
The purpose of the initiative was to liberalize Egypt’s economy to encourage and increase American private investment in Egypt as an alternative to the official U.S. government aid (Table 2) (Momani, 2003, p. 96).

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<td>815</td>
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<td>2311</td>
<td>2267</td>
<td>2298</td>
<td>2057</td>
<td>2413</td>
<td>2115</td>
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Table 2: Composition of U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt (in millions)
Source: (Momani, 2003, p. 101)

In parallel to the U.S-Egypt Partnership in 1994, the state was taking other privatisation measures such as subsidising the urban property developers as well, selling public land cheaply and putting up the required expressways and Nile bridges in rapid time and most of the remaining stock market activity, and privatisation progress, was confined to the construction sector - cement making, steel reinforcing bars, and contracting companies at the expense of agriculture, industry and their successive problems of training and employment (Mitchell, 1999). “It now subsidised financiers instead of factories, cement kilns instead of bakeries and speculators instead of schools” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 461). Completely in tune with the parameters of economic liberalization and IMF-driven structural adjustment, the Ministry of Housing as well sold plots of land on the desert margins of Cairo for investors to construct luxurious housing. The number of luxury constructions surpassed the capacities of market absorption and the affordability of regular Egyptians. Such policies and measures such as these “radically transformed the urban metropolitan landscape which its promoters invite us to view as an urban renaissance” (Denis, 2006).
4.3.2. Role of Civil Society

The previously mentioned policies have contributed to over-urbanisation, slowed economic expansion, and were applied at the expense of the poorest segments of society. “Development organisations assumed an additional burden to fill the void left by an increasingly fragile state as state services were cut” (W. Bradshaw & J. Schafer, 2000, p. 99). “This reflected in the gathering momentum in civil society activity starting in the 1980s which resulted in the multiplication of CSOs from 7,593 in 1985 to 16,000 by 1999” (Institute of National Planning, 2008, p. 65). This was due to a number of factors; firstly CSOs grew in response to the services gaps created by a retreating and financially constrained state, secondly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have advocated for civil society organisations to assist the state in development as part of their conditions witnessing a rise in the number of civil associations, and thirdly The UN’s ‘International Conference on Population and Development’ which was hosted in Egypt in 1994, with 20,000 delegates from various governments, UN agencies, NGOs, and media. After that conference an increased civic activity was noticeable among development oriented NGOs and increased donor interest in funding non-governmental activities working on the ground, in a diversity of areas, such as women’s rights, sustainable human development, environmental protection, children’s rights and advocacy.

“The 1990s have witnessed the emergence of participatory approaches which involved local communities to assist in development interventions as an empowerment to the marginalized population and a reaction to the failure of top-down interventions” (Piffero, 2009, p. 23). “Critics claim that the top-down model had failed because the institutions created to foster development from the top had themselves become the greatest hindrance to development” (Sanyal, 1998). The 1980s may have been the era of "bringing the state back in," but the 1990s clearly have been an era of recognizing the
importance of NGOs and civil society in underdeveloped countries” (W. Bradshaw & J. Schafer, 2000, p. 103). Again, on another level, “in 1999 the state passed an NGO law that dissolved all the licensed NGOs and required them to apply for permission to re-form under more restrictive regulations, including a ban on any activity that the state considered political which is not the main concern of this research” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 465).


4.4.1. Role of State

A very important milestone of this time was the “government of businessmen’ that came into power in July 2004 and had been brought economic liberals to the forefront. As soon as they took power, they accelerated the pace of privatization of public-sector enterprises. “As a result of these reform efforts, Egypt’s economic growth increased from 4.5 percent in 2004 to 7.2 percent in 2008 and Egypt was described as an “emerging success story” by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and listed among the top performers in the World Bank’s 2010 Doing Business Report. Egypt also managed to withstand the impact of the global recession and grew at an average rate of 5 % during 2008 to 2010. “With rising exports, workers’ remittances from overseas, tourism revenues, Suez Canal receipts, and large inflows of foreign direct investment and portfolio capital, foreign currency reserves increased from $14.8 billion in 2004 to $36 billion in 2010” (Khan & Milbert, 2012, p. 02). The problem was in equity and distribution of resources. According to ‘The Egyptian Report for Investment: Toward a Fair Distribution of Growth’, 2009 report published by the Board of Trustees of the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones in Egypt, is that the benefits of economic expansion have failed to trickle down to the poor, creating a growing gap between the very rich and everyone else. The report cites three principal causes for this” (Schenker, 2012):
• Sources of growth have been located primarily in sectors with the least employment.
• 35 percent of the labour force works in the informal sector, which has the lowest salaries and few available decent jobs
• Distribution of income is limited such that 40 percent of the lowest wage earners garner just 15 percent of the salaries

For example, a major move was the privatisation of water utilities Egyptian government “transforming them into corporations which were required to operate at a profit” (Piper, 2012).

“These reforms laid the groundwork for privatization of the sector, while water tariffs for households doubled in 2004 from LE 0.12 to LE 0.23 per cubic meter, as opposed to water use in golf courses, green areas and swimming pools in private upper-class developments continued to be unregulated, leading to public dissatisfaction expressed in the form of protests” (Shawkat, 2013).

Another example is the housing stock. According to a ‘A Framework For Housing Policy Reform in Urban Areas in Egypt’ report issued by the World Bank and USAID in 2008, even though “Egypt applied a mortgage finance system, a property registration system, a property tax law, a Unified Building Code, a new Rental Law, and expanded affordable housing typologies offered under social housing programs, 3.7 million housing units are either vacant or closed, 42% of the housing stock in Greater Cairo is frozen under rent control, and 45% of new urban housing over the past decade was produced by the informal sector”(World Bank, et al., 2008).
A debatable urban development scheme in 2007 was initiated to prioritize projects in Cairo, named ‘Cairo 2050’, whose vision was to design for a “competing city at the local and international levels, upgrade living conditions to an international standard, improve the environment in areas such as in Al-Warrak & Al-Dahab islands, provide proper infrastructure services and redistribute residents living in informal areas in Cairo and Giza to new satellite cities, such as 6th of October City and Helwan” (GOPP, 2009). According to (Amnesty, 2011), that development plan raised concerns about potential forced evictions, especially because there has not been proper consultation with the residents of areas that are to be redeveloped or improved and at the same time no constructive alternatives have been provided. This fear was not raised from emptiness because during that time, as an indicator, there has been a case of forced eviction almost every year from the years 2004 to 2010 (Table 3).

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<td>Duwayqa area</td>
<td>130 people</td>
<td>100 killed</td>
<td>90 families</td>
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<td>Al-Damrania</td>
<td>480 households</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ezbet Al-Bakry</td>
<td>18 families</td>
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<td>Wady For'on</td>
<td>60 households</td>
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Table 3: Estimated Number of Forced Evictions in Egypt from 2004 to 2010
Sources: (Amnesty, 2011), (COHRE, 2009)

One year later after the signed agreement for Cairo 2050 in 2008, a rock slide in Manshiet Nasser in Cairo killed 45 residents and injured 57. This brought the issue of informal areas, particularly in unsafe locations, to the forefront of government concern and media debate. In response, the International Settlement Development Fund (ISDF) was established by a presidential decree No. 305 of 2008 to develop informal areas. It’s directly headed by the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers with the aim of developing and upgrading informal areas, in addition to providing plans for housing, utilities infrastructure, water, sanitation and electricity (ISDF Website).

4.4.2. Role of Civil Society

Over the course of 2004 and 2005, a study was made that assessed the state of civil society in Egypt called ‘Civil Society Index Report for the Arab Republic of Egypt’ produced by CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) (CDS, 2005). In CIVICUS, the state of civil society in the Egyptian national context was assessed, while taking account of informal coalitions and groups, along four basic dimensions (Figure 15) explained below using use more than 70 indicators and a structured methodology (CIVICUS, 2011).

- The structure of civil society: According to CIVICUS, despite the thousands of existing CSOs in Egypt, citizen participation is still quite...
limited in the structure of civil society. This might be attributed to the inability of the CSOs to engage with wider segments of the public, and that charity continues to be the principal mode of operation, despite the fact that some CSOs have adopted more developmental approaches to their work.

- The environment in which civil society functions: Legal and political restrictions, economic hardship and social problems still negatively influence the work of CSOs, especially the work that requires a high degree of political openness, citizen engagement and mobilization, such as advocacy work due to a centralized state which sought control all aspects of civil life.

- The values practiced in the civil society arena: According to CIVICUS, this positive assessment in the chart may have been influenced by the fact that many are civil society members are activists and practitioners, and deeply believe in civil society and its causes.

- The impact of activities pursued by civil society actors: There is no clear picture for the impact of their work since engaging in development work is still a new territory for many CSOs.

Figure 15: Egyptian Civil Society Diamond
Source: (CIVICUS, 2005)
“By the end of 2008, there were around 30,000 civil society organizations in Egypt, around one for every 2,800 Egyptian residents. Only a minority of those was active. Religious and development associations together were more than half of all civil society organisations” (Hassan, 2010, p. 326). During that phase and due to the acceleration of privatization of public sector and inequity in income distribution protests arouse sharply all over Egypt. A labour movement began to take shape in Egyptian industrial towns like Mahalla protesting low wages, non-payment of bonuses, wage supplements, and social benefits, and private investors’ failure to uphold their contractual obligations to their workers. The Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya) was established at the end 2004. In 2006, workers of the ‘Misr Spinning and Weaving’ protested and made a large labour strike in the strongest action before Mubarak’s ouster. “In 2008, a demonstration in Mahalla grew to thousands within hours, an action that riveted the country and shook the regime to its core, in the words of former regime officials. The movement continued to build steam in late 2010.” (Maher, 2011)

4.5. Post Revolution: 2011 - 2013

4.5.1. Role of State

A couple of reasons triggered the uprising in Egypt, from them were the low government effectiveness, the corruption level in the country, the death of Khalid Said who was brutally killed by police, and the labour protests. “From the year 2000 to 2010 (Figure 16), Egypt showed a significant decrease for voice and accountability (24.5 to 13.3), corruption control (43.4 to 34.4) and government effectiveness (46.8 to 40.2)” (Sakamoto, 2013). Since the revolution in 2011, Egypt has witnessed political instability. This phase is characterized by a transition phase that was led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), an elected president, 4 prime ministers, and 5 cabinet reshuffles. This political instability, has affected
economic growth. According to an Interim Strategy Note for the Arab Republic of Egypt written by the World Bank, the GDP growth declined to 2.2% in 2012/13 and investments to 13% of GDP in 2012. Unemployment was 13% at the end of 2012, with 3.5 million people out of work. Poverty rate increased from 21.6% in 2008/09 to 25.2% in 2010/11 (World Bank, 2013).

The pace of urbanization has been exploding. Not only illegal and informal constructions have been taking place at a rapid speed, but urbanisation has moved beyond informal housing and rental systems. Deterioration reflected in the quality of health services, education, street vendors, destruction of heritage buildings, and construction of extra stories illegally on buildings. Encroachments on agricultural land have reached 31,881 acres from 25 January 2011 to 9 May 2013 (MENA, 2013). “There has been an exponential increase in the rate of informal. For example, in Geziret El-Warraq in Giza the post-revolution rate of population growth has increased four and a half times compared to its pre-revolution rate.” (Sims, 2013) Forced eviction cases have continued as well, such as in Qorsaya Island and Ramlet Boulaq behind the Nile Towers. Since the revolution, there has been some blurred direction regarding the vision of the government in setting the national
plans and development according to interviews with some government employees and officials working in urban planning institutions but it appears that national plans and policies remain the same from the previous regime more or less. For example, Cairo 2050 Plan continues to be developed by the GOPP regardless of the criticisms around it.

According to an interview with (Shalaby, 2013), an advisor to the Minister of Housing and Construction, a member of the Board of Directors of ISDF and an ex-rapporteur of the Central Committee for the Development of Informal Areas in the Freedom and Justice Party, he stated that approach of the current government is as an enabler and not a provider. The idea is the government provides employment opportunities, proper environment and legislations for development and is responsible for setting a regional plan and master plan like Cairo 2050. Construction of housing and services will depend solely on private sector and civil society organizations. In addition to that, civil society organizations will be responsible for the development and service provision of deteriorated areas.

The Freedom and Justice Party ‘Vision for Upgrading Informal Areas’ report, seeks to enable the civil society organisations, both the formal ones and informal, to play in a pivotal role in upgrading their informal areas within a national vision which should lie under its civic responsibility towards its community and not rely on the government’s intervention. (Freedom and Justice Party, 2012) Institutions such as the ISDF will be left to deal mainly with unsafe areas and buildings and the GOPP will be a consultancy agency to inspect development projects proposed by the private sector. This will ensure that the country doesn’t go into informality through participation of different stakeholders.

A few projects though have been announced though on the official website of the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development mostly are
protocol of cooperations, such as the protocol of cooperation between the Mortgage Finance Fund and Ministry of Islamic Endowments to construct affordable housing units in Sadat City and Tenth of Ramadan, and the protocol between the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development and Ministry of Industry to activate the development of new industrial cities (MOH, 2013).

4.5.2. Role of Civil Society

After the revolution in 2011, the people felt that the city has been given back to them. They have figured out how to relate to one another and to the city they have always occupied without quite fully owning, have understood the usage of public spaces and streets, have determined how to deal with their own neighbourhoods, and have discovered their right to the city (Kimmelman, 2013) (Hopewell, 2013). This has been strengthened during the 18 days of the revolution. Firstly, this started to develop when people conquered public spaces to protest and demand for their rights. They used to change the spatial organization of the space to suit their needs. Secondly, during the security vacuum when people were forced to protect their homes in the form of organizing themselves into popular coalitions. Some of these popular committees dissolved after that time, other continued and evolved into a more formal structure taking care of neighbourhood issues such as the surveillance of gas cylinders prices and bread distribution. Even the planning approach by experts to the city’s informal areas and deteriorated places have changed.

Currently, with an increase in momentum after 2011, a different shift in the nature of the civil society has occurred (Figure 18). Approaches taken by most of them have shifted and undergone a rapid change especially with professional or experts in the field. There is a shift by many CSOs taken towards different conceptual frameworks for their work such as “rights-
based approaches” or “policy think-tanks” (Lewis, 2006, p. 668). Some of them are thinking of innovative space re-use and outside-of-the-box schemes to “re-invent and re-imagine the city when negative forces lead to a breakthrough” (Koolhaas, 2012) and some have also gone “too corporate and professionalized” (Lewis, 2006, p. 668). Others mainly focus on advocacy or research. Some civil society organizations have started addressing critical matters such as the right to housing and the expropriation of lands to the public benefit and its absence from the Egyptian constitution and laws. In addition, communities are no longer waiting for the state to approach them but are defining solutions that shape their own urban environment. New platforms of communication are launched to promote dialogue between civil societies, private and public institutions and academics to find new approaches in dealing with the urban futures of Cairo (CEDEJ, 2013). Through field observations, internet search and interviews with experts, the following are some of the categories of civil society (formal and informal) that are currently working on ground (See Appendix 2 for more information):

Advocacy
Awareness Campaigns
Beautification
Business Association
Climate Change
Co-working spaces
Environment
Food Production
Forced Evictions
Housing Construction
Income Generation

Informal areas upgrading
Recycling
Research
Right to Housing
Social Accountability
Solid Waste Management
Strategic Planning
Communication Platforms
Think Tanks
Urban Citizenship
Whistle-Blowers
Modes of professional engagement have also shifted (Figure 17). This touches upon the ethical concern in the professional practice as “many contemporary planners are increasingly recognizing the ethical basis of choices” (Campbell, 2012) they take when they set up such organisations. Some are working at a state level providing technical expertise and consulting, other are working on diminishing the gap between the state and civil society by negotiating, and networking. There are a considerable amount of professionals now working in empowering newly established CSOs and grassroots initiatives and providing technical support to them. A lot of civil society organisations have been driven to informality after the latest draft law. Many small-sized civil society organisations are working with the local society and are not necessarily registered.

Figure 17: Modes of Professional Engagement
Source: (Abdel-Halim, et al., 2012)
1. A recycling plant established by Yaqaza in Shubra and hiring its residents,
2. Neighbourhood beautification by Mantetzty and community

3. Urban gardening by Shagara,
4. Resisting forced evictions campaigns by Neighbourhoods in Name Only.

5. Co-Working Space in Built Environment Collective-Megawra
6. Know your City Workshop, TADAMUN

Figure 18: Examples of Civil Society Initiatives in Cairo
Sources: Facebook pages of corresponding civil society initiatives:
According to the latest data obtained from the Federation of NGOs and Civil Society on February 2013 the registered NGOs according to the statistics from MOSSA in Egypt in the year 2012 are 36,724 NGOs. (Medhat, 2013) Civil society is now governed by Law 84 of 2002 on Non-Governmental Societies and Organisations. A latest draft law of new NGO law that was being drafted since January 2011 was issued by the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs in October 2012. For locally based and locally funded civil society organisations, the draft guarantees the right to all citizens to establish a civil society organisation simply by notifying the authorities and its amendments stipulate that the minimum number of members range from 10 to 20 and the minimum setting up capital range from LE 10,000 to LE 250,000. According to the draft, civil society organisations could only be dissolved by a court ruling, in accordance with Article 51 of the Constitution. Foreign funded organisations conform to more severe restrictions such as complying to a coordination committee that oversees all their works including submitting notices, reporting, and approval provisions (MENA, 2013) (Anon., 2012) (Aziz & Thabet, 2013).

All civil society organisations have to be registered through the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs (MOSSA). Based on interviews with officials in the MOSSA (Al-Okaily, 2012) (Al-Tody, 2012) and with the General Federation of NGOs and Civil Societies (Medhat, 2013), there is no clear classification for the organisations working on urbanisation issues (Table 4). An operational mapping describing the size, geographical interventions and conditions of Cairo’s civil society organisations is difficult to draw, given that information, data and research is lacking and that no accurate official classification system exists to date. CSO activities are grouped together under broad categories in the MOSSA. “Classification is also blurred by the tendency of some CSOs to list numerous activities as part of their mission” (Institute of National Planning, 2008, p. 62).
Chapter 4 | State & Civil Society in Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Cairo</th>
<th>Giza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural, Scientific and Religious Services</td>
<td>6032</td>
<td>1772</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Assistance</td>
<td>4837</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maternity and child care</td>
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<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother and Child</td>
<td>1378</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family welfare</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age welfare</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special categories and welfare for the handicapped</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and Administration</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison Inmates’ Welfare</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship between Countries</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Activities</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Protection and Conservation</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development &amp; Income Generation</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer’s Protection</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>3611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Civil Society Classification according to MOSSA for the year 2012
Source: General Federation for NGOs and Civil Society (Medhat, 2013)

In the Arabic Encyclopaedia for Civil Society, Amany Kandil, Head of the Arab Federation for NGOs and author of the book ‘Civil Society Organisations in Egypt’ states that the traditional classification authorized by the concerned entities such as the MOSSA is incapable of accurately classifying fields of activities for civil society organisations. The
classification also mixes between the fields of activities and the target
groups. In addition, there is no law that necessitates that organisations abide
by their major field of activity which in turn makes the registration of an
organisation accompanied by multiple activities and not the main one
(Kandil, 2008, p. 70).

Updated statistical information on number of civil society organisations is
lacking and despite an online database on the website of the General
Federation of NGOs and civil societies that includes names of CSOs per
governorate, details and qualitative information is missing. According to
data derived from interviews with the representatives of the Civil Society in
Giza and Cairo Governorate, all registered civil society organisations
working on urban planning issues lie under three categories namely;
environment protection and conservation, economic development and
income generation, and community development. There is no breakdown of
activities inside each category. The unavailability of data on various features
of the civil society sector in Egypt makes it difficult to map their
organisations and their distribution across different areas and regions.
“Matters are further complicated by the inaccuracy of some of the data that
is available and the fact that some figures tend to misrepresent their actual
situation. Another problem with the data is that organisations are classified
by MOSSA according to their activities and this has changed a number of
times”(M. Abdelrahman, 2004, p. 122). Districts which have records of civil
society organisations are likely to have those that are active while districts
that have recorded hundreds of CSOs could not tell which ones were
functional. For example by selecting an area such as Manshiyat Nasser13,
“there are over 60 CSOs in it. Most of them act as solidarity groups whose

13 Also known as Garbage City is an unplanned area at the base of Mokattam Hill on the
outskirts of Cairo which houses one million Egyptians, making it one of the most densely
populated areas, and whose main income generation used to revolve around the collection
and recycling of the city's garbage.
activities are restricted to charity support. Only 10 to 15 of them are move beyond those activities and try to bring out development” (Ismail, 2011). To complicate things further, interventions and plans by those civil society organisations and projects set forward by the government have been done on separate islands (Appendix 1).
Figure 20: Urbanomics Timeline
Source: Adapted by author from the references of the literature review in Chapter 4
Chapter 5 | Case Study of Ard Al-Liwa’
Chapter 5 | The Case Study of Ard Al-Liwa’

Ard Al-Liwa’ is an informal neighbourhood belonging to Agouza district (formerly belonged to Kerdassa District), located in the west of Cairo, adjacent to Al-Muhandiseen district, and is separated from the east of Cairo by a regional railway to Upper Egypt and Al-Zomor irrigation canal (Figure 21). Ard Al-Liwa’ is separated from adjacent farmland on the west side such as Al-Mi’timidiya Village by Cairo Ring Road.

Figure 21: Ard Al-Liwa Location Map
Source: Google Earth adapted by author
5.1. Area Profile

Its population for the year 2012 reached 145,811 inhabitants on an area of 825.28 acres. The neighbourhood is well connected with infrastructure provision, with sewerage 93.8%, with water 99.6%. Even though the neighbourhood is entirely informal, 47.6% of the houses are privately owned. Other public services such as public schools, hospitals, and police stations are insufficient. In state institutions such as the GOPP, ‘Ard Al-Liwa’ neighbourhood is still recorded as part of a farm zone. Buildings are very high on the periphery and of medium heights to the inside of the neighbourhood. “It is not under the jurisdiction of law 106 – which stipulates that the elevation of a building must be no more than one and a half times the width of the street.” (Ben Nefissa, 2009, p. 189) Therefore, streets are very narrow compared to the high buildings in the area and that result in a very high density. There are vacant agriculture pockets inside the neighbourhood but are rapidly being filled up by buildings (Figure 22).

![Figure 22: Agriculture pockets in and around Ard Al-Liwa’](Source: Google Earth adapted by author)

Ard Al-Liwa’ has been a very prominent area especially since the uprising in January 2011, because of the many initiatives by the community, professionals and civil society organisations (Table 5)(See Appendix 3 for more information).

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14 Source: General Organization for Physical Planning
A non-profit studio initiated in 2007 by residents for contemporary art with the aim of connecting the area with the surrounding art and culture and acts as communication platform.

A civil society organisation set-up by the popular coalition of Ard Al-Liwa after January 25 to address the different needs of the community.

A newspaper produced by a workshop funded by the British Council, that trained the residents on drawing cartoons, journalism, photography, and writing stories.

Improving courtyards of El-Kods school, a public primary school initiated by GUC, TU Berlin and CLUSTER, funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A solid urban waste project to engage the public by putting objects made from urban waste into public spaces for public use initiated by the Spanish ‘Basurama’ and CLUSTER funded by the Spanish Embassy.

Table 5: Some of the initiatives in Ard Al-Liwa’
Chapter 5 | The Case Study of Ard Al-Liwa’

The three micro-projects selected in the case study have all been initiated after 25th January 2011 as a response to absence of certain services and facilities in the neighbourhood. The three projects are the railway crossing in Ard Al-Liwa’, Ard Al-Liwa’ Park and Al-Mi’timidiya Cairo Ring Road Ramps (Figure 23). The three case studies all started after the 25th January 2011 uprising. The analysis of the case studies was based on field research, desk research and semi-structured interviews with the initiators of the civil society projects, officials working in state institutions who assisted in the project and professionals who provided their expertise on the projects. The first project is the railway crossing between Ard Al-Liwa’ and Al-Muhandiseen district which needs a controlling system to enforce and
control vehicles from crossing the road during a trains’ passage through the neighbourhood and some organisation of space activities to lessen the congestion on the intersection. For this project interviews were carried out with (Shalaby, 2013) (Youssef, 2013). The second project focuses on providing missing services such as a health unit, green spaces and some schools on a 14 acre plot of undevelopable land that is located between Ard Al-Liwa’ and Al-Muhandiseen district. Interviews were carried out with (Gad, 2013) (Nagati, 2013)(Salem, 2013). The final project is the connection of Al-Mi’timidiya Village and Ard Al-Liwa’ to Cairo Ring Road through the construction of four ramps. Interviews for this project were carried out with (Abou-Musa, 2013) (Salem, 2013) (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Main Features in Ard al-Liwa
Source: GIS Map GOPP 2006, adapted by author
There are no updated development plans for Ard Al-Liwa’. The latest published one is the General Strategic Plan for the municipal unit of Ard Al-Liwa’, Kirdasa Township for the year 2009, produced by the Ministry of Housing, Infrastructure and Development, General Organisation for Physical Planning, and Cairo University, Faculty of Urban Planning (Figure 25). According to official interviews in the General Organisation for Physical Planning, there are two unpublished development plans, not yet approved and are not open for public viewing, the ‘Detailed Plan for Ard Al-Liwa’, Study of Existing Condition’ for the year 2011, produced by the Ministry of Housing and General Organisation for Physical Planning and the ‘Action Plan for the Development of Ard Al-Liwa’ - Giza Governorate’ for the year – 2011, produced by the Informal Settlements Development Fund (ISDF).

Figure 25: The General Strategic Plan for Ard Al-Liwa’ – 2009
Source: General Organisation for Physical Planning, 2013
5.2. Civil Society Micro-Projects

5.2.1. Project 1: Railway Crossing in Ard Al-Liwa’

The railway crossing is an ‘at-grade level crossing’ and is one of the three main accesses to the area. As the railway crossing is a central area in the neighbourhood since it connects Al-Muhandiseen with Ard Al-Liwa’, a lot of activities take place there. The railway intersection has garbage dumps, street vendors, a stop for the ‘tuk-tuk’ and another one for micro-buses, pedestrians crossing to the other side and a small park around it (Figure 26).

Figure 26: Railway Crossing in Ard Al-Liwa, Source: author

\[15\] A three wheeler auto rickshaw widely used as taxis in poorer neighborhoods of the city, and have become a popular symbol for lower income groups
i. **Urbanisation Issue**

The crossing is a very crowded dangerous junction and most taxi drivers would just leave customers out on the periphery to avoid entering it. On the 6th of January 2013, a tragic accident occurred in Ard Al-Liwa’. A train crashed into a taxi passing through the crossing and a whole family passed away. Level crossings present a significant risk of collisions between trains and road vehicles in Egypt. The railroad-crossing environment in the country is known to be relatively unsafe, and uncomfortable. Several factors contribute to this situation such as the unsatisfactory design of crossings, deteriorated conditions of their associated control systems, the condition of crossing vehicles, violation and non-compliance with traffic rules and regulations from pedestrians and vehicles, deficiency in traffic legislations and a lack of serious enforcement. (Abbas, 2003, p. 301) “In addition to that, level crossings are operated by untrained and underpaid staff who have been known to fall asleep or even abandon their posts during a shift.”(Applegate, 2013) One of the earlier fatal train-bus collision in the Upper Egyptian Assuit governorate in the beginning of the year, made the Transport Minister Rashad El-Metini and the head of the Egyptian Railway Authority during that time hand in their resignations. “Many Egyptians have blamed the government for corruption and for underfunding transport services, especially in the country’s provinces.” (Ahram Online, 2011)

ii. **Policies and State Intervention**

The railways sector in the Arab Republic of Egypt is operated by the Egyptian National Railways (ENR), a public economic authority affiliated to the Minister of Transport. It is one of the earliest railways in the world. The Egyptian National Railways (ENR) represents the official state institution responsible for the railway infrastructure, services and transportation of both passengers and freight in Egypt. “ENR has a significant role in
passenger transportation (about 50% of the total passenger traffic) and a minor share of freight transport (about 5%)” (El-Sayed & Lashine, 2000, p. 324). “Its main activities include planning, construction, upgrading, maintenance, operation, and safety works, etc. for rail tracks and bridges all over the Egyptian rail network” (Abbas, 2003, p. 301). “ENR plays a significant role in the Egyptian economy: it is a big railway, with a strong focus on passenger services and generally high technical productivity. (World Bank, 2005) According to the website of the World Bank, on 14th December 2010, The World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors granted the Egyptian National Railways Restructuring Project (additional financing) with a loan of US$ 330 million to improve the railways' services through safety measures such as signalling, track renewal and upgrading of its management and operation. (World Bank, 2010) This is quite paradoxical because in the year 2010 7,000 people were lost on road and rail accidents and that was around 7.9% increase from 2009 (Ahram Online, 2013) and suffered 16,830 accidents in 2011, which claimed 7,115 lives. (Ministry of Finance, 2013) “Egypt is negotiating a $4.8bn loan from the International Monetary Fund to construct level crossings, install modern safety mechanisms, and purchasing new air-conditioned and second class carriages” (Applegate, 2013). In the case study, 2 million EGP have been approved by the government to commence on the upgrading of the railway crossing in Ard Al-Liwa’ (Shalaby, 2013) (Mahmoud, 2013).

iii. Civil Society Initiative

The project was initiated by the Freedom and Justice Party, as civil society in the area. It was undertaken by the Central Committee of Housing and Urban Planning, which is a sub-committee from the Planning and Development Secretariat of the Party. The initiative started a year and a half after the revolution in 2011. The Committee has undertaken the developmental initiative without any coordination with the Ministry of
Solidarity and Social Affairs (MOSSA). It has however worked in collaboration with the Municipality of Giza and with the Syndicate of Engineers. “The Freedom and Justice Party believes that the climax for the civil society was in the 18 days of the revolution when the community felt its civilian responsibility and started forming popular coalitions to protect its homes and regained control for its affairs and thus they are investing on this strength.” (Shalaby, 2013)

The Vision of the CSO (Figure 27)

“The party seeks to enable the civil society organisations, both the formal ones and informal, to play a pivotal role in upgrading their informal areas within a national vision which should lie under its civic responsibility towards its community and not rely on the government’s intervention.” (Freedom and Justice Party, 2012)

Figure 27: Ard Al-Liwa’ Community Needs for the railway crossing
Source: Author, sketch idea taken from (L.Rosa & E.Weiland, 2012)
The first forum for community participation was carried out between the governorate of Giza and the Syndicate of Giza Engineers on the 15th of September 2012. The General Organisation of Physical Planning is not aware of the project. The aim of the forum was to find a short-term plan to develop fast interventions to the main problems that hinder development within the community mainly under three main topics: Traffic - Garbage - Informal Areas. (Giza Governorate, 2012) The Freedom and Justice Party proposed several initiatives out of which the Civil Society Initiative for Railway Crossing in Ard Al-Liwa‘ was selected. Once approved, the Freedom and Justice Party started working on ground. They divided the neighbourhood into areas and started distributing questionnaires on the community to select representatives to work on the initiative’s committee. A conference was held in the area inviting all interested stakeholders to take
part. A participatory approach was carried out with civil society organisations on-site to produce alternatives and ideas for developing the area of the railway crossing. The initiative was carried out with the following civil society organisations in collaboration with the Freedom and Justice Party, Giza Municipality and the Syndicate of Giza Engineers (Figure 28). After several meetings and the development of alternatives, the Freedom and Justice Party made a committee with the previously mentioned stakeholders and shifted their role from civil society to consultancy services. The Party sees the government as an enabler and not a provider – its role is to only provide job opportunities, investment projects and proper legislative environment for development. In Ard Al-Liwa’, the vision for the initiative was to build on the capacity of the civil society organisations in the neighbourhood and offer a pilot project for others informal areas.

iv. Current Situation

According to the interviews, the project is not moving forward due to a couple of reasons. Firstly is the non-cooperation of security and police. Secondly is the lack of integrated efforts on ground with other state institutions in addition to the corruption of local authorities and community representatives. The public interest is not the main aim for everybody. Thirdly is the national project of Al-Zomor irrigation canal which involved filling the canal to be used for other projects and this was a constraint for the implementation of the initiative. Fourthly a lot of alternatives have been presented which made it difficult to proceed further.
5.2.2. Project 2: Ard Al-Liwa’ Park

A remaining undeveloped plot of land still exists between Ard Al-Liwa’ and Al-Muhandiseen. The land’s size is around 14 acres and belongs to the Ministry of Endowments. For the residents of Ard Al-Liwa’, it offers a chance for them to provide absent or missing services in their neighbourhood and improve the overall environmental quality of life and “establish active interface between the increasingly segregated formal and informal developments on its both sides” (Nagati & Elgendy, 2013, p. 05).

Figure 29: Undeveloped Land Parcel
Source: author

i. Urbanisation Issue

There are a few public schools, hospitals and no fire stations for emergencies. The neighbourhood is dependent on Al-Muhandiseen in both
its economy and in terms of public services. The cause of all these problems is there is no planned public land where state services can be situated (Ben Nefissa, 2009)(Nagati & Elgendy, 2013). Based on a detailed survey in 1994, Giza's informal areas contained 30% of undeveloped land inside Cairo Ring Road. The Giza Comprehensive Urban Planning Policy proposed to freeze those plots to limit densities and improve overall living conditions of the residents. Most of this land has been built on losing any opportunities of public intervention. Only state owned properties provide some opportunity to accommodate some public services (Denis & Séjourné, 2002).

Currently, those 14 acres are the biggest remaining undeveloped piece of land that exists between Ard Al-Liwa’ and Al-Muhandiseen. This land is state owned and belongs to the Ministry of Endowments. According to the Ministry of Endowments website, it contributes to solve the housing problem of the state, by creating housing projects on the lands that belong to the endowments (waqf) in all the Egyptian governorates either for ownership or for renting, in collaboration with Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Local Development. Furthermore, community priorities at the moment are not more housing units but are the lack of services in their area, such as a health unit, a police unit, an outlet for bread distribution, and the untreated water canal in the area.

ii. Policies and State Intervention

The project proposed by the Ministry of Endowments (Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf, Projects’ Department: Housing project on Waqf Mohamed Sinan, Ard Al-Liwa’, 2009 – Figure 30) for the undeveloped land was planned to establish 9 residential buildings for investment and 14 others for youth housing, in addition to the construction of services in the same plot of land to serve these buildings (Abdel-Kareem, 2012) (Kamel, 2012). The project
was approved by the governor in 1994 (Salem, 2013). After almost a decade and presently, the Ministry of Endowments has already taken the necessary operational procedures for the construction of the residential area and the contractor has received the land to begin construction.

Figure 30: Housing project on Waqf Mohamed Sinan – 2009
Source: (Gad, 2013)

iii. Civil Society Initiative

The initiative started with the Popular Coalition of Ard Al-Liwa’, which was formed directly after the revolution in 2011. In the beginning the coalition used to protect the area during the 18 days of security vacuum (4.5) in the revolution, than its role evolved into political mobilization and awareness during the elections. Later and after dealing more openly with the people and knowing their needs, they shifted to help in service provision in the neighbourhood. The coalition depends on voluntarily efforts of its members who are from all ages and from the community. The coalition has done a lot of ‘self effort’ initiatives such as construction of a police unit, gas cylinders’ distribution, garbage removal near the ring-road, protection of schools
during the security vacuum, and political mobilization and awareness. The coalition is formed from people within the community. Their main vision is to provide for the community’s needs. They know Ard Al-Liwa’ needs because they are a part of the community.

The Vision of the CSO (Figure 31)

“[The land that belongs to the Ministry of Religious Endowments represents an opportunity for the whole surrounding neighbourhoods, Ard Al-Liwa’, Al-Muhandiseen and Al-Agouza to be a catalyst for social and economic development and the overall improvement of the quality of life in the area that was once neglected area.” (Gad, 2013)
Chapter 5 | The Case Study of Ard Al-Liwa’

The Popular Coalition of Ard Al-Liwa’ has identified priorities and then took practical steps to address these needs. One of the founders of the coalition, a resident of Ard Al-Liwa’ had been doing her studies on Ard Al-Liwa’ when she discovered the hidden potential in the piece of land. The coalition started by involving the community in their vision, talking to the residents, raising awareness about how such a project will benefit the neighbourhood (Gad, 2013). They also campaigned for their project and vision with other political groups. They were working with a parliament representative, Amr El-Shobaki, an independent parliament representative at that time. “The coalition afterwards approached Cluster group requesting to translate their needs and aspirations into a technically feasible planning scheme, and thus

Figure 32: Process of the Civil Society Initiative for Ard Al-Liwa’ Park
Source: (Gad, 2013) (Nagati & Elgendy, 2013) adapted by author
turning an oppositional position into a proactive developmental vision” (Nagati & Elgendy, 2013, p. 07). The formal approval process had to be negotiated with multiple state institutions, such as the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Irrigation, the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and the Ministry of International Cooperation, the GOPP and the Giza Governorate. By the time the Ministry of Religious Endowments had come to establish the project and begin construction, the Popular Coalition of Ard Al-Liwa’ had already mobilised the society and formed a pressure group to demand for their needs and rights (Figure 32). They protested in front of the land and declared that they have an alternative vision to the one of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. In parallel to that, Amr El-Shobaki managed to set up a meeting with Kamal Al-Ganzoury, who was a Minister of Cabinets at that time. The coalition negotiated their demands to the minister who in turn was convinced and managed to stop the planned project of the Ministry of Religious Endowments.

iv. Current Situation

The land belongs to the Ministry of Religious Endowments. In order for the government to get hold of the land, the Cabinet of Ministers needs to compensate the Ministry of Religious Endowments with another parcel of land equal in size. Till then, no projects can be constructed on the undeveloped land. Since the Popular Coalition of Ard Al-Liwa’ has raised their demands, Egypt has witnessed a democratically elected president, 4 prime ministers, and 5 cabinet reshuffles and changing governors. (See Chapter 4). This has somehow slowed down the progress of the project according to each cabinet’s agenda. In addition to that, the dissolution of the parliament has caused a major slow down, as the community cannot find a political representative.
5.2.3. Project 3: Ring-Road Ramps Construction

Connections of the outskirt areas to Cairo Ring Road were almost non-existent; and even where they exist, they don’t provide local accessibility through some pedestrian ramps. Al-Mi’timidiya village had no linkages to the city, other than passing through the whole neighbourhood of Ard Al-Liwa’ from west to east.

Figure 33: Disconnection from Cairo Ring Road
Source: (Abou-Musa, 2013)

i. Urbanisation Issue

Cairo Ring Road was considered as a main tool to reduce the inner-city transit circulation and also to limit the urban sprawl of informal areas (Chapter 4). In Giza governorate, the Ring Road is elevated as a wall constraining the local interconnection and accessibility. “It doesn’t only reduce access to the highway but, built as a wall, it limits severely the possibly to develop tangential connections to the settlements inside and outside the Ring Road” (Denis & Séjourné, 2002). Cutting off access to it has resulted into a blockage of the adjacent informal areas resulting in a social exclusion more than growth containment. Nowadays most of the high-income segments live in gated communities located on the outskirts of
Cairo. These highly protected spaces are usually well connected to the city centre through highways that are constructed from the spaces of the poor, avoiding the cultural clash between extremely rich and poor. The informal area of Al-Mi’timidiya is located on the west borders of Ard Al-Liwa’ and of which Ard Al-Liwa’ was a part of previously, had evolved from a rural settlement to a fast-growing residential area. “It has, thus, ‘fallen outside’ the ring road when it was constructed.” (Nagati & Elgendy, 2013, p. 03) The area was totally disconnected from the surrounding urban areas which made it difficult for people to commute to the city centre and excluded the village from inner Cairo.

ii. Policies and State Interventions

The Ring Road was a containment strategy for the growth of Cairo (Figure 12).

iii. Civil Society Initiative

In the beginning, there were two active civil society organisations on site; Al-Gami’iya al-Shari’ya and Gameita Al Hidaya. Their aims have been social welfare from the start, such as organising subsidised bread distribution in the area, gas cylinders and garbage collection, construction of schools and hospitals, and any services needed. The initiation of ‘Al-Mi’timidiya Baladna’ came into being after the revolution of 2011 as a fusion of those two civil society organisations that produced a new entity to renew the blood of civil society in the area and avoid old disputes if there were any. It also involved people from the community. They organisation was around 7 -10 members only and according to the interviews, it was stated that they are not affiliated to any political parties but by observation they are religiously affiliated. They had a list of priorities to help in the area and the ramps were one of them. It was a much needed project by the community to connect the people with the rest of the city.
The Vision of the CSO

The vision of the association is quite simple really. It is mainly social welfare and providing services that respond to the needs of the community. (Abou-Musa, 2013)

The process

It embarked in 2011 in during the shift in regime between the former and the current one. ‘Al-Mi’timidiya Baladna’ informal organisation at that time only hoped to construct a sand ramp to serve the area. When the village of Al-Mi’timidiya noticed that the CSO was serious in its promises, engineers, experts and normal residents who lived in the community started to assist them. The vision grew and the community decided to make four ascending and descending ramps in asphalt. Since the people in the organisation had a history in philanthropic services, they had contacts with experts and
companies involved in infrastructure construction that provided their assistance. They also got a paid contractor to carry out the project. They made advertisements calling out for donations and explaining the project and every week a paper (called the yellow paper) was passed around with the names of the donors, and their amount of donation. A lot of donations fell on them, starting from 5 EGP to 20,000 EGP. The project was a risk, and no legal approvals were taken at that time but no one stopped the project for them. The ramps were constructed by ‘Al-Mi’timidiya Baladna’ informal association which was not registered at the time, took three months and cost around 1 million Egyptian pounds. Later on, the association was registered formally in MOSSA. At first, the General Authority for Roads, Bridges and Transport disapproves the ramps construction. ‘Al-Mi’timidiya Baladna’ then had to raise the issue to the media and the Shura council which later forced the General Authority for Roads, Bridges and Transport to approve and legalise the ramps.

iv. Current situation

The ramps are being used successfully now. However they have caused traffic congestion in the area especially from Ard Al-Liwa who use them and somehow raised the prices of land and real estate around them.

Figure 35: Ring Road Ramps after construction
Source: author
5.3. Reflections

Civil society organisations that work on providing solutions for small sectoral urbanisation issues in their context exert a lot of effort in determining which state institution to communicate with, get approvals on their proposals from and follow-up with. As mentioned before, the housing project belonging to the Ministry of Religious Endowments had been approved by the governor in 1994, long forgotten afterwards and was only about to be constructed in 2012. Between 1994 and 2012, a lot of informal construction had taken place by the neighbourhood residents to house themselves. Housing might have been an issue in 1994, but there is the possibility that housing might not be one of the priorities of the area in 2012 anymore. Not only are the procedures of amending errors very rigid, but also the operational mechanisms and methods to update plans according to society changes, or provide alternative solutions is hardly available.

In the Ard Al-Liwa’ Park project, CSOs had to approach more than one state institution to raise their demands and reach a consensus, the Ministry of Religious Endowments which is carrying out the housing project in the neighbourhood, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Irrigation, and the Ministry of International Cooperation, as well as the GOPP, which is only a consultant and not an executive body but has to approve any future plans in accordance with its own strategic plans of the area, and the Giza Governorate, which will be the owner of the Park project (Nagati & Elgendy, 2013). On the one hand, not only did those institutions not have any updated vision for the area but also, they didn’t have any pioneering solutions for providing alternatives to the Ministry of Religious Endowments, except to compensate the Ministry of Religious Endowments with an equal plot of land in a different location, which showed to be difficult and that’s why the projects had been brought to an abrupt halt besides of course the political instability in the country.
“The involvement of stakeholders in development interventions seemed to be the best way of making projects more effective and efficient and equally important less costly” (Piffero, 2009, p. 38). However, projects carried out by some of the CSOs in Ard Al-Liwa’ have been overdone more than the project itself needs. The project of the train crossing could have been handled simply by constructing a controlling system to enforce and control vehicles passing on the level crossing especially since 2 million Egyptian pounds have already been dispatched for that project. In addition special areas could have been specified for street vendors and tuk-tuk cars, and enforced by a security institution or by a popular council as civil society assistance. This hadn’t been the case, instead an extended participatory process, meetings with the governors, syndicates and other CSOs in the neighbourhood were thoroughly organised and eventually the main problems and requirements which the community needed weren’t accomplished.

As mentioned earlier, some of the strategic plans were sent from earlier masterplans to battle certain urbanisation issues, such as Cairo ring Road that was constructed with an aim of limiting urban sprawl. This hasn’t happened and villages started filling the agricultural pockets within and around Cairo. Even though, the Cairo Ring Road hasn’t achieved its objectives, nevertheless, it was a strategic plan set in place and had to be revised, evaluated and updated. Civil society projects that are not done in accordance with state plans sometimes conflict with its strategies. Al-Mitimidya village reconnected itself to the ring-road regardless of the legitimacy of the action. It does connect the people to the city, but there ought have been other considerations such as the traffic impact on the neighbourhoods adjacent to it, the increase in land prices and real estate in the village itself which has already started taking place in some of the plot that are nearby to the newly constructed ramps (Abou-Musa, 2013) and the

100
changing dynamics of the villages itself. The project was done in a short time, with only one civil society organisations fused from two previous CSOs existing in the village, which somehow emphasizes a strong point that the smaller the civil society organisations working on a project the more focused and achievable are they. As much as it’s an appealing project, however it is not an easy project that can be replicated elsewhere but it does show that during the disappearance of security from the streets of Cairo, some CSOs took the chance to go ahead with a project that is benefitting their community in a way. Law enforcement is a fundamental service, but if civil society was to provide for itself, then some of the legal limitations on their work capacity needs to be reconsidered.
Chapter 6 | Conclusion
There is an increased emergence of civil society organisations concerned with urbanisation issues especially in post-revolutionary Cairo mainly because the state lacks the necessary resources (economic growth and basic services provision) to support its growing urban population, finance urban infrastructure and provide urban services. It is quite obvious that the assistance of civil society organisations is an ostensible pillar. One can’t deny the fact that a lot of the impoverished areas in Cairo are fully dependant on those civil society organisations especially after the retreat of a financially strained state after the uprising of 25th January. As seen when analysing the state and civil society context in Egypt, this dependence on civil society organisations has increased in momentum since the neoliberal narrative which occurred around 1974 in the form of Sadat’s “Open Door” economic policy (Chapter 4).
6.1. Emergence of CSOs Concerned with Urbanisation Issues

The economic liberalisation and neoliberal economic policies brought about a paradigm shift in urban development in Cairo and in the state-civil society relations. These neoliberal policies (Chapter 2) displaced welfare provision models through policies of privatization and deregulation either with minimal state intervention or excluding any state interference this simultaneously shifted spending priorities for public services. This resulted in an underinvestment in the services upon which most low-income groups are dependent. Not only that but foreign capital was encouraged to invest in urban development which forced people to deal with urbanisation issues on their own and organize themselves for the provision of the most basic services such as health care, water, and mosques without relying on the state for provision of public services and resources (Chapter 4). Consequently, in the absence of any state intervention; development efforts, social aids and service provision have mostly been led by civil society organisations generally charity and religious ones at that time. It is true that there was an economic independence on international financial bodies and development cooperations but the research focuses mainly on local civil society organisations.

The economic reform and structural adjustment programme signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1991 further strengthened the existence of civil society organisations that assisted in urban development. Its conditions further reduced state spending in health, education, and other social services in addition to severer privatisation measures (Chapter 2) such that most of the remaining stock market activity, and privatisation progress, was confined to the construction sector as explained in (Chapter 4). In addition the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have advocated as well for civil society organisations to assist the state in
development as part of their conditions which witnessed a rise in the number of civil associations.

The government of businessmen in 2004 brought about another paradigm shift in urban development in Cairo and state-society relations. As soon as they took power, they accelerated the pace of privatization of public-sector enterprises such as the privatisation of water utilities, forced evictions for luxurious housing and some 45% of new urban housing over the past decade was produced by the informal sector. Even though International Monetary Fund (IMF) listed Egypt among the top performers in the ‘World Bank’s 2010 Doing Business Report’, there was problem was in equity and distribution of resources and benefits of economic expansion have failed to trickle down to the poor, creating a growing gap between segments of the society. Due to that, protests and labour movements aroused sharply all over Egypt and its industrial towns which build up steam to the uprising in 25th January 2011.

Post-January 25 revolution brought about another paradigm shift in urban development in Cairo, state-society relations and a reorienting of citizenship rights. Today, a call for a more modern approach to urban development seems to be growing in the post-revolutionary crowd. After the revolution in 2011, the people felt that the city has been given back to them. They have figured out how to relate to one another and to the city they have always occupied without quite fully owning, have understood the usage of public spaces and streets, have determined how to deal with their own neighbourhoods, and have discovered their right to the city (Kimmelman, 2013) (Hopewell, 2013). As seen in (Chapter 4), there is a shift by civil society, professionals, experts and community residents taken towards different conceptual frameworks to provide for their needs and services.
6.2. Mobilisation Patterns of Civil Society Organisations

Three micro-projects were analysed in Ard Al-Liwa’ and Al-Mutamidy’ia; the railway crossing between Ard Al Liwa’ and Al-Muhandiseen, Ard Al Liwa’ park project and the highway ramps that connect to the Cairo Ring Road. It is apparent from the interviews and site visits that communities are no longer waiting for the state to approach them but are defining solutions that shape the own urban environment and needs (Chapter 5). The case studies illustrated three different mobilisation patterns, social processes and power structures between state and non-state.

6.2.1. Railway Crossing in Ard Al-Liwa’

The first pattern (Figure 36) was a participatory process in the community mobilised by a civil society organisation, the Freedom and Justice Party, the governing party at that time in Ard Al-Liwa’ in collaboration with a state institution (Governorate of Giza) and the Syndicate of Giza Engineers. The mobilisation pattern enabled some decentralisation in the decision by involving other CSOs in the neighbourhood (Figure 28). From the

Figure 36: Mobilisation Patterns of Civil Society in Ard Al-Liwa’
Source: adapted by author
challenges and deficiencies collected from the previous literature (Chapter 2) and overlapping those with the first mobilisation process, some advantages and challenges were concluded:

i. **Political or Religious Affiliation**

The political influence of the civil society organisation which initiated the project was a challenge, because this can turn out to be a double-edged sword. Firstly, not only may they use their reputation in their working contexts to exert a political influence at the local level but this may also corner them if the community doesn’t agree to their political agenda.

ii. **Involvement of other CSOs**

Other CSOs that got involved in the project were also either politically or religiously affiliated. This is because when involving or contracting other CSOs, they sometimes have to meet the objectives of the donors or the initiators in this case rather than adapting their own values in response to local situations especially if it’s a different political or religious stance (Chapter 2) in that case was the security apparatus which refused to assist in the project and enforce security.

iii. **Contribution to the Community**

Even though a fundamental aspect of CSOs is to raise communities’ demands to the state and try to meet communities’ needs, and even though even though civil society promotes different ideas and interests, this doesn’t always necessarily mean that all of them might contribute positively to equity and justice to build a good society (Chapter 2). On the one hand, one can’t disregard the fact that some CSOs could have been misusing the idea of civil society to meet certain agendas. In this case the main requirements of the community weren’t accomplished. The vision for the Freedom and Justice Party was to enable the civil society organisations, both the formal
ones and informal, to play in a pivotal role in upgrading their informal areas within a national vision which should lie under its civic responsibility towards its community and not rely on the government's intervention (Freedom and Justice Party, 2012) which was not one of the urgent priorities of the community. The needs of the community were the simple construction of a controlling system to enforce and control vehicles passing on the level crossing to avoid more deaths on the railway tracks and the simple organisation of street vendors and tuk-tuk cars enforced by a security apparatus or by a popular council as civil society assistance.

6.2.2. Ard Al-Liwa’ Park

The second pattern (Figure 36) was the project of Ard Al Liwa’ Park which was mobilised by the Popular Coalition of Ard Al-Liwa’ that was initiated in the 18 days of the 25th January uprising before the ouster of Mubarak’s regime during the security vacuum when people were forced to protect their homes in the form of organizing themselves into popular coalitions. Later and for legal purposes it became a registered civil society organisation called “Ard Al-Horreya” or “Land of Freedom”. The mobilisation pattern was distributed such that it involved many strategies to communicate with the different levels of the community, civil society and state. It varied between consultancy with experts, community participation, negotiations and advocacy with government and parliamentary representation (Figure 32). Again, from the challenges and deficiencies collected from the previous literature (See chapter two) and by overlapping them with the case study, some advantages and challenges were concluded:

i. Voicing Community Needs

Projects which are initiated from people within the community are more realistic and properly address the community’s needs better than those that are not situated in the local context. They are also able to reach citizens who
are "beyond the reach of the government's bureaucratic administrative apparatus" (Sanyal, 1998). There is also mutual trust from neighbourhood residents.

ii. State Representation

A critical issue is the importance of parliamentary members that represent that society and voice their demands. Coalitions and organisations such as these are having major problems in voicing their demands to the state in the absence of a parliament.

iii. Coordination with Relevant State Institutions

In the Ard Al-Liwa' Park project, CSOs had to approach more than one state institution to raise their demands and reach a consensus. Multiplicity of state institutions, working on resolving urbanisation issues, that exist, many of which are with overlapping mandates that compete against each other (Singerman, 2009) basically halts all possible ways forward for progress.

iv. Responsibility without Power

In the neoliberal development model in Egypt, local institutions and civil society that were given responsibility without power as in the case of the park. Even more, sometimes civil society organisations face a lot of challenges from the state when attempting to implement some of their projects such as administrative approvals, police clearance, and accusations of implementing foreign agendas.

v. Conflict of Interests

Sometimes conflicts of interests impede their work progress. Private developers who benefit from the lack of government interventions are sometimes an obstacle when it comes to developing a project that might conflict with their interests regardless of its importance to the community. Furthermore, CSO projects might conflict with public interest if there is no
national plan. Some other CSOs which are politically affiliated might work for their own interest and not for public good.

6.2.3. Al-Mi’timidya Cairo Ring Road Ramps

The third pattern ((Figure 36) was mobilised by Al-Mi’timidya Baladna’ which came into being after the revolution of 2011. Their process was quite centralised straightforward and uncomplicated. The mobilisation pattern involved collecting donations, implementing the project and get approval through representative entity, the Shura council which later forced the General Authority for Roads, Bridges and Transport to approve and legalise the ramps. Advantages and challenges concluded:

i. Cost and Effectiveness

It has been observed from the case study that the more compact the civil society organisation is, the more it tends to be more focused and the more effective its aims are. In the case study it only cost 1 million EGP to construct heavy infrastructure such as the four ramps while n the railway crossing, there was funding of 2 million EGP to install safety control and organise the activities in the space.

ii. Public interest

Even though this initiative responded directly to the community needs, it disregarded other issues in the wider context. For example no study has been made to see whether the construction of such ramps will generate the traffic loads in the area and surrounding neighbourhoods. Another concern is the urban sprawl which will extend around Al-Mi’timidya due to the high connectivity. Not only will it cause more pressure on infrastructure and encroachment on agricultural land near the ramps but will also increase the land prices for the surrounding neighbourhoods which are mostly lower income groups.
6.3. State-Society Paradigm in Cairo

There is a critical need for the proper coordination with civil societies and local driven initiatives that call for urban reform and assist in harnessing urbanisation issues. The reason for that is not only the unstable ever-changing political situation but also, the total disconnection between the state and civil society. On the other hand as well, state institutions in Egypt have been always characterised by excessive centralization, lack of transparency, and communication failures between the administrative apparatus and citizens (Ben Nefissa, 2009). This hasn’t changed much after the revolution as well. It’s true that most civil societies have to register in the a state entity such as the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs (MOSSA), but this is as far as it goes. Further coordination and supervision is cut-off after that, except in cases where there is a partnership between the civil society organisation and the state apparatus to implement a specific scope of work. In the absence of a clear framework for planning institutions and a national development vision, it is quite paradoxical that civil society organizations are used as mobilizing resources to combat urbanisation and underdevelopment. Only the government has the necessary tools and administrative powers for large-scale projects development and measures. Development paradigms ought to be interwoven and connected to harness urbanisation. Following are some of the issues combined from the literature review, the context of state and civil society in Egypt and the analysis of the case studies:

Issue #1: Coordination between State and Civil Society

Numerous state institutions deal with urban development and urbanisation issues. For example, some of the state institutions responsible for urban development of Cairo are the Governorates, the General Organization for Physical Planning, the Ministry of Housing and Urban communities,
Informal Settlements Development Fund, local municipalities and many others. This is in addition to other subsidiary entities such as the Ministry of Religious Endowments which take approvals to implement certain urban projects. Not only that, but the plans envisioned by the state institutions are occasionally very rigid and don’t respond to apparent societal changes, such as some plans that have been envisioned since a decade and still remain the same. Cairo is a dynamic city, changing frequently and shaped all the time by its residents and as such plans have to comply and correspond.

The only institution responsible for dealing with civil society organisations is the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs and that is only limited to approval of registration and issuing of formal licences. Other urban development institutions such as GOPP and Giza Governorate claim that they take into consideration CSOs works within their overall visions and strategies (Egypt Urban Futures, 2013) (Youssef, 2013), but that happens only when the CSOs approach them first according to their communities’
needs as investigated in the case studies. A proper restructuring for roles of those entities as well a clear framework for civil society engagement is needed, as they are, if not the only, the most well informed organizations in the society capable of raising the demands and knowing the changing needs of the communities.

**Issue #2: Regularisation of CSOs**

Egypt depends a lot on CSOs to perform a number of critical functions such as help provide much needed services, such as health, education, and find solutions to poverty, often in partnership with the state or market; and to mobilize communities. But sometimes civil society projects are often isolated from one another and from planned government interventions, and are difficult to replicate due to their specificity (Sims, 2013). They may sometimes also carry out duplicative work especially in research stages due to lack of knowledge of other similar projects going on. It is worthwhile to pinpoint that the regularisation of civil society organisations in Egypt might limit their capabilities and that their coordination with the authorities ends in an “over-centralized decision making, bureaucratic delay, and the suffocation of badly-needed private initiative” (Bratton, 1989) which should be reduced as possible by laws that lessen government interference in certain arenas.

**Issue #3: Classification of Civil Society Organisations**

Boundaries between state, market and civil society is blurred. As mentioned before in (Chapter 4) all civil society organisations have to be registered through the Ministry of Solidarity and Social Affairs (MOSSA). There is no clear classification for the organisations working on urbanisation issues (Table 4). Information, data and research is lacking and no accurate official classification exists to date. Activities are grouped together under broad categories and some CSOs list numerous activities.
Issue #4: Evaluation of Work

Society projects do not always achieve desired end results such that they sometimes do not meet the specific communities' needs at the end (Fakhry, 2013). Sometimes too much or too little is done. Most of the CSO don't have a proper evaluation system unless they are working in partnership with foreign agencies or the state. Therefore civil society organisations need to assess and evaluate the outcome of their works against their objectives which must be clearly defined from the beginning. This will reduce the waste of money and resources on unneeded processes or actions.

6.4. The Way Forward

Civil society organisations are now an effective actor in urban development, but until now no proper management scheme has been endorsed that fully integrates their work in a complementary manner. A new paradigm (for example Figure 38) for management of service delivery with the assistance of civil society organisation can be further studied to enhance their performances together and improve efficiency, effectiveness or equity in service delivery. This could be achieved by bringing together of a number of public, private and voluntary sector bodies to work across organisational boundaries towards a common goal. (Cook, 2004, p. 21)

Figure 38: Changing Paradigms for Sector Roles
Source: (World Economic Forum, 2013, p. 10)
Even though CSOs are self-regulatory, it is indispensable that there be a framework for regularisation of CSO works. On the other hand, the proper regularisation of CSOs acts like a snowball effect which will diminish down other issues facing civil society such as coordinating between CSOs projects and works, avoiding duplication and overlapping of projects and identifying priority areas in need of fast interventions. Furthermore, there needs to be an accurate official classification system other than the existing one (Table 4) which doesn’t take into account different forms of civil society organisations that are working on ground. For example, the International Classification of Non-profit Organizations (ICNPO) which was developed through a collaborative process involving the team of scholars working on the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project classifies CSOs into 12 major activity groups that are in turn further subdivided into 24 Subgroups. Each of the Subgroups has been broken into a number of activities, but the ICNPO system does not attempt to achieve standardization at the level of the activities because of the great diversity of the non-profit sector in the different locales. (Salamon, 1996)

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A regularly updated operational mapping (for example Figure 40) that is accessible to everyone will help empower stakeholders with valuable information and identify how different types of civil society organisations are positioned in relation to communities, the state and the market – some are closer to the market and the state than others (NCVO, 2012). Such mapping may include the specialization of CSOs, their size, their values, their affiliations for transparency between potential partnerships. It may also include poverty areas, donors, grants’ offers, markets that are interested in contractual business between CSOs for specific time durations, partnerships, direct supply and provision of goods and services. It may help point out active and inactive CSOs, describing the size, geographical interventions and time durations for CSOs projects. It may also clarify
stages of an undergoing project process which may help CSO in assisting in a certain part of the process if desired and not all the project. Certain tools could be developed to make such data visible to everyone. Evaluation of impacts and end results of projects can also be shared on such an interactive mapping database.

Figure 40: Mapping for Results Platform
Source: (World Bank, 2011)
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Appendices
## Appendix 1: Summary of Policy Interventions with Involved Partners in Manshiyet Nasser

Source: Usama Fakhry (Policies to Deal with Informal Areas in Egypt – ISDF) and author’s research

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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Involved Partners</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manshiyat Naser Plan - 1999</td>
<td>Cairo Governorate, GOPP, Suzanne Mubarak Abu Dhabi, Development Box</td>
<td>Gradual replacement and renovation for the entire area</td>
<td>Was not completed after January 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading Plans for Manshiyat Naser Areas - 2010</td>
<td>ISDF, Ministry of Housing and Urban Communities, Cairo Governorate</td>
<td>Evacuate dangerous areas and inadequate housing areas outside the area and hand-over the vacant land to the armed forces.</td>
<td>Didn’t take into account the social dimension of relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading the areas of garbage collectors-2010</td>
<td>Spirit of Youth NGO</td>
<td>Transfer the garbage collection activity in Ezbet Bekhit to a proper environmental location in May 15 City</td>
<td>Absence of funding schemes and realistic vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading Ezbet Bekhit - 2011</td>
<td>Sawiris Foundation for Social Development, GOPP</td>
<td>Upgrading Ezbet Bekhit area through a proper integrated cultural, educational, health and environmental program</td>
<td>Conflicting with the first project, Conflicting with the Spirit of Youth NGO project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Development Plan for Manshiyat Naser - 2011</td>
<td>Amar Ya Masr Initiative – REMAL NGO</td>
<td>Preparing a comprehensive development plan for the area based on relocation, renovation and upgrading policies</td>
<td>Very high cost estimate for the project, Duplication with the projects of Ezbet Bekhit where detailed plans are being prepared</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participative design for Social Inclusion - 2010</td>
<td>Locus Foundation</td>
<td>Research on the area Zero running cost by photovoltaic cells</td>
<td>Duplication of research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading the built environment of residential buildings - 2011</td>
<td>Takween</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote environmentally safe solid waste management in Manshiyat Naser - 25 years</td>
<td>Association for the Protection of the Environment (APE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takween piloted “Paint Cairo” in Ezbet Khairallah, an initiative that tackle's one dimension of the city's built environment.</td>
<td>Child Protection and Development - Recycling Machine Production Unit - Income Generating Programs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Field of Activity</td>
<td>Geographical Intervention</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association for the Protection of Environment</td>
<td>Solid waste management in Egypt</td>
<td>Masniyet Nasser</td>
<td>License no. 3255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Association for Urban Planning</td>
<td>Preparation and publication of studies related to Urban Sciences</td>
<td>Has license</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EECA</td>
<td>Disseminate sustainable building techniques</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Historic Cairo</td>
<td>Historical areas awareness</td>
<td>Darb Al-Ahmmar</td>
<td>License no. 5052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahdet El Mahrousia</td>
<td>Support social entrepreneurs to develop social enterprises</td>
<td>Has Licence</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shehab Institution</td>
<td>Promote and develop slum areas and empower the residents</td>
<td>Ezbet Al-Haggana</td>
<td>License no. 5186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Plenty or &quot;Kheir weh Baraka&quot;</td>
<td>Development of a prototype for unplanned communities</td>
<td>Ezbet Khairalla</td>
<td>License no. 5763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alwan-Wa-Awtar</td>
<td>Promote visual, arts for social development</td>
<td>El Hadaba El Wosta</td>
<td>Org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>License no.</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamayit El-Misbah El-Mudii</td>
<td>Collect recyclable items and work generation for poor people</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow Ministry of Housing</td>
<td>Analyses and critiques built environment policy and public projects</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takween</td>
<td>Expertise for built environment, social &amp; economic development interventions</td>
<td>Manshiet Nasser - Ezzbet Khairallah - Cairo</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Built Environment Collective - Megawra</td>
<td>Architectural hub for architecture and urbanism</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo from Below</td>
<td>Information and debate on the urban future of Cairo</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo Observer</td>
<td>Urban news, architecture and cultural heritage</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster Cairo Lab</td>
<td>A platform for urban research and initiatives</td>
<td>Ard El Lewa Street Vendors</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA)</td>
<td>Enable business ecosystem for sustainable development</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zad</td>
<td>Civil Society empowerment and charity</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebny Foundation</td>
<td>Empowerment of youth participate in Egypt’s economy</td>
<td>Manshiet Nasser - Paint Cairo in Ezzbet Khairallah</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schaduf</td>
<td>Rooftop farming food produce</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shagara</td>
<td>Environmental awareness, planting and income generation</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takamol Foundation</td>
<td>Integrated and sustainable development</td>
<td>License no. 8340</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Together Foundation</td>
<td>Establishing a neighborhood in Salam City to relocate informal area residents</td>
<td>Collaborations with the Governorate of Cairo</td>
<td>CSO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahliat</td>
<td>Development of local councils</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawaya</td>
<td>organic produce, fair-trade produce</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain al-Biaa Cooperative Association</td>
<td>Garbage collection, Beautification</td>
<td>Sakr Qurish in Basatin</td>
<td>License no. 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADAMUN</td>
<td>Right to the City and democratic management</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Urban Action</td>
<td>A platform for sharing urban knowledge and expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remal Foundation</td>
<td>Amar Ya Masr Initiative - Egypt 712 Project</td>
<td>Egypt - Manshiet Nasser</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqaza</td>
<td>Established</td>
<td>Shubra</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor-hoods in Name Only</td>
<td>Supports the rights of the residents by assisting them to form coalitions.</td>
<td>Locations of forced evictions</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Youth Climate movement</td>
<td>Empowering and mobilising young climate activists</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEE'iE</td>
<td>Energy &amp; Environmental knowledge</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mante2ty</td>
<td>Street beautification</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezzbet Al Nasr Coalition</td>
<td>Voicing community needs</td>
<td>Ezzbet nasr Residents</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanics</td>
<td>Awareness about sustainable environment in</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt without slums campaign</td>
<td>Informal areas upgrading &amp; housing construction</td>
<td>Ezzbet Bekheit - Manshiet Nasser</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3: A Sample of Categories of Civil Society in Ard Al-Liwa’ and Al-Mi’timdiya

Source: Authors’ Research (Internet, Interviews and Site Visits) and (Shalaby, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Scope of Work</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your factory from home</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Clothes for school kids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundtruth</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Collaborative platforms (Community Mapping)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basurama (In Love We Trash)</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
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<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Interventions in public space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hidaya</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Shari’yah</td>
<td>Org.</td>
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<td>Religious</td>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
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<td>Sahwa Charity Association</td>
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<td>Philanthropy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Salsabeel Al-Shafee</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Philanthropy and Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Manhal Al-Athab for Charity</td>
<td>Org</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lifemakers</td>
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<td>Religious</td>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resala</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shams Al-Bar</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Social care for special groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Esmaa Charity</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tareek Al-Nour</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hady Mosque</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanabel Al-Rahma</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Om Al-Mo’mineen</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Mu'tamidya Baladna</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To improve and develop services in Al-Mu'tamidya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ard Al-Liwa Youth Coalition (ALYC)</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance (CEWLA)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Equality of women with emphasis on the legal equity and the change of laws.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association for Women and Society</td>
<td>Women</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Artellewa Space for Contemporary Art</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Space for the formation and activation of dialogue between artists and society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noshokaty Foundation for Contemporary Art Education</td>
<td>Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cairo Lab for Urban Studies, Training and Environmental Research, CLUSTER</td>
<td>Business</td>
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<td>Business</td>
<td>Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn-Move-Play-Ground (GUC Technical University in Berlin’s)</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Build environmental awareness through play</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Additional Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>Consultancy for Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) for Egypt’s Solid Waste Management</td>
<td>Exchange programs between Ard Al-Liwa’, Zabbaleen &amp; Mensheyat Nasser (Zarayeb Ard Al-Liwa’)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ard El Lewa Community Center</td>
<td>(UNHCR)</td>
<td>Works with refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Noor Party</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom &amp; Justice Party</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Al- Dostoor Party</td>
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<td>6th April Movement</td>
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<td>Masr Party</td>
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<td>Tayar Shaaby</td>
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<td>Al-Wasat</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shabab Begad</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Community Planting trees</td>
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<td>Ard Al-Liwa Youth Center</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Ard Al-Liwa Development Foundation</td>
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<td>Upgrading and Development of Ard Al-Liwa</td>
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<td>Al-Mobadra</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td>1998 Local community development</td>
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<td>Al-mostakbal Al-Samy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zabbaleen Community</td>
<td>Org.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
نبذة

تتزايد وتيرة التحضর في القاهرة بشكل يضيف إلى خطورة قضاياها التخطيطية. حيث تستمر القاهرة في تأديا وظائفها بالرغم من المركزية المفرطة، وانعدام الشفافية، وقلة التطبيق لأسس التخطيط العمراني، وفشل الاتصالات بين مختلف المؤسسات الإدارية، وتضاعف تعداد سكانها منذ الستينيات. في حين تزداد أهمية المجتمع المدني على مدى العقود الماضية كعنصر فعال في محاولة للتقليل من مشكلات التحضور وإيجاد حلول للفقر والمشاكل الحضرية الأخرى. معظم هذه المشكلات تعود جزئياً إلى التأثر بالإصلاحات النيوبييرالية التي قللت من حدود مسؤولية الدولة في التعامل مع قضايا التحضور مثل الطلب المتزايد على تقديم الخدمات العامة. حيث تركت الدولة مساحة أكبر للقطاع الخاص ومنظمات المجتمع المدني لتؤدي هذا الدور. وكان نتيجة تزايد دور القطاع الخاص في مدن المناطق بالخدمات العامة أن أصبح الدفع مقابل الخدمة هو الأساس وهو ما أثر بشكل أكبر على القطاعات الفقيرة في المناطق الحضرية.

وفي مرحلة ما بعد ثورة يناير 2011 ظهرت بعض الاستراتيجيات/الحلول لمشكلات التحضور مثل تعبئة مساحات المجتمع المدني، والتعاون بين سكان المناطق الحضرية، واستراتيجيات الجهود الذاتية، وكذلك العديد من أنشطة التواصل كالمؤتمرات والاتصالات التي تدعو لتلبية احتياجات المجتمع. ومن ثم حاولت الرسالة استكشاف نماذج مختلفة من العلاقات بين الدولة والمجتمع المدني في مصر مع التركيز بشكل رئيسي على القاهرة حيث حققت الرسالة في الأسباب والتطورات التي أدت إلى هذا التحول في أداء التنمية الحضرية مع التركيز على التحضور كظاهرة عمرانية. وتركز أطروحات البحث على إحدى المناطق القاهرة، وهي منطقة أرض اللواء التي تعرضت لعملية تحضر سريعة منذ عام 1970. تناول البحث تحليل ثلاثة مشاريع صغيرة مختلفة للمجتمع المدني لوضيح الأنماط المختلفة للتعامل مع النقص في تقديم الخدمات العامة في المنطقة كما تستعرض كيف تتشكل المدينة وفقاً لاحتياجات السكان اليومية.
إقرار

هذه الرسالة مقدمة في جامعة عين شمس وجامعة شتوتغارت للحصول على درجة العمران المتكامل والتصميم المستدام. إن العمل الذي تجريه هذه الرسالة قد تم إنجازه بمرفعة الباحث سنة 2013.

هذا ويقر الباحث أن العمل المقدم هو خلاصة بحثه الشخصي وأنه قد اتبع الإسلوب العلمي السليم في الإشارة إلى المواد المؤخورة من المراجع العلمية كل في مكانه في مختلف أجزاء الرسالة.

وهذا إقرار مني بذلك...

توقيع:

الباحث: إبتهال محمد زكريا رشاد
التاريخ: 31/07/2013
آفاق التنمية في القاهرة
أنماط التعبئة لدى منظمات المجتمع المدني

مقدمة للحصول على درجة الماجستير في العمران المتكامل والتصميم المستدام

إعداد: ابتهال محمد زكريا رشاد عباس

لجنة أشراف

أ.ذ.د.م. فلبي ميسيلفيتز
أستاذ المتهى الخارجى
جامعة برلين التقنية

أ.ذ.د.م. نين جرباج
أستاذ العمران الدولي
جامعة شتوتجارت

توقيع

لجنة الحكم

أ.ذ.د.م. المتهى الخارجى
جامعة...

أ.ذ.د.م. المتهى الخارجى
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تاريخ المناقشة:...............

الدراسات العليا

أجيزت الرسالة بتاريخ:...............
موافقة مجلس الجامعة ...
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جامعة شتوتجارت

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آفاق التنمية في القاهرة
أنماط التعهب لدى منظمات المجتمع المدني

رسالة مقدمة للحصول على درجة الماجستير في العلوم المتكامل والتصميم المستدام

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