Camp Cities between Planning and Practice
Mapping the Urbanisation of Zaatari Camp

A Thesis submitted in the Partial Fulfillment for the Requirement of the Degree of Master of Science in Integrated Urbanism and Sustainable Design

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Disclaimer

This dissertation is submitted to Ain Shams University, Faculty of Engineering and University of Stuttgart, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning for the degree of Integrated Urbanism and Sustainable Design.

The work included in this thesis was carried out by the author in the Year 2014. The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

July/21/2014

Ayham Dalal

Signature
**Acknowledgment**

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To all the refugees; the marginalised, the queers; the unwanted others...

To a borderless world...
Abstract
Camp cities are increasingly dotting the landscapes of the Middle East. The crystallisation of Palestinian camp cities into spaces of exclusion and marginalisation is the consequences of uncontrolled, unguided, and sometimes oppressed process of urbanisation. International attention towards this fact has resulted into a ‘paradigm shift’ towards human development and rights. However, without studying refugee camps as urban sites, this paradigm shift failed, and camp cities have been declared to be ‘no refuge’. With the escalating crisis of Syrian refugees, this research links and compares the fragmented documents, surveys and reports produced about the camp, with field observations and interviews in order to explain why and how Zaatari camp is urbanising and trying to become a city. Since urbanisation is a complex process; a focus on space, economy and power relations was chosen in order to provide a criss-crossing insight into this process. A synthesis of findings has clearly revealed that while Zaatari camp became a field of tensions between a humanitarian agenda and a Syrian socio-cultural agenda; it has been rapidly and uncontrollably urbanising by Syrian refugees who are eager to be a mere population of victims. The failure of the camp model to contain and steer an inevitable process of urbanisation urges the need to revise and restructure it, not as a state of exception; but as opportunities, developments and win-win solutions.
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<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement (NGO)</td>
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<td>CFW</td>
<td>Cash for Work</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Camp Improvement Programme</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Community Service</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>IRD</td>
<td>International Relief and Development (NGO)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration (NGO)</td>
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<td>JHCO</td>
<td>Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization (NGO)</td>
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<td>JOD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Multi Activity Center</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins Sans Frontierre</td>
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<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Item</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NGO)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Protracted Refugee Situations</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
<td>Regional Response Plan</td>
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<td>SRCD</td>
<td>Syrian Refugees Camp Directorate</td>
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<td>UNOSAT</td>
<td>United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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List of Definitions and Translations

*Ashira*
Meaning a clan [Originally in Arabic]. It was defined in the sweep reports as ‘the main high-level organisational unit that structures the Syrian population, it is different from a paternal name or an assumed name in that it is a basis for actual cohesive social structures.

*Caravanisation*
Refers to current camp’s policy that aims to substitute tents with caravans.

*Dar*
Meaning house in Arabic, this word has societal connotations as people can also use it referring to families, saying for example: Dar ‘last name’ or Dar Abu-‘name’.

*Fakhth*
Means ‘leg’ [Originally in Arabic]. Larger Ashira is subdivided into ‘fakths’.

*Hara*
Meaning the neighborhood [Originally in Arabic]. In Arab world, this word is used to intimately express belonging and commitment to a certain location and community. It also has its deep connection to Islamic culture.

*Nashama*
Meaning very generous [Originally in Arabic]. The word connects with tribal roots of Arabic language and the culture of Bedouins, where generosity and manhood is a tradition and a source of honor in the context of scarce resources in the desert. In Jordan, it has national dimensions, taking into account that original Jordanians are Bedouins and tribes.

*Nakba*
Meaning catastrophe [Originally Arabic]. It refers to the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their cities and villages in Palestine by the Israeli militias in 1948.

*REACH*
It is a joint initiative of two international non-governmental organisations, ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives, and UNOSAT.

*Souk*
Meaning the market [Originally in Arabic]. This word has profound presence in the Arabic and Islamic culture and special urban character in old Arab cities. They usually emerge as linear structures stretching from main gates towards the inside (sometimes ending up with public space around main mosques like old cities in Damascus and Tunis).

*Sweep Report*
Refer to surveys in the camp that are done on a household level.
But I am the exile.  
Seal me with your eyes. 
Take me wherever you are - 
Take me whatever you are.

- Mahmoud Darwish
Chapter I

Prologue
1.1. Introduction: Why Camp Cities?

“Camps are thought of as mimetic spaces that appropriate city characteristics to become camp-villes or city-camps, where a unique form of enduring organisation of space, social life and system of power is created” – Romola Sanyal (2010: 879)

Attention towards refugee camps increased when they were suddenly associated with cities. Considering that our cities are the ‘norm’; refugee camps were perceived as a state of exception, a counter-city, or even a not-city (Agamben, 1998; Malkki, 2002; Petti & Hilal, 2013). These interpretations capitalise on refugee camps as the different ‘other’; and therefore, fail to capture the whole picture. French anthropologist Michel Agier (2002) realised a different dimension in this relationship. He went beyond judging the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’, the ‘norm’ and the ‘other’; he simply called them ‘camp-cities’. By that, he expressed that both models, the city and the camp, converge, interlink and, eternally blur into each other.

However, the implication of that on urban research was very modest. Refugee camps were either considered as fields of humanitarian interventions and designs; or at its best, as another form of slums. This explains the increasing interest in improving and upgrading Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East. However, with the proliferation of refugee camps in the region, becoming a distinctive spatial element of the landscapes of the Levant; the real question was left abandoned: How a city can emerge out of a refugee camp?

Attempts to answer this question are very little. Architect Manuel Herz (2012) presented an analysis for Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, through which he explored how urbanity appears in the camp. However, one of the chief contributions was made through UNRWA-Stuttgart pilot project led by Philipp Misselwitz. The research gave an in-depth analysis of how -after 60 years of exile- Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank were urbanised. The lesson learned from this research was clear: ‘Palestinian camp cities reveal the dangers of uncontrolled and unguided urbanisation’ (Misselwitz 2009: 408). Ironically, no matter how alarming this statement is; urbanisation of refugee camps remained uncontrolled, and sometimes unnoticed.

Holding the name of the ‘biggest refugee camp in the world’, Dadaab complex grabbed the attention of many scholarships (Agier, 2002, 2011; Kennedy, 2004; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Covering different aspects, the previous studies affirmed the
emergence of urbanity in the camp. Nonetheless, after 20 years of being the only ‘home’ for more than 450,000 refugees, the camp is no more a refuge. Médecine Sans Frontier (2012: 5) reported: ‘it is clear that the current paradigm of the camps is not working, and that alternatives need to be found’. But what reasons led to this failure? Is it ‘too demanding’ for refugee camps to be spaces for dignity and rights – a ‘home’ that embraces refugees until other options are made possible?

1.2. Objectives of the Study

“One cannot understand the problems of refugee camps unless one studies them as urban sites.” – Sari Hanafi (2008: 10)

Today, the second biggest refugee camp in the world is three years old. Hosting more than 80,000 Syrian refugees, Zaatari camp is a station on the way back home. However, for how long? What kind of future Syrian refugees are expecting to face if the crisis last longer and repatriation is not possible? Will they face the same fate of refugees in Dadaab camp? Will Zaatari camp become space for misery, indignity and impoverishment? The answers for these questions rely on many variables; however, one key strategy can ensure that Zaatari camp is always remaining on the ‘safe’ side.

Despite the restrictive framework and tight regulations through which they are constructed and managed; refugee camps began to be thought of as development. Suddenly, UNHCR shifted its mode of operations from simple delivery of services towards self-sustainability and human development; and for the first time, refugees were looked at not as passive victims, but as active partners (Misselwitz, 2009).

However, the enthusiasm towards the new approach did not match on-ground practices. Strategies and policies remained fragmented; urbanisation of refugee camps was uncontrolled; and development could not be achieved (ibid). The missing key component was the introduction of a comprehensive and integrated urban planning, through which urbanisation – a multifaceted, dynamic and complex process- could be understood, monitored and steered (ibid).

With the absence of such an approach, development cannot be implemented and urbanisation of camps remains an ambiguous, unguided and uncontrolled process. Like in Dadaab camp, Zaatari could be facing the same fate of becoming a no refuge if urbanisation was not steered through integrated urban planning in order for the
camp to become a safe haven. Therefore, and in order to overcome this deficiency; this research is taking the first step in order to situate Zaatari camp on the map of urbanisation. It aims to investigate how Zaatari camp is urbanising. What dynamics, tensions and actors are influencing and shaping this process? And according to that, how can Zaatari camp be a space for dignity and rights?

The answer for these question starts by examining Zaatari as an urban laboratory. It first places it on the map, explaining how, why and under which circumstance, Zaatari camp came to existence. Then it gives a background on the actors involved in this process: who are they, what are they doing in the camp, and how do they relate to the overall process of urbanisation.

Then, the camp is being explored from a spatial perspective: What are the components that constitute space in the camp? What kind of typologies could be found there? Under which circumstances and why were they formed? How is the camp being planned? How refugees react to this planning? How are they designing their lived space? These questions are then further investigated through a micro study sample where space is being closely examined. Later on, the camp is economically analysed: How is it perceived from the perspective of Jordanian economy? How refugee camps are economically handled by the agency? Why socio-economics in refugee camps emerge? What are these activities in Zaatari camp? How do they generate income? What implications do they have on urbanisation? Finally, a focus on governance patterns and power structures in the camp highlights the tensions through which urbanisation is taking place: Who governs Zaatari camp? Who are the street leaders? How the camp is being governed? What impacts does this have on the relationship between the stakeholders? How critical notions such as participation, democracy and empowerment are being practiced in Zaatari camp? A synthesis of the findings is then being presented and the process of urbanisation is then being compared to the Palestinian refugee camps. Later on, recommendations and lessons drawn from the urbanisation of Zaatari camp are being presented.

1.3. Research Methodology
The urbanisation of Zaatari camp was mapped, documented and analysed by deploying an exploratory and descriptive research methodology. During that, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. Comparisons and reflections were based on the findings of the UNRWA-Stuttgart research project, led by Philipp Misselwitz in the West Bank.
1.3.1. Selection Of Case Study

Different reasons contributed to the appropriateness of Zaatari camp in Jordan as case study for researching urbanisation in refugee camps:

**Signs of Urbanisation**

It was not a coincidence that Zaatari camp was frequently associated with ‘city’ in news and media. Many journalistic articles described –and still- aspects and sides of urbanisation without referring to it as a holistic process. For instance, the emergence of the market was one of the clearest signs of an advanced process of urbanisation occurring in the camp.

**Background of the researcher**

Being Palestinian, born and raised in Syria, and holding a Jordanian passport poured into choosing Zaatari camp as suitable case study for this research. This stems from a personal interest in exile as an individual and existential experience; from familiarity with Syrian culture and dialect; and from accessibility to the camp that was supported due to being a Jordanian citizen.

1.3.2. Sources and Data Collection

Different methods for obtaining data were deployed. These were influenced by the short timeframe given for this research and the limited accessibility to the camp.

a) **Quantitative Data**

- UNOSAT Satellite images taken for Zaatari camp between (August 2012 and April 2014).
- Published and unpublished surveys, documents and reports regarding Syrian refugees and Zaatari camp. These were mainly conducted by UN, UNHCR, REACH, NRC, and ACTED. However, worth mentioning that Sweep reports provided an important insight as they are surveys done on a household level in the camp; while ‘2013 Safety and Security Report’ published by UNHCR gave an interesting insight on how UNHCR observes and operates in the camp.
- A questionnaire was designated especially for the micro study cluster in order to generate an in-depth understanding of the emerging spatial-physical, socio-economic and socio-cultural practices on a cluster level at a specific part of the camp (see annex).
b) Qualitative Data

- Fieldwork observations: a number of visits to Zaatari camp took place between February and April 2014. Through these visits data was collected by being a participant observer. Certain information was documented through sketches and photographs made during the fieldwork.
- Semi-structured interviews: These were made during field visits with UNHCR staff members in planning unit and community service unit; as well as with refugees.
- In-depth interviews: most of them were carried out with refugees during the field visits. The aim was to obtain information about the camp as a lived and multifaceted experience. Additionally, an insightful and in-depth discussion was made with Kilian Kleinschmidt in Amman about Zaatari camp.

1.3.3. Limitations

During field research, difficulties listed here have been encountered, and thus, influenced the outcome of its findings:

• **Accessibility**
Refugee camps are highly political. As an academic researcher, the visits allowed for the camp are limited and connoted with strict approval of the Jordanian ministry of interior. Therefore, visits to the camp were very limited (10 in maximum) and connoted within certain durations that sometimes are not matching with adequate preparation for field visits. In order to overcome this issue, early field visits were exploratory, intensive and targeted toward gathering the maximum of data possible regarding all aspects of urbanisation; whereas the latest were targeted toward obtaining precise data in each of investigated sector in the research.

• **Communication**
Refugee camps are intense fields where humanitarians are expected to have lots of responsibilities. Sadly, many staff members and humanitarians organisations that were approached during the field research were simply neglecting requests for interviews or providing information. A personal interpretation was that humanitarian workers consider scholars and researchers as ‘unwanted intruders’ that are interrupting their mission in the camp. Therefore, a strong academic insistence to open up the humanitarian field for accepting research investigations might be needed to be claimed and assured; and especially in refugee camps.
1.3.4. Ethical Considerations

Refugees were reluctant to share their ‘full names’ during interviews. As they were cautious and sceptical about sharing such information, the researcher chose not to refer to refugees by name. Information that are specifically located (micro-study cluster), are referred to by household number.

1.4. Overview on Chapters

In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, the research goes in the following chronology:

Chapter II: presents the theoretical framework for this research. It questions refuge as a politico-spatial dilemma in order to draw connections to context, and thus, situate refugee camps in their wider context as inseparable experience from cities or the ‘normal’ urbanity. Then the fiction of humanitarianism is being examined and related to space and urbanism in order to understand how and why refugee camps are constructed. Later one, it is explained how these humanitarian strategies endured different changes, and why they failed to transform refugee camps to development.

Chapter III: shifts towards the case study in order to situate it on an international and local map. It explains the influence of Syrian refugees in Jordan, and why they were accommodated in a refugee camp. Then, a closer look on Zaataraki camp is taken in order to understand the agendas behind each stakeholder and to articulate their relations later on space and urbanisation.

Chapter IV: is the richest part of this thesis. It presents and extensive analysis for the spatiality of Zaataraki camp. It starts first by observing the camp from above in order to map the dynamics and understand the reasons behind the camp’s distinctive geography. Later on, it displays urbanisation as a result of tension between humanitarian planning and refugee’s socio-culture. This marks the emergence of households, habitat and districts. A deeper look into these dynamics is obtained by performing a micro-study in the old camp. The 27 households cluster demonstrates the multifaceted appropriations of space and a clear shift towards urbanisation of the camp.
Chapter V: looks into Zaatarari camp as an economic system. In order to understand this system, a brief overview on Jordanian economy is given, and how it connects to Zaatarari camp. Later on, it is explained how humanitarians support refugees financially, and why strategies like self-reliance fails. Then, it illustrates Zaatarari camp as an economic cycle by elaborating on possibilities for income generating activities in the camp. Finally, it looks into the market as a clearest evidence of urbanisation, trying to articulate its dimensions on space, law and economy.

Chapter VI: is one of the most important chapters as it has the greatest influence on the future development of the camp. It analyses power relations in order to understand how governance is being practiced and challenged. It examines the channels of communication between refugees and UNHCR, and then, explains the difficulties in implementing democratic and decentralised governance structures in the camp. Later on, it shifts toward examining refugees actions in the camp as attempts to be activists’ citizens. This is then juxtaposed with a humanitarian reaction that seems to give contradicting messages regarding its mission in the refugee camp.

Chapter VII: orchestrates the findings of this analysis. After the urbanisation of Zaatarari camp was examined in previous chapters, the findings are then synthesised in order to observe the whole picture. The process is then compared to Palestinian camps in order to reflect and articulate on current practices, as well as, on future outcomes of this process. A further step is then taken to question the model of camps and to urge the need to restructure them as opportunity – as a sustainable development.
Chapter II

Refugee Camps as an Urban Challenge

Refugee camps are urban settings of ‘other’ nature. They entail different challenges and realities that draw on special politico-spatial dimensions, tensions and power relations. In order to analyse Zaatarí camp as an urban setting, it is highly important, that these relations are illustrated and clearly set. This chapter draws on theories from different fields about refugee camps in order to create the framework of this analysis. It starts first by examining refuge from a different angle: is it a political or a spatial problem? An abstraction of a tripod relationship between borders, systems and power is drawn and further explored throughout this thesis. The implications of this relationship are then examined spatially. However, first by explaining what is UNHCR and what kind of ideology does it refer to through its operations. This helps to explain the nature of space, architecture and planning resulting from this ideology, and why it is similar to slums. Later on, this chapter explains how UNHCR attempted to change its mode of operations and strategies in refugee camps and why it failed.
2.1. Refugees: Political or Spatial Dilemma?

“Our age – with its modern warfare, imperialism, and the quasi-theological ambitions of totalitarian rules – is indeed the age of refugee, the displaced person, mass immigration.” – Edward Said (2002: 138)

“It is not possible to think citizenship without its ‘others’... This must be the source of a new inflection on the meaning of the ‘right to have rights’ to the city and to the polity.” – Engin F. Isin (Interview by Pullano, 2013)

Refuge is the result of displacement. The politicisation of the term came as a result of the huge mass displacements marking history of the last century, leading to demographic pressure in the age of nationalism. The demand to politically contain the situation resulted into what is known as Geneva Convention in 1950. The document defines refugees as those who ‘fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’; therefore, offered a safe haven by countries who signed the agreement (UNHCR, 1950a: 3). The increasingly political utilisation of the term reduced its spatial connotations that are the very first reason of refuge: displacement as a spatial phenomenon. A phenomenon that is marking our age where ‘people are chronically mobile and routinely displaced, and invent homes and homelands in the absence of territorial, national bases’ (Malkki, 1992: 24).

In order to understand the meaning of refuge, it has to be observed in relation to two aspects: domination and borders. History has shown how minorities and alienated groups were excluded by a dominant group. They were excluded and marginalized because these groups, willingly or not, have crossed visible or invisible borders leading them to appear to the other, and to the self, as aliens. This process of crossing borders – sometimes faced with violence – is what makes refuge very problematic (see fig. 1 & 2). It threatens the dominant group by posing them to the question of undesirable change, leading them to exclude these groups and refuse their claims to share the right to have rights. If Engin Isin (Pullano, 2013) explained that throughout history, ‘struggle’ is what ensured these groups the rights to participate in political life, changing perceptions on citizenship; it is this very process, again, of crossing borders where the minorities, the marginalized, and the others once sought refuge from threatening inhospitality, today re-crossed these borders claiming rights to recognition, equality, and membership. If the process of re-crossing borders marks the politics of today, how is it then, articulated on space?
In her research, Young (2011: 535) defines refuge as a ‘state exercise of border control practices at national and global scales, as well as an ongoing, everyday process that takes place in local spaces and relationships’. Therefore, refuge is not a mere political status but rather ‘a process of negotiation and contestation’ that is exhaustively related to a certain place, but marked by the action of resistance ‘through the spatial practices and tactics’ (ibid: 535, emphasis added). By that, she sets her argument against Derrida’s concept ‘cities of refuge’ where he recalls the construction of cities that outreach all political influences in order to be real asylums, opened for all refugees. However, Young (2011: 535) claims that that ‘the potential of a particular city—or town or refugee camp—as a space of refuge is not guaranteed’. In that case, if refuge is not guaranteed even in its spatial programme ‘the Camp’, how can refugee camps be spaces of refuge?

Based on previous argumentation, the mere reliance on political and international agreements signed to define and achieve refuge can be misleading. Refuge, resulting from physical or non-physical displacement, from crossing political and non-political borders, is an act of resistance. It is not limited to a certain location, time, people or tactic, but it resembles political, as well as non-political struggle against domination and intolerance of a hostile environment. Scholars like Michel Agier (2009, 2012) and Adam Ramadan (2013) have managed to explain how ghettos, hyper ghettos and protest camps are special urban settings resulting from the act of refuge. Interestingly, in both examples, the inhabitants of the ghettos and protestors are producing a distinctive spatial setting, claiming the right for an inclusive citizenship and equal rights. This goes similarly to what Isin (2008: 39) theorised as an ‘act of citizenship’: ‘We define acts of citizenship as those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle’. In this perspective, refuge can be viewed as an act of citizenship and refugees as an activists citizens, while camps are mechanisms for care and control (Malkki, 1992). The term ‘refugee camp’ entails the very paradoxical tension of its reality. Based on that, refuge is not when refugees—or ‘people of concern’ in UNHCR’s terminology—receive their asylum cards, but when they employ orientations, strategies and technologies to create spaces for claiming rights, dignity and equality—true spaces of refuge. On the light this argument, the next sections examine the solutions developed in order to overcome the politico-spatial dilemma of refugees.
2.2. International Actors and the Paradox of Camps

2.2.1. Governance: The Emergence of UNHCR

“And just beyond the frontier between “us” and the “outsiders” is the perilous territory of not-belonging: this is to where primitive time peoples were banished, and where the modern era immense aggregates of humanity loiter as refugees and displaced persons”


Refugee camps are extraterritorial spaces that are carved into the body of the hosting country. In relation to borders, systems and domination of power, these spaces host people who are expelled –voluntarily or not- from the domination of a system, to become intruders, undesirables or informal members in the eyes of the same, or may be another, dominating system. This endlessly fluctuating, uncontrollable process of
crossing borders suddenly becomes scandalous on a global level. The speculation and shame of the moment - that of inhospitality and violent exclusiveness - puts a burden on those who are watching to react to a globally unacceptable and embarrassing situation.

Starting with 24 and becoming 79 countries in May 2010, these are countries ‘with a demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of refugee problems’ have signed on Geneva Convention in 1951 (UNHCR 1950b: 3). Embedded within strategies, structures and categories, the solution gave birth to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an international agency which acts under the authority of the General Assembly. This was accompanied with the birth of different categories of border crossers, uprooted and displaced population. Among those are: refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returned IDPs, stateless persons and others of concern. However, UNHCR – usually referred to as ‘the agency’ in relation to refugee camps – defines its objectives as ‘to lead and coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems’ (UNHCR 2014: 2).

Since it was established in 1951, UNHCR has ‘dramatically evolved from a temporary agency with a specific task to the most powerful designated humanitarian agency in the world’ (Misselwitz 2009: 39). Under its mandate is a population of around 39 million persons and 750 NGOs operating as implementing partners (IPs), and a budget of 5,307,842,780 USD in 2014 (UNHCR, 2014a). The agency defines the nature of its work as ‘entirely non-political’; but ‘humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees’ (UNHCR 1950b: 6). Despite its apolitical character, the agency ‘works in partnership with governments, regional organizations, international and non-governmental organizations’ in order to achieve durable solutions for the problem of refugees (UNHCR 2014: 3). However, it advises governments regarding their policies towards refugees and asylum seekers, and is claimed to increasingly play a leading political and economic role (Agier, 2010; Misselwitz, 2009).

Values of impartiality, neutrality and independence are the foundation of an expanding humanitarian mandate (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). Sharing the same principles, ‘a set of organizations, networks, agents, and financial means distributed across different countries and crisscrossing the world... [and] people who often happen to be “committed,” trained in the disciplines of human rights, social and political science,
or in the professions of health or humanitarian logistics’ are introduced as neutral mediators in the politicised problem of refugees (Agier 2010: 32).

The contradiction between proclaimed apolitical agendas and de facto political nature of operations influence the spatial products of the humanitarian work. In reality, the agency advises governments about their policies regarding refugees and asylum seekers, where as they claim to stay away from politics (Misselwitz, 2009). This has given birth to what has been called as ‘humanitarian government’. This is defined as ‘the administration of human collectivities in the name of higher moral principle that sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action’ (Fassin, 2007: 3).

UNHCR’s current campaign to raise funds holds the slogan ‘A Family Torn Apart by War is Too Many’. Ironically, this expresses what exactly the French Anthropologist Michel Agier defines as the reason behind a humanitarian ideology. According to him ‘humanitarianism arises from a totalitarian fiction that takes place in two stages: first, is the fiction of the unity of humans (humanity as identity) with there being no place for inequality; and second, is the transparency between ideological universalism and organizational globalization’ (Agier 2010: 33). He reinterprets humanitarianism based on the rationale of kinship, concluding that both logics are trapped in political impossibility.

In the name of humanity, UNHCR is sought to ease refugees’ pain and sufferings. It is held responsible for, and capable of, taking care of them and providing them with spaces they can refuge to. One of these spaces is widely known as the refugee camp. UNHCR has a long experience in establishing camps in many regions, locations, and environments around the world. Moreover, UNHCR is usually the governor of camps. It runs and coordinates operations, strategies and interventions which are partially implemented by other national and international humanitarian organisations. Based on the previous, it is important to note two points: 1) UNHCR is a mediator, or more explicitly in camps, an isolator that was produced to intervene between refugees – seen as intruders that lost their citizenship status, and thus their rights (see 2.1)- and the citizens of the hosting state, 2) the universal nature of humanitarianism, backed up with claims of apolitical mode of operations render the position of UNHCR in camps, and justifies how and why they operate in a certain manner.

The implications of that on space gave different dimensions and meaning to refugee camps – the spaces where humanitarian mandate is the most demonstrated and vis-
ible. In order to understand these dimensions and draw on similarities between refugee camps as ‘claimed’ spaces of refugee, and other spaces of refuge such as slums; the next section digs deeper into these inquiries.

2.2.2. Politics of Space: Humanitarianism or Heterotopia?

In his famous urban revolution, Henri Lefebvre (1996) explains how space is urbanised, shaped and negotiated by a “far order” – that of ideologies, societies and culture; and a “near order” – that which is enacted by daily actions of inhabitants. Urbanisation of refugee camps follows the same logic. Humanitarianism was briefly explained as an ideology that dictates and influences the mode of operation, that of UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations. The space they produce was introduced as ‘humanitarian space’.

Humanitarian space was argued to be ‘an unavoidably wide and subjective concept’ (Collinson et al., 2012: 2); however, it could be basically defined as ‘an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity’ (Spearin 2001 cited in Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010: 1). This definition enacts the very fact that in order to create a space where humanitarians can operate, it is important to dictate these principles on space. Therefore, nation-state politics are suspended and humanitarian non-politics rule. This relation relatively frames all spatial practices that take place within the humanitarian space.

In 1967, French philosopher Michel Foucault introduced the concept of heterotopia in contrast to utopia. He explains that utopia is like a reflection in a mirror, a place that is not real, whereas the mirror in this case is real, however, the images that it shows do not represent its reality. For him, heterotopias ‘are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted’ (Foucault & Miskowiec 1986: 3). He explains that although heterotopias can be found everywhere, they do not have a specific form or nature. However, he further sets few principles that make them distinctive: their ability to juxtapose different ‘foreign’ realities next to reach other, their disconnection from traditional time, and their system of opening and closing where certain permission is needed to enter them. Moreover, Foucault relates these spaces to their context, claiming that they either aim to expose the partitioned human realities contested in one site, or they aim to ‘create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticu-
lous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled’ (Foucault & Miskowiec 1986: 8). But how this relates to refugee camps, or humanitarian space? Articulating these factors on the relationship between space, borders and dominating systems, heterotopias are produced by exclusion and survival. Either voluntarily or not, they produce a different system that influences space and dictate its codes and settings. These characteristics make them spaces of refuge par excellence. Michel Agier explores the relationship between heterotopia and refuge. He explains how ghettos emerge in the absence of tolerance and hospitality in cities (Agier, 2012).

Interestingly, the urbanisation of refugee camps produced an urban setting, similar to that of ghettos, slums and favelas. However, the difference is that refugee camps are planned and supervised by a humanitarian mandate that transforms them into humanitarian spaces; whereas slums and ghettos are developed without supervision and by citizens. But why then did they develop similarly? Refugee camps or ghettos, whether humanitarian or heterotopian, are spaces where the relationship to the nation state is either interrupted or dismissed. The distance from state equates the exclusion from the privileges and rights of being a citizen. And despite the inhabitants of a slums might are also citizens, however, they are excluded from participating in polity, economy and society. Moreover, both metaphors are thought of as temporal spaces of ‘abnormality’ waiting to be evacuated and dismantled. However, Agier explains that a political revolution: favelas gained recognition as parts of the city. This allowed them to have an official access to city’s services like electricity, transportation, sewage, as well as, municipal political recognition (ibid: 272). Would this ever be the fate of refugee camps? An answer for this question is further investigated in this thesis; however, coming back to refugee camps as heterotopic and humanitarian space, what implications does this have on architecture and urbanism? The next section attempts to answer these interrogations.

2.2.3. Humanitarian Urbanism and the Handbook of Emergencies
A recently published paper defines humanitarian urbanism as ‘the production of space through humanitarian action... a set of interventions to the built environment, at multiple scales, that are parts of the humanitarian responses to a crisis’ (Potvin, 2013: 3). The influence of humanitarian mandate differs according to their relation to the space. For instance, in refugee camps, this relation appears to be very direct; while in cities it has an indirect and different influence on urbanity and space. Büscher and Vlassenroot (2013) explained how the sudden and intensive presence of humanitarian workers outside their ‘spaces of intervention’ has influenced urbanity.
While they created lots of new opportunities for the locals; they participated in fostering patterns of conflict and competition over political and socioeconomic spaces within cities. Moreover, the presence of INGOs has badly affected the efficiency of existing local NGOs and glocalized the lived environment. The transformation of the urban occurred as INGOs became ‘vital components of the survival strategies of urban inhabitants and have replaced the state in many areas of public life’ (Büscher and Vlassenroot, 2013).

However the direct influence of humanitarians on space has a different departure point. Refugee camps are empty space that has to suddenly be filled with life and order. Foucault in his lectures Sécurité, Territoire, Population describes the logic that stands behind the construction and spatial programming of empty spaces like those in refugee camps. He says ‘a town is built where previously there was nothing. How is it built? The famous form of the Roman camp is used, which, along with the military institution, was being reutilized at this time as a fundamental instrument of discipline (Foucault 2007: 31). Therefore, discipline stands behind the logic of spatial relations in a refugee camp when planned in a top-down manner.

However, practically, planning and design of refugee camps is dependent on universal standards. These were summarised in what is known as the Handbook for Emergencies (UNHCR, 2007). The book gives instructions on how to operate during emergencies, conflicts and crisis, in order to ensure the well-being of refugees during and after influx. Regarding refugee camps it indicates that ‘the layout, infrastructure and shelter of a camp will have a major influence on the safety and well-being of refugees’ (UNHCR, 2007: 207). Therefore, it gives advices regarding site selection; land use and rights; topography; drainage; soil and climatic conditions; health; shelter and infrastructure allocations and design.

The handbook presents its overall strategy in a master plan that should give information about the camp as a settlement in relation to context and natural features. The book further states that ‘the plan should take into account the social organization of the refugees and principles of module planning’ (ibid: 215). These principles take the family as the smallest module and build up upon it, a whole camp. (See table 1). This means taking the needs of an individual household as a starting point: its distance from latrines and fresh water, its relationship to other members of the community (clans, tribes...etc.), as well as, traditional arrangement of households (ibid).
Module Contesting of Approx. No. of persons
Family 1 family 4 - 6 persons
1 community 16 families 80 persons
1 block 16 communities 1250 persons
1 sector 4 blocks 5000 persons
1 camp module 4 sectors 20,000 persons

(Table 1) — Family as basic unit for modular planning
Source: UNHCR, 2007

The modular divisions are accompanied with modular distribution of services on the level of family, community, block and sector (table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service/ Infrastructure</th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 water tap</td>
<td>1 community (80-100 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 latrine</td>
<td>1 family (6-10 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 health centre</td>
<td>1 site (20,000 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 referral hospital</td>
<td>10 sites (200,000 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 school block</td>
<td>1 sector (5,000 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 distribution points</td>
<td>1 site (20,000 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 market</td>
<td>1 site (20,000 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 feeding centre</td>
<td>1 site (20,000 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 refuse drums</td>
<td>1 community (80-100 persons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 2) — Provision of services based on modular planning
Source: UNHCR, 2007

The handbook advises also regarding camp location, size and density. It states that the selection of location should be aware of existing natural resources on site and context, and the size of the camp should be based on a standard of 45 m² per refugee. Interestingly, the handbook states that ‘modular planning does not necessarily mean using a rigid layout for the site’ (ibid: 216). On the contrary, rigid layout should be avoided in all means possible because it interrupt community interaction, makes the distinction on communal services difficult, and does not promote ownership of the community over service (ibid). An example of a spatially planned, self-contained community was also noted (see fig. 3).
(fig. 3)–Layout of self-contained community as per the Handbook of Emergencies
Source: UNHCR, 2007
However, criticism towards this book was constantly increasing. John Kennedy (2008), for example, addressed the planning mentality that is behind the ‘failure of performance’ in refugee camps. He summarized the reasons to: not considering long-term solutions; little knowledge about the time factor; few graphic tools developed in the field of refugee camp design; tendency towards universalist solutions; the inapplicability of small-scale planning solutions; no agreed upon vocabulary, textual or graphic language in the refugee camps planning field; and the lack of attention towards the location of camps and their surrounding (ibid). While the architect Manuel Herz observed the negative implications of this standardised paradigm of planning on environment and refugees as well. He concluded that refugee camps are a ‘naïve model of an idealized city [that] is used to project a camp-city of European understanding onto regions that could not be more different’ (Herz, 2007: 8). While drawing on previous of Foucault, Misselwitz noticed that refugee camps are another form of the roman camp. Both models are translated through a ‘diagram-like functional layout, orthogonal spatial organisations, temporary structures, and surveillance and control devices such as watch towers or perimeter fences’ (Misselwitz 2009: 57).

Interestingly, however, it could not be said that the agency is unaware of this criticism. On the contrary, different attempts have been made to change the way refugee camps are constructed and managed. The next section gives a brief overview on these changes.

2.2.4. Urbanisation: Between Emergency and Development

The construction of Palestinian refugee camps came as a consequence of the Israeli ethnic cleansing in Palestine during 1948 and 1967. At that time, the newly established UNRWA was mandated responsible for Palestinian refugees, as well as, camps. However, after more than 60 years of exile, the temporality of these spaces was gradually substituted with more semi-permanent and permanent structures echoing refugees’ need to live and survive, constantly alternating between permanency and temporariness, reality and memories. In short, they were urbanised. Urbanisation of camps was considered a taboo, and thus, was always neglected by the hosting countries and the UNRWA. Even though, refugee camps developed special relations with cities in hosting countries, and even grew beyond the borders of the camp (UNDP, 2010). However, the consequences of unguided urbanisations were yielding alarmingly.
Refugee camps turned into overcrowded zones of prone-to-collapse structures, little open space, and hazardous environments. Under this pressure, UNRWA, and UNHCR, being responsible for refugee camps, recognised the need to change. Misselwitz (2009: 88) claims that it was ‘the combination of external pressure on UNHCR and an internal awareness of the need to change, which triggered a paradigm shift from relief to development’. The agency explained this need by saying that:

‘traditional relief-based approaches to providing assistance to refugees have undoubtedly saved lives, but have not always been effective in systematically building productive capacities and preparing them for durable solutions. They have also made marginal contributions to local development and poverty eradication in refugee hosting areas. In many situations, refugees and refugee hosting areas are marginalised in development agendas’ (UNHCR, 2005: vii).

In search for a new “Framework for Durable Solutions”, UNHCR issued documents promoting this change of policies such Handbook for Planning and Implementing Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) Programmes (2005) and A Community-based Approach in UNHCR’s Operations (2008). Through these books, UNHCR was attempting to re-approach refugee camps as human development: to promote participation, self-reliance, sustainable livelihood, integration into local and national development plans, and to enhance stakeholders interaction (Misselwitz, 2009). Eventually, this was considered to benefit local economic development, and prepare refugees for durable solutions (UNHCR, 2005a).

However, the implementation of these promising strategies remained modest. By evaluating them in different refugee camps around the world; Misselwitz (2009) noted the absence of integrated urban planning as a key strategy in order to orchestrate all these operations. Therefore, they remained a set of fragmented policies and strategies. Which was, ironically, observed to had been the reason behind the informal and alienated urbanisation of Palestinian refugee camps (Al-Qutub, 1989).

2.3. Conclusions

Within the limited capacity given for this thesis, different topics about refugee camps and how they influence space could not be mentioned. However, the aim of this chapter was to briefly illustrate and set the framework for the following analysis for Zaatari camp. For that, it could be concluded that:
• Refuge is a politico-spatial experience that could only be observed through referring to the relationship between borders, systems and domination.

• Slums and refugee camps develop and urbanise similarly due to exclusion that resulted from distance from nation states.

• UNHCR mediates the relationship between refugees and the nation state.

• Coming from a humanitarian ideology, UNHCR developed universalised standards in order to plan and design refugee camps, which was frequently criticised.

• UNHCR has noticed the need to change its mode of operations towards development; however, implementation of the new strategies remained fragmented due to absence of integrated urban planning as a maestro that can orchestrate these operations and strategies.
In order to analyse Zaatari camp as an urban planning topic, this chapter lays the basis and background suitable for this analysis. First by giving an overview on the Syrian crisis of refugees, it will be explained how Jordan reacted and was influenced by this sudden demographical change. Then, zooming in to Al-Mafraq governorate, it will be explained why, where and under which circumstances Zaatari camp was opened. Finally, the actors operating in Zaatari camp will be introduced and analysed. By that, they are situated on Zaatari’s map of urbanisation.
3.1. The Crisis of Syrian Refugees: Challenges and Tensions in Al-Mafraq

In 2011, the Syrian conflict began in Dara’a leading to what is considered now to be ‘one of the largest refugee exoduses in recent history’ (UN 2014: 4). Since the regime of Al-Assad insisted on deploying military attacks and violence rather than politics, this has led to the manipulation of the sectarian fabric of Syria. Not only internal displacement has led to change the demographical map of the country, but also refugees fleeing to surrounding countries and others seeking asylum in more than 90 states around the world (ibid). However, the unsettling conflict is expected to have a huge impact on the region. According to the United Nations: ‘with no immediate prospect for peace in sight, the combination of the conflict, deteriorating economic opportunities, and shrinking social services are likely to generate further levels of displacement within Syria and the region’ (ibid: 6).

The agency has noticed that 127,000 refugees are crossing the borders each month (ibid). Currently, more than 2 million registered refugees reside in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (See fig. 4). According to the United Nations this number is foreseen to double by the end of 2014 (See table 3). 16% of the Syrian refugees are planned to be resided in camps and 84% outside camps (ibid). Therefore, with the expectedly high pressure on hosting countries, the UN strategic Regional Response Plan (RRP6) seeks to provide ‘longer-term development interventions upon which stabilization processes in the region will largely depend’ (ibid: 7). This plan was developed in a participatory manner, and closely negotiated between actors such as UN agencies, national governments, local and international NGOs, and international inter-governmental agencies (IGOs), as well as, the refugee communities (ibid).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>588,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2013</td>
<td>905,000</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>562,000</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>2,403,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>1,277,000</td>
<td>687,000</td>
<td>781,000</td>
<td>308,000</td>
<td>197,500</td>
<td>3,252,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2014</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>4,100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 3)— Syrian Refugees Planning Figure
Source: UN, 2014

Statistics revealed that by the end of 2013, almost a quarter of the Syrian refugees had fled to Jordan (ibid). This number is estimated to reach 800,000 registered refugees by the end of 2014; while 25% of them are expected to be accommodated in camps (200,000 refugees) (UN, 2014b).
The majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan originate from the mid-southern governorates in Syria: Dara’a (53.4%), Homs (14.9%), Rural Damascus (7.5%) and Hama (4.4%) (ibid: 2). In comparison to a Jordanian population of around 6 million, Syrian refugees present a percentage of 10%, expected to increase to 13% at the end of 2014 (ibid). Since the distribution of refugees in Jordan is not equal, it was reported that some Jordanian governorates are overcrowded with Syrian refugees, especially in the north. The report claims that the ration of Jordanians to Syrian in Al-Mafraq governorate where Zaatari camp is located exceeds 60% if the residents of the camp were included (ibid). This situation has put much pressure on the scarce resources available in Jordan. This includes public services, education and health system, real estate market, economy and labour market. Although the agency is assisting refugees through aid rations, a significant number of refugees are working ‘illegally’ in construction, agriculture and service sectors (ibid).

This challenging situation is very stressful for hosting communities as well as for the Jordanian government. Looking at the extreme case of Al-Mafraq governorate, it might be that the acute transgression of Syrians-to-Jordanians ratio has led to the decision of establishing Zaatari camp: confining refugees in an extraterritorial space, excluding them from national infrastructure and services in order to achieve
a balance, release demographic tensions and ease competition over resources. This reflects the early opinion of Al-Mafraq residents in 2012, where 80% affirmed that Syrian refugees should be segregated from the community in a refugee camp (Mercy Corps 2013).

This opinion was explained by the fact that prior to the Syrian conflict, the governorate suffered from poverty and water shortages (ibid). The surge in population, leading to increased demands on infrastructure and shelter was escalated by the fact that many Syrian refugees from the camp are selling NFIs and food rations in the open market. According to the report, this ‘has generated resentment and the impression that Syrians in Mafraq are doing quite well, much better, in fact, than the majority of local residents’ (ibid: 7). Moreover, local riots against Syrian refugees was rising in 2013. A youth organisation called ‘Nashama Al-Mafraq’ was identified to have initiated increasingly vocal and vehement protests against Syrian refugees and humanitarian aid (ibid). They even attacked a Jordanian CBO known for its active involvement in supporting the Syrian refugees, and organised riots and tire burning demonstrations (ibid). By comparing Jordan and Syria in the times of refugee influx, Syria has always succeeded to contain the situation through its quasi-socialist policies, tolerance and stable development patterns. Whereas in Jordan, the increasing intolerance of hosting communities underlies the exclusive policies of Jordan, societal tension and weaknesses of the Jordanian system to establish sustainable patterns for development through the few available resources.\(^3\) This was mentioned in the report through the ways Jordanians deployed media to politicise the problem of Syrian refugees, claiming that they are not receiving enough international fund to cover the expenses of their stay in the country (ibid).

The last point is especially important when overlooking the future of Zaatari camp and the relationship between hosting communities and Syrian refugees. It clearly indicates that solutions focusing on Syrian refugees alone are not sufficient, and that the need to address the challenges and the-already-existing tensions of the system (which discussing them is beyond the scope of this thesis) are necessary in order to deliver tailored solutions that comes in the benefit of all parties. The report also refers to the need for Syrians to act as a community and recognise the new culture they are introduce to, in order to become peers in the processes of decision-making that will inevitably have an impact on both parties at the same time, inside and outside camps.
3.2. Za‘atari: The Biggest Refugee Camp in Jordan

The previous illustration shows how mass displacement of Syrians resulted into extraterritorial spaces of different scales, sizes and locations scattered around the Syrian borders (see fig. 4). With the majority of refugee camps established in Turkey, only five recognisable camps— and maybe the most problematic— are spotted in Jordan: King Abdullah Park (821 refugees); Cyber City (202 refugees), the Emirati Jordanian camp (3,885 refugees); Za‘atari camp (75,000 refugees) and the recently opened, Al-Azraq camp with capacity of accommodating up to 130,000 refugees (UN, 2014b). Among other Syrian refugee camps in the region, Za‘atari camp has so far the highest share of refugees and international attention. It has evolved into the second biggest camp in the world after Dadaab complex, where according to statistics; more than 350,000 registered refugees were accommodated (ibid). Za‘atari lies 12 km from the Syrian borders (UNHCR, 2014b); few kilometres to the south of a transit centre (collection point) were refugees entering Jordan—either legally from Naseeb or illegally through borders— are first concentrated and later distributed to either camps or hosting communities (see fig. 5).
The camp is located in the second biggest governorates in Jordan Al-Mafraq with a population of around 250,000 Jordanians (Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 2014). Geographically, the governorate stretches reaching the Iraqi borders, becoming the longest frontier in contact with Syrian borders. In the governorate, the camp is located in Zaatari municipality, around 12 kilometres to the south-east of Al-Mafraq city. The camp is connected to the road network through a street cutting through farms leading to national road number 10. This connection is safeguarded by checkpoints (one near national road and one at the camp). Currently, public transportations can be seen overcrowded at the outer gate of the camp, as well as in the bus station in Mafraq city where competition between buses driving to the camp are most obvious. This indicates the emerging dynamics behind the camp’s extraterritoriality. The relations between the camp and its surrounding seem to be reciprocal, as well as, inevitable.

Regarding climate, comparison with maps issued by the Ministry of Environment (2009), can be translated that the camp is located in a warm Saharan Mediterranean climate. Ironically, and with the scarcity of water resources in Jordan, the camp was constructed over an aquifer that is making the establishment of sewage systems almost impossible (IRIN, 2013). In terms of land ownership, the agency claims that the land for camps like Zaatari and Azraq were provided by the Jordanian government with no further indication on legislative details in this regard (UNHCR, 2014c). While Zaatari emerged as the biggest refugee camp in the world, it became a field of operations, strategies and interventions for different local and international actors. The next section aims to introduce these actors. Who are they; in which way are they related to Zaatari camp; and why.

3.3. Actors Analysis

3.3.1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Jordan was not a signatory country on Geneva’s Convention in 1951. However, in 1998 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and the government was signed which is considered now to be the legal basis of operations and activities for the agency in the Kingdom (UNHCR, 2014c).

UNHCR had different tasks in the Kingdom before the Syrian crisis. These were mainly related with Iraqi refugees, whereas UNRWA was, and still, responsible for Palestinian refugees through its head quarter in Amman. However, since Jordan
granted Syrian refugees with accessibility to public services like education and health, and permit the establishment of refugee camps, the agency has witnessed dramatic changes on an operational level. This is observed as funding to cover its operations in 2010 was stated USD 62.8 million in 2010 to reach USD 430.4 million in 2014 (ibid, UN 2014b). In July 2013, the USA contributed 44% of the total funds, followed by Kuwait 21%, EU 9%, Japan 6%, and Norway 3% (UNHCR, 2013a). This is to cover its operations assisting 800,000 Syrian refugees and over 2 million Jordanians affected by the presence of refugees (UN, 2014b).

Aside from its joint responsibility in running the camp in collaboration with the Jordanian government through the Syrian Refugee Camps Directorate (SRCD), the agency implements different programs in Zaatari, responding to refugees’ basic needs and visions for Syrian refugees in Jordan as stated in RRP6. The agency collaborates closely with the government, as well as, local and international NGOs to implement its programs. Those are referred to as Implementing Partners (IPs), where the agency has more than 740 IPs under its mandate worldwide, helping her to manage and operate humanitarian work worldwide (UNHCR, 2014a). In 2013, 193 NGOs were claimed to have been providing humanitarian services in the camp (Tets, 2013). The following table is extracted from the agency’s dashboard (webpage) explaining which programs are implemented in Zaatari and by who (see fig. 6).

Interestingly, the strong contrast between sectors/programs implemented in the camp sheds light on the notion of refugee camps as a point of intersection between medical and spatial practice (Brauman, Weizman, & Kimbell, 2008). Obviously, sectors like health, children and education receive most of the attention compared to sectors such as shelter and livelihoods. For instance, 15 different NGOs are providing medical support to refugees, whereas only 1 NGO (NRC) is held responsible for programs targeting livelihoods, and 3 for providing support regarding shelter for a city-like refugee camp. Considering the fact that humanitarian work is rarely of a spatial character, and that refugee camps have been recently recognised for their urban implications; and despite the paradigm shift in the agency’s perception of camps more as a ‘development’; it seems that lack of expertise and NGOs developing enough skills to intervene in this field are still missing.

Surveys and estimations about Zaatari camp’s population reveal that the agency came to manage the camp where number of refugees where rapidly increasing, reaching its peak in April in 2013. According to security reports, the agency assumed its respon-
sibilities as camp manager in 1st of March 2013 (UNHCR, 2014b). Afterwards, the agency was orchestrating the work of more than 20 IPs in the camp including UN organisations and bodies, local and international NGOs, as well as, representatives of the Jordanian administrative system. However, prior to that date, the camp was managed by the Jordanian government, which will be explained in the next section.

(fig. 6)— Analysis of UNHCR programs in Zaatari camp
Source: Author, based on UNHCR’s internet dashboard, 2014
3.2. Jordanian Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations: JHCO and SRCD

Since its establishment in July 2012 and till March 2013, the camp was directed by a non-governmental and non-profit organisation known as The Jordan Hashemite Charity Organisation for Relief and Development (JHCO, 2014). Also known as JHCO, the organisation was established in 1990 has provided assistance for people from all over the world - those ‘who are suffering from the consequences of conflict, natural disasters, poverty and under development regardless of their religion, origin or creed’ (ibid). Despite being active in more than 34 countries around the world, the humanitarian work of the agency was limited between distributing humanitarian relief, and participating in providing medical assistance, but never exceeded to providing service, management and planning of refugee camps of more than 10,000 refugees (ibid).

The security report (2014c) explains that ‘JHCO held the coordination and primary implementation role in the camp, while a Jordanian civil servant undertook the ‘governorship’ of the camp’. At that time, security of the camp was under the responsibility of the Jordanian military in concert with an appointed governor from the Jordanian authorities (ibid). This has been changed in March 2013, when the Syrian Refugees Camps Directorate (SRCD) took over the responsibility for securing the camp.

Established in January 2013, SRCD ‘was created and operationalised with funding by the Canadian government as an integrated directorate comprising elements of the public security (police), civil defence (ambulance and fire) and gendarmerie (public order and reinforcements for the police) (ibid: 15). The newly formed governmental body grew from 100 workers in 2013, to reach around 300 gendarmes, 50 civil defence members and 200 public security policemen in 2014 (ibid). These forces are planned to cover the following domains: access control; patrol; preventative deployment; criminal investigation; operations; administration; quick reaction force; and community policing (UNHCR, 2013b). The agency reports that SRCD was able to develop good relations with ‘informal leaders’ (known as Street Leaders) in order to secure the camp and get more information about what is happening in the camp (see 6.2 and 6.5).

The same report suggests that ‘several incidents initiated within the camp, could be partly explained as a test of the authority of the relatively new SRCD’ (ibid: 15). The
report, however, further explains that SRCD was able to develop relations with the informal leaders of the camp (known as street leaders) and other centres of power within the camp. This has led to a ‘gradual shift in refugee perceptions of the police and greater information flows to the SRCD’ (ibid: 15). However, the need to ensure further control on refugees has led to the creation of two concepts: community policing, and friends of police. These will be described further in Governance section.

3.3. Syrian Refugees: Demographics and Population Profile
Different resources have different estimations of refugees’ origins in Zaatari camp. This might be related to the relationship of influx-repatriation and the estimated number of population at the time of survey. All reports, however, refer to an overwhelming majority coming from Dara’a governorate in Syria. Sweep report deployed in June 2013, breaks the population of the camp down to a 97% coming from Dara’a, while a minority of 3% originate from Homs and Rural Damascus (REACH, 2013). In comparison to the fact that 42% of registered Syrian refugees are accommodated in Al-Mafraq relates to a very important factor about the geography, culture and demography of Hauran Plain where Dara’a and Al-Mafraq are located (UNHCR, 2014b).

Hauran Plain is the land limited by Golan Heights, Lebanese borders and the northern parts of Jordan. Sharing culture, traditions and history; residents of the Plain maintained strong social relations that predate the establishment of national borders based on colonial divisions (ibid). This was sustained through intermarriages and trade relations. Therefore, social connections in the camp, beyond the camp and beyond the Syrian-Jordanian borders are creating a seemingly similar societal network (ibid). However, the tensions between refugees and host communities in Al-Mafraq relate to the fact that they originate from Homs (MercyCorps, 2013). Whereas in Al-Ramtha, social ties between refugees and host communities played a greater role in stabilising the temporal demographic change (ibid).

The governorate of Dara’a is composed of three administrative parts: Dara’a on the south, Izara’ in the middle and As-Sanamyen to the north (see fig. 7). It was reported that many refugees originate from villages and towns like Sahwa, Ankhal and Al-Hrak in Dara’a, but are dominated by refugees from Mahaja in As-Sanamyen (UNHCR 2014c, interviw Kleinschmidt). On a family level, the camp is dominated by Al-Hariris, whose family ties extend beyond the camp and is headed by an old man living in Irbid in Jordan (ibid).
Interviews with refugees show that the minority from Homs originate from its rural side, with the majority from Al-Quṣayr village. Whereas refugees from Rural Damascus are Bedouins that might not have the same connections to clans from Houran Plain, but are still familiar with clanic social structures in the camp. This was considered to be a stabilising factor of the demographic mixture in the camp (ibid). Especially in comparison to Palestinian camps where refugees originated from different villages with a distinction between civil refugees and farmer refugees, or Dadaab camp that hosts refugees from different nationalities around Kenya (Misselwitz, 2009).

However, in regard to work skills prior to leaving Syria, a recent survey indicates that more than 30% of refugees were engaged in agricultural activities; around 25% in skilled daily labour, 11% in teaching and public service (REACH & UNHCR, 2014). Another assessment revealed that skilled construction men worked as: 37% masons, 21% tile workers, 20% carpenters, 14% welders and 8% as painters (ACTED, 2013). Whereas skilled traders were divided as: 44% plumbers, 28% mechanics, 17% electricians and 11% technicians (ibid). As for women, 76% reported to have worked as housewives, followed by: 6% sewing and tailoring, 5% skilled non-manual professions, 4% agricultural work, 3% do not know, 2% beautician, and 2% handcrafts.
This gives an overview of the different skills and potentials among refugees that can be invested in the camp and in reaching a stage of self-reliance (see 5.2).

On the one hand, despite the changing trends in population counts and the challenging task of surveying residents of the camp, basic statistics published on the agency’s portal show that camp’s population is balanced between men and women. As much as this would contribute to growth of camp’s population, a detailed breakdown shows that around 40% are aged between 18-59 years old while 42% are children refugees counted younger than 11 years old (UNHCR, 2014d). On the other hand, around 15% are youth between 12-17 years, and around 3% are over 60 years old (ibid). According to agency standards, more than half of refugees in Zaatari are children under 18 who are not allowed to work, while, coping with culture and the need to assess families; it is not unfamiliar for youth between 12 and 18 to work as well, especially in rural areas where most of the refugees come from.

Another aspect which is education can contribute to that. The results of the previous assessment show that only 5% received no education during their stay in Syria; whereas 60% completed secondary school, 16% high school, 9% primary school, 6% university, and 4% diploma (ibid). During interviews with refugees, many have expressed a growing sense of disempowerment generated by the humanitarian system of the camp. They explained that despite their high level of education, there are not enough channels where they can deploy their academic and professional skills in developing the camp.

However, as much as the possession of an educational degree may encourage refugees to leave the camp through ‘bail out’ system, a striking majority of 97.7% of refugees are considering to stay in the camp for the next six months from the date of the assessment (REACH & UNHCR, 2014). This highlights the need to reconsider the options regarding the camp, not only as a matter of funds but also the great amount of human resources currently deactivated in the camp.
3.4. Conclusions

Based on the previous, Zaatari camp is an interesting urban model. Similar to slums, it became a field of operations and interventions for NGOs, military and security forces (Agier, 2009). The relationships between actors in the camp differ since UNHCR is mandated to control, manage and coordinate operations in cooperation with the hosting country (see fig. 8). The previous analysis, however, could be summarised as follows:

- The increasing numbers of Syrian refugees in northern Jordan has put a pressure on public services, economy and infrastructure. Moreover, tensions between refugees and the local community in AL-Mafraq were proliferating. Under these conditions, Zaatari camp was established to contain and accommodate Syrian refugees and at the same time, release these emerging tensions.
- The camp is located in hot arid climate in a relatively similar distance to Syrian-Jordanian borders and to Al-Mafraq city - the closest urban agglomeration to the camp.
- Most of the NGOs operating in the camp under the umbrella of UNHCR are specialised in health and education sectors. Whereas very little attention is given to the physical environment, shelter and livelihoods.
- Until March 2013, the camp was managed by a Jordanian NGO (JHCO), which has no previous experiences in running and coordinating operations in refugee camps.
- Jordan government is involved in the camp through SRCD through which, the camp is regulated and secured. Further involvement was noted in the education and health sectors.
- The greater majority of Syrian refugees in the camp originate from Dara’a. A province that is a natural extension to northern Jordan. Therefore, people in both sides of the borders are sharing common traditions, cultures and societal connections.
- The population of Zaatari camp is highly potential. They demonstrated the acquisition of academic and professional skills, with the majority involved in agricultural activities prior to the camp. These skills, however, remain neglected, unused and deactivated in the camp.
(fig. 8)—Relationships between actors in Zaatari camp
Source: Author
No wonder that this chapter constitutes the largest and most contested part of this thesis, since it maps the spatial-physical transformations of Zaatari camp on the way to urbanisation. The first part is dedicated to explain the spatial implications of expansion and growth. It describes and analyses the development of Zaatari camp through time. Not as a linear process, but as a multitudes of variables, dynamics and process that interact on the ground. The resulting tensions are expressed spatially as the morphology of the camp. The second part looks deeper into these dynamics, focusing on the emergence of certain distinctions and designs of space. It specifically documents and analyses the significance transformation from shelter units to habitat as a milestone towards urbanity. The last part dedicates an in-depth analysis to a micro part of the emerging habitat, in order to generate further understanding to the dynamics and tensions that are leading the urbanity of Zaatari camp.
4.1. Morphology
This section overlooks Zaatari camp from above. It observes it as a one spatial entity – a field of dynamics and tensions between planning and practice. It paves the way for next chapters and sections by explaining how Zaatari camp developed by time, how is it programmed in order to function, and which factors are influencing its resulting spatial morphology.

4.1.1. Chronology: Expanding the Camp
‘Unhappy event’; this is what the minister of interior commented on the opening of Zaatari camp (Al-Rai, 2012). At that time, Jordan has already welcomed 140,000 Syrian refugees and was receiving around 1500 to 2000 refugees every day (ibid). Therefore, Zaatari camp was established with the intention to host around 10,000 refugees in order to release the pressure resulting from this demographic change (UN, 2014b). However, it is not clear on which basis, refugees crossing the border were divided to be hosted in camps or in Jordanian communities. Moreover, it is not clear if limiting the camp to 10,000 refugees was recommended by the agency that prefers to plan and manage camps with maximum 20,000 refugees, or the decision of the Jordanian government, since according to the fact that 1500 to 2000 refugees crossing the border every day, the camp would be filled in less than 7 days from its opening – which seems to have been the case.

An analysis of satellite images shows how the camp has been growing exponentially (see fig. 9). The gradual expansion of the humanitarian space in relation to influx phases and the spatial practices in these places have influenced the demographical allocations, densities and special morphology of the camp. In six months, Zaatari grew rapidly from the size of a farm (30 hectares in September 2012) to the size of a city (530 hectares in March 2013). Ever since, the camp has maintained its size. According to the planner of the camp, there are no intentions to further expand the camp; however, additional space around the camp is saved for that purpose. This space is not attributed to certain usages, but might host additional facilities, administration, a farming project and a sewage treatment plant for the camp.

The increase in size was due to increased influx of refugees. The agency has no published data about the estimation of registered refugees in the camp before January 2013; however, it could be estimated that 10,000 refugees were already there in less than a month. A rise in camp’s population has reached a peak in April 2013 counting more than 200,000 refugees in the camp (UNHCR, 2014d).
(fig. 9)—The physical-spatial growth of Zaatari camp between August 2012 and January 2014

Source: Author, based on UNOSAT
Afterwards, the number has decreased reaching 70,000-80,000 refugees today (REACH & UNHCR, 2013, 2014). This might be due to the fact that the rapid increase in population was not able to be met in services provided by the agency and other humanitarian actors. Therefore, refugees decided to leave the camp or repatriate to Syria. Another possible option to leave the camp is through an official ‘bail out’ system where Jordanians are held responsible in sponsoring Syrian refugees outside the camp (ibid).
Interestingly, despite the fact that UNHCR’s counting has been reported to be not so accurate due to on-ground difficulties, many sources indicate that more than 350,000 Syrian refugees were registered in the camp, whereas less than 100,000 are currently living there (REACH & UNHCR, 2013; UN, 2014b; UNHCR, 2014b). Meaning that, around 150,000 refugees assisted with Non-Food Items (NFIs) have left the camp. By analysing the data produced through UNOSAT images where shelters were located on the map and then compared to older ones in order to estimate the differences, the timeline is altering between additions and reductions (see figure 10). This could be due to the dynamics that housing units undergo, which will be explained later (see 4.2). However, the latest image dated in April 2014, refers to a peak of shelter units reaching 31,280. This explains that the physical structure of the camp is increasing despite the decrease in population after April 2013. The growth of the camp, however, was marked by two different spatial practices: planning and non-planning.

(fig. 11)—Zones A and B
Source: Author, based on Open Street Map
4.1.2. Unplanned: The Older Camp

While the construction of new infrastructure and facilities to serve the camp was taking place under the management and coordination of JHCO, refugees were spontaneously settling within the limited boundaries of the humanitarian space. Since these boundaries have been expanding in parallel to the increasing influx of refugees, the older camp reached less than 200 hectares, meaning around 40% of total current camp space.

The unplanned nature of this part resulted into two recognisable urban patterns. Despite the fact that the camp was expanding and refugees’ number increasing, its infrastructure played a role in defining routes and orientating refugees in the camp. The camp space then was halved by a main street, and used by humanitarians to access the camp. This resulted into facilities being constructed in juxtaposition along the main street facing one side of the camp and neglecting the other. Due to that, the part which I call zone A has developed by its movement patterns – refugees settled creating strips (walkways) heading towards the main street and bending in accordance to the camp’s boundaries. This pattern is observed to appear in earliest stages and was developed later as will be explained in the next sections.

Whereas, the spatial settings through which refugees in the other part of the camp settled were different, and therefore, the resulting patterns were also different. Refugees in this part, which I call B, were trapped behind main facilities that left only few exits for them to the main streets. Besides, communal facilities were constructed in separate zones. This spatial divisions increased fragmentation. This can be seen in the camp’s map with resulting sub-road system that was spontaneously developed by refugees through daily usage and utilisation of space (see figure 11). However, as the influx of refugees was transgressing the capacities of the old camp, the decision was made to expand the camp accommodating the newcomers.

4.1.3. Planned: The New Camp

Satellite images show that in November 2012, the construction of the new camp began, and ended before March 2013. This is when the camp doubled in size reaching a maximum of 530 hectares. The expansion of space was accompanied with an increase in shelter units, reaching its first peak in mid-March 2013 of around 26000 units.
The new camp is based on a duplication of the main road to the east, and cutting through these duplications by another road that is mediating the camp. These duplications created chess like network of around 75x50 metres each (see fig. 12). The new districts or sub-camps, sized around 375000 m², were prepared to accommodate refugees reaching the camp. In order to overcome the difficulties resulting from self-settlement of refugees in the older district, the planning of the new camp was as much a response for emergency, as much for discipline and control.
(fig. 13)—Illustration of a planned block in Zaatari camp
Source: Author
The former grid of districts embedded another grid of shelters and services. Each district contained 12 residential blocks supplied with infrastructure. Each block was attributed with 1 drinking water storage and 4 communal latrines and, whiles every two blocks shared 3 communal kitchens. Satellite images show, that additional spaces were spared on the side of each block for multi-activity centres (MACs). At the same time, each block followed a grid of 12 lines and 7 rows of caravans. Each caravan is supposed to host one family according to the current camp policy, meaning that, each residential block was planned to host 84 families of around 420 to 504 persons, and each district can host up to 6048 refugees. Following the same logic of 45-30 m² of camp space per refugee, the districts can host up to 8000 refugees. This indicates an addition in space of around 100,000 m² in each new district that might be saved for services. However, these resulted into vast spaces around the residential blocks that have no hint on their function (see fig. 13).

The planning of the new camp does not exactly follow the Handbook in terms of divisions and distribution of services. This difference was affirmed by the planner of the camp who explained: ‘the handbook is our bible. It is however our responsibility to respond to challenges as they happen on the ground...The Handbook provides minimums that are better not to be exceeded’ (Interview Jertila 2014). Although, it might not then follow the exact instructions of the Handbook, the planning of the new camp is quite instructive through its attempts to maintain order and discipline in the camp. However, in order to understand the implications of planning and non-planning on urbanisation; it is important to understand the very distinctive materiality, through which urbanisation is taking place.

4.1.4. Spatial Elements

"we should perhaps here introduce a distinction between the city, a present and immediate reality, a practico-material and architectural fact and the urban, a social reality made up of relations which are to be conceived of, constructed and reconstructed by thought...If one adopts this terminology, the relations between the city and the urban will have to be determined with the greatest care, by avoiding separation as well as confusion, and metaphysics as well as reduction to the immediate and tangible” – Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre et al. 1996: 103)

From an urban point of view, Zaatari camp is a very interesting setting. There, one could sense a contradicting image between an unmistakable sense of urbanity, similar to that in cities; and a very limited materiality. This paradox, gives urbanisation
a very limited sources of material to express itself visually. However, based on the previous Lefebvrian distinction between the city and the urban, this section explores the city in Zaatari camp.

It could be said that Zaatari camp’s architecture is trapped in a cycle of elements that it cannot break. This repetition of elements displays Zaatari as a quarantined settlement, an urban carpet spreading on a city-like area of 530 hectares – a spectacular image, rendered by the humanitarian principles of equality, homogeneity, and neutrality (see fig. 14). Analysing the spatial elements that constitute the camp implies a new perspective of seeing the urban. These elements are not only symbols of the materiality of space being very limited, but also to its temporal nature that is very persistence. In this regard, the physical appearance of a human settlement –its diversity or homogeneity- relies on different aspects that could relate to its raison d’être and ideology or what Lefebvre (1996) called a ‘far order’.

(fig. 14)—Zaatari camp as seen from distance
Source: Author
(fig. 15)—Spatial elements in Zaatari camp
Source: Author
As found in Zaatari camp, the spatial elements are displayed in relation to three levels: lower, middle and upper. The lower level is the ground of the camp and all seen elements that relate to it, these can be divided between infrastructure and nature: asphalted streets cutting through the camp, defining its districts; refugees-made canals and septic tanks dug into the ground, resulting into swamps and mud; vegetation such as grass, herbs and trees; growing on gravel, earth and sand. The middle level, rising around 3 meters above the ground, contains elements for shelter, infrastructure, mobility and construction. It contains: UNHCR's famous tents; caravans; metal sheets and sections; water tanks; communal facilities; wooden beams; brick; barbed wires; fences; stone; Jeeps, trucks, caravan carriers and trolleys. Whereas in the upper level flags; speakers; lighting poles; electricity cables and power transmitters, can be seen (see fig. 15).

Logically, the overall morphology of the camp is a production of its parts. As much as the spatial elements can give an idea on the architecture of the camp, it also gives an impression of its morphology: an urban carpet of caravans, tents and fences, cut by few linear roads, dotted by huge power transmitters and light poles that became anchors for electricity cables swinging over the camp. All this is isolated from the surrounding environment by ring road, followed by earthwork, trenched, barbed wire and military check points (see figure 16).

4.1.5. Caravanisation: The Solidification of Habitat

It is not a coincidence that tents are symbols for camps. In many refugee camps around the world, UNHCR distribute its famous tents as an asset for protection and shelter for refugees fleeing war and natural disasters (Agier, 2002). Nonetheless, this universal solution for shelter is suddenly faced with different climatic conditions around the world. These are especially escalated in protracted refugee situations. For instance, after few years from their establishment, Palestinian refugee camps
witnessed a large-scale project by UNRWA to substitute tents with a durable solution. These were ‘self-built mud and stone shelters with single-storey standardized shelter units (of approximately 20 square metres each, or about one room per family of up to five members, two rooms for families with more than five members), built from light-weight materials, such as hollow concrete blocks’ (Misselwitz, 2009).

In Zaatari camp, tents proved to be incapable of protecting refugees from harsh weather, especially during snow falls and heavy rains, in which tents tended to either collapse or damage (Mercy Corps, 2013). It is observed that caravans, as more durable solution, were brought to the camp by donors, and not the agency. These donors vary from Oil countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar to Fareast countries like Taiwan, as well as, private donors from individuals.

Satellite images show that what I refer to as caravanisation, meaning the process of substituting tents with caravans, appeared first in mid-March 2013 when the majority of tents in zone A were substituted with caravans; however, the agency reports the process to have begun in November 2012, 5 month after the opening of the camp (UNHCR, 2014b). What started as philanthropy became a camp policy. The latest RRP justifies the need for caravanisation, stating that ‘emergency tents need to be replaced with more durable dwelling units in order to provide efficient protection from extreme desert wind and climate conditions’ (UN 2014b: 80). As this has already started in Zaatarari, and later was implemented in other camps in Jordan, in Zaatarari, the policy states that each family are provided with one caravan, whereas families of more than 5 members can have an additional tent (REACH, 2013).

This policy has influenced the camp’s morphology. Within the older unplanned camp, caravans where replacing tents that were spontaneously allocated, leading to a congestion of caravans. Whereas in the new camp, caravanisation was taking place in spaces between residential blocks described earlier, or between communal infrastructures as the designed blocks were already made of caravans. This implementation of this policy can be seen throughout REACH surveys (see fig. 17). However, the morphology of the camp is not only influenced by allocations of caravans, but also with refugees’ nomadic movement in the camp.
(fig. 17)—Allocations of households according to the type of shelter unit used between March 2014 and March 2014
Source: ACTED 2013; REACH 2013; UNHCR, 2014
(fig. 18)—Allocations of refugees according to origins in May 2013
Source: REACH 2013

(fig. 19)—Allocations of refugees according to time of arrival as per May 2013
Source: REACH 2013
4.1.6. Refugees: Between Allocation, Movement and Density

Contrary to the UNRWA constructed shelter, caravans, like tents, are movable. Refugees have developed a caravan carrier of metal sections attached to four tires on which caravans can be carried around the camp. Usually this movement indicates preferences for location, neighbourhoods and neighbours. In a 2013 Sweep report, statistics show that if given the chance, 63% of interviewed households would prefer to live next to refugees from the same family origins, whereas 11% would choose to be with people originating from the same place in Syria, and 26% with people living in the same place at the moment of leaving Syria (REACH, 2013).

However, comparing the results of the survey with two REACH maps: Origin with Dara’a Governorate May 2013 (see fig. 18), and Time of Arrival to the camp (see fig. 19) show that refugees allocation in the camp can be highly related to time of arrival rather than to origins in Dara’a, which also appears in the micro case study later. Moreover, the maps show that refugee’s movement within the camp has taken place, but they do not indicate any attempts for grouping or isolation of certain groups from the others on a camp scale. They appear to have a tendency to integrate and mix in contrary to studied Palestinian camps in West Bank where it was documented that once refugees arrived and started to settle, a grouping process based on origins immediately took place, dominating the spatiality of the camp and influencing its urbanisation process (Misselwitz, 2009).5

The intention of refugees to relocate inside the camp and the ability to move households can be problematic, since the provision of services relies on an estimated number of refugees in each district or sub-camp (Interview with Jertila 2014). This could lead to congestion of refugees in certain parts of the camp and vice versa, which would create imbalance in demographical distribution and thus requires redistribution of services and infrastructure around the camp. This can be observed in Za’atari camp as there is a concentration of refugees in the older camp near the entrance, in contrast to the new camp and especially the furthest parts from the entrance (REACH & UNHCR, 2013) (see fig. 20). The uneven densities of refugees in Za’atari were observed by Sweep report 2013, stating that ‘the de-congestion of over-populated districts to under-populated districts (possibly through the provision of additional services) may therefore be necessary in order to ensure all persons have a sufficient amount of open space to live healthily’ (REACH & UNHCR 2013: 4).
These dynamics, however, are brought to a fundamental change after the development of shelter units into households. This will be explained in the following parts of the thesis. Finally, it could be said that allocations of refugees in relation to the previously explained chronological growth of Zaatari camp contributed to create uneven densities that are expected to influence the further development of the camp. In regard to the Palestinian case, it was claimed that ‘this uneven density is still visible today. The camps’ uneven formation suggests the presence of a complex, integrated, and differentiated social/ spatial order’ (Misselwitz 2009: 161). The social/spatial order in Zaatari camp will be anchored in the next sections; however, it should be first examined how morphology influenced these dynamics, dividing the camp into districts and quarters.

(fig. 20)—Densities between May and November 2013
Source: ACTED 2013
4.1.7. Districts and Physical Consolidation of Quarters

The urbanisation of Palestinian refugee camps in West Bank witnessed a gradual process of consolidation of physical structure in the form of quarters. The main drive in this process was sticking to village or city of origin in Palestine within the camp, while this social clustering symbolised protection and safety. Through time, it developed spatially forming the camps quarters named after their places of origin (Misselwitz, 2009). The influence of this social order is still visible today in the studied camps. Misselwitz comments on that by saying: ‘It is striking that both the names and geographic locations of quarters are basic knowledge shared by all camp residents. Precise boundaries can still be drawn based on the descriptions of residents. The names have become part of the general camp “culture” and are firmly established in the vocabulary of everyday life. They are used to describe locations of dwellings and institutions or to give directions through the camp’ (ibid: 282).

Taking into consideration the huge difference in size - Palestinian camps are much smaller than Zaatari - it could be said that there are different levels of district divisions and naming techniques. On a micro scale, districts or neighbourhoods are gradually being shaped by pedestrian routes emerging from refugees’ movement in the camp. In the older camp, these appeared earlier as refugees settled down creating routes towards main infrastructures and services. In the newer camp, UNO satellite images reveal a process of filling-in and re-ordering. As the planner of the camp programmed space as described earlier, refugees were first filling in the caravans, and later spontaneously, as the influx of refugees increased refugees were filling the undefinable spaces between blocks and infrastructure. By time, solidification of districts is taking place; districts are defined also by routes that are mainly following the grid line of the planner. As a result, rectangular districts of different sizes appeared (see fig. 21).

However, on a camp scale, the agency has divided the camp into 12 districts. No official information could be obtained about why Zaatari was divided this way, but it is estimated that divisions were made upon number of population expected in each district, so the provision of services can be better organised. Therefore, it is seen that the older camp with higher densities was divided into smaller parts compared to the new camp. Streets were also numbered in order to be controlled and managed. In contrast to the numeric system of the agency, refugees use different mechanisms for naming districts, and locating oneself in the camp. For instance, it was observed
that refugees collectively developed a mechanism to divide the camp into districts based on the country donating the caravans in that location. These are recognised by flags of the donor country on caravans: Saudi, Qatari, Kuwaiti, Omani and Bahraini district (see fig. 22). The boundaries and location of each districts were drawn based on interviews with refugees from different locations around the camp, however, it should be noted that refugees were not able to define the exact borders of districts, this might be due to the big size of the camp; therefore, the borders were estimated according to interviews with refugees (see fig. 23). Moreover, the main market street is referred to as Champs-Élysées by the agency, humanitarians and media; whereas during my visits to the camp, none of the interviewed refugees ever referred to it by this name, but it was always called the Souk.

Therefore, it could be concluded that naming in refugee camps is a political act. In the Palestinian case, it did not merely refer to the origins of the inhabitants in Palestine, but was also a mechanism of resistance to externalization and exile, and later symbolism as reminder of stolen or destroyed cities and villages. Despite the fact that the Syrian conflict is of a different nature, the naming of districts appears to have political connotations. Some non-Arab countries like Taiwan and Korea donated caravans, but districts held only the names of Gulf countries that are active on Syrian political scene as pro-opposition.

Similarly, the naming of the main market as Champs-Élysées can be interpreted as a way to draw international attention towards ‘urbanisation’ witnesses by the booming economy and the expansion of Zaatari camp, and maybe, ironically relating it to Syria’s previous colonists France which can be considered as a reminder of the responsibilities of the international community towards the Syrian crisis, and the needs to increase funds. A further investigation in this regard might be needed to affirm these interpretations and assumptions. However, the next section examines the morphology of the camp under the challenges of accessibility and population growth.

**4.1.8. Closed Camp: Accessibility and Population Growth**

Sociologist Sari Hanafi (2008) differentiates between two types of camps: closed and open. To him, open camps are spaces: 1) integrated and connected spatially with their context; 2) where refugees are able to mix, socialise and normalise their relationship with the hosting population. Whereas, closed camps are those not meeting at least one of these two standards. In this regard, it could be said that Zaatari camp is closed par excellence.
(fig. 21)—The crystallisation of quarters between December 2012 and January 2014
Source: Author, based on UNOSAT
(fig. 22) — Flags, symbols or names of donors on caravans
Source: Author
Ironically, with its isolation, the camp resembles a medieval city. Its 530 hectares are of orbital shape; surrounded with trenches, earthworks and surveillance towers (military points with tanks); opening up to the outer world through only one gate that is not directly connected to Jordanian transportation network, but through a long road that increase the possibility to control via another gate at the end of that road can give a hint of how the camp is being isolated from its surrounding.

Also socially, the process of entering and leaving the camp is not arbitrary. It is monitored by Jordanian security forces where those entering the camp should either be refugees registered in the camp, or humanitarians working in the camp, or ‘others’ who have a limited permissions to visit the camp (usually journalists and scholars). Refugees wanting to leave the camp for a short period of time should apply for special permission that is ironically called ‘vacation’, which resembles the name of permissions soldiers obtain to leave military camps. This all highlights the excessive control practiced by Jordanian security forces to monitor and isolate the camp. Despite all the attempts, however, refugees are still able to leave and get inside the camp illegally.

With the recent opening of Al-Azraq camp in Jordan, Zaatari’s management has no intention to receive more refugees (Interview with Kleinschmidt). In this regard, Syrian refugees have the following options: 1) repatriate to Syria 2) leave the camp
through ‘bail out’ system 3) illegally leave the camp 4) stay in the camp. While according to recent survey the great majority of interviewees expressed their intention to stay in the camp for the next 6 months can indicate refugees will to invest in the camp, and further urbanise it (REACH & UNHCR, 2014). Therefore, as long as refugees having these options while the Syrian conflict has reached no safe end, the population of the camp will be fluctuating between natural increase, mortality rates and repatriation.

However, according to previous studies, refugees usually prefer to stay in camps for longer periods than expected. The dependency on humanitarian assistance, the quality of health services and education that is usually better than in original and hosting countries, connection to economic system and development of the lived conditions can ‘weaken their ties to the place of origin’ (Misselwitz 2009: 71). Therefore, the natural increase in camp’s population should be taken into consideration.

High fertility rates were indicated among Syrian refugees in the camp especially those coming from rural areas where 10 to 13 births were taking place every day in April 2013 (Idris, 2013). In the same year, it was reported that crude birth rates in Zaatari camps reached 19.7 per 1000 refugees, and crude mortality rates were 0.21 per 1000 refugees (UNHCR & Malkawi, 2013). Thus, the rate of natural increase can be estimated to be around 1.9% of the camp’s population every year. However, according to refugees and due to difficulties related to the legislative system in the camp regarding marital registration, not all children born in the camp are being registered. Therefore, it could be estimated that rate of natural increase is more than the estimated number.6

In this respect, the camp presents an isolated land, where in the absence of durable solutions in the near future, refugees are expected to stay in the camp for longer periods of time. This will not only be accompanied with a natural growth of the camp’s population, but, compared to the previously mentioned study of Sari Hanafi, will have negative impacts on living qualities – economically, educationally and socially (Hanafi, 2008).
4.1.9. Conclusions
The intention of this section was to give an overview of the development of Zaatari, the phases and process that led to its current ‘practico-material’ status quo. It aimed to create a framework for understanding and positioning, the following arguments for the development of space, habitat, socio-economics and governance. Therefore it could be summarised that:

• Zaatari camp is composed of two parts with different patterns of growth and development: a planned new camp, and unplanned old camp. Both are divided into 12 districts in order to facilitate the process of planning and administration; however, neither the divisions nor the planning paradigm distinguish the difference in spatial, urban and development stage of each of the two parts.
• The caravanisation of Zaatari camp is a shift towards durable solution for shelter, and at the same time, a solidification of the built environment, and thus, a shift towards stability of structure.
• Despite the known fact that refugees usually stick to kinship relations while residing in new empty spaces like camps, in Zaatari, refugees have shown a great tendency to mix and allocate themselves in accordance to time of arrival and camp’s expansion. Drawing on experiences from Palestinian camps, this will have a positive impact on urbanisation.
• The chronological growth of the camp resulted into an old and a new camp with uneven densities, as a consequence of the top-down spatial practices and the perpetual allocations of refugees.
• The urban settings through which the camp is being urbanised as a ‘closed space’ will have a negative impact on refugees and the camp, and thus a need to reviewed in relation to the spatial and legislative context of the hosting country.

The next section will offer an insight to the spatial practices on a closer level, examining the development of habitat, created upon tensions between humanitarians’ normalised policies vis-à-vis refugees’ cultures and traditions.
4.2. From Shelter Unit to Habitat

Drawing on the distinction between shelter as a ‘temporary or emergency form of dwelling’, and habitat as a ‘more durable form of housing’, this section aims to highlights the dynamics and tensions that lead to the emergence of habitat in Zaatari camp (Rueff & Viaro 2009: 339).

4.2.1. Standardisation of Living: Shelter Units

The distribution of NFIs like tents and caravans is based on humanitarian principles of neutrality, homogeneity and equality. In this regard, refugees are rendered victims, with more privileges given to those showing higher degrees of vulnerability. Despite the recent attempts to change this fact, no different strategies were implemented in Zaatari camp. The humanitarian ideology was translated on the ground as a standardised distribution of shelter units and policies. As this could be also argued to directly relate to a need for fast provision of services during emergency, the deployed strategies are leading to create a homogenous face that was frequently criticised for camouflaging diversity, culture and character of refugees (Agier, 2010; Herz, 2007; Malkki, 1996).

At the beginning, tents were distributed to accommodate refugees in the camp. These have hexagonal shape and cover an area of 23 m2. Some refugees reported that the agency had additionally provided metal sheets that could be attached to tents in order to create an extra space used as kitchenette or storage room. Later on, caravans were donated which start to become an alternative solution for shelter.

A caravan is 16 m2 prefabricated rectangular metal room with a parquet floor, a door and small windows. They are raised few centimetres above the ground by a metal base. Refugees reported that caravans may vary in insulation, strength and quality of material; however, they provide a better solution in regard to the harsh summer and winter weather in the camp.

According to sphere standards refugees are entitled with 3.5 m2 per shelter space (REACH, 2013). Considering the fact that families are estimated between 4-6 persons (UNHCR, 2007), tents and caravans are thus considered a one-space shelter per family. This policy was implied in Zaatari as each family is entitled to one caravan, except those exceeding 5 members are supplied with an additional tent (REACH, 2013).
The problem arising from this policy stems from its universal character that contradicts with the culture of Syrian refugees in the camp. This culture, influenced by Islamic values, stands for the separation of men and women, especially when young and non-married. This even gets more complicated with extended family structures: 1 family or more living together, or hosting other family members that are not directly related (aunts, uncles, nephews...etc.). This societal constrains can be generalised to be the rule all around the camp, and especially in closed spaces like caravans and tents. Even among the same family, mixing of sexes is considered to be humiliating as one refugee explained: “imagine that because we all have to live in this room, my young daughter has to change her clothes in front of her brother!! What a shame!! We never did that in Syria”.

The social discomfort brought to refugees by universalisation of standards became a driving force for them to find appropriate solutions for living and shelter. Within a limited availability of materials, refugees started to create new habitat that transgresses by its dynamics, the monolithic image of housing in refugee camps, and marks the earliest steps towards the urbanisation of Zaatari camp. Habitat, however, is not exhaustive to living spaces as shelter units, but fundamentally includes spaces for services and infrastructure. Implications on the latter are examined in the following section.

4.2.2. The Challenge of Communal Infrastructure

In response to emergency, the camp’s program offers refugees the access to shared facilities and infrastructure that are planned and distributed according to an estimated number of users (see 2.2.3). These include communal latrines, kitchens and water storages. This ‘surviving system’ implies that refugee families have to live in the provided shelter unit, cook their meals from what the humanitarian aid offers each month in the communal kitchens, use the communal toilets when needed, and get their water for drinking through communal water tanks.

In this respect, each block (see 4.1.3) represents by its spatial layout, a simplified plan for a normal flat: a living space fragmented into tens of identical family shelter units, a kitchen, a bathroom/toilet and a water tap designated to be used by the same group of people (see fig. 13). The ‘commonality’ of these facilities reduces their number so they can be easily constructed, administered, monitored, maintained, and supplied with service. The same situation applies to the old camp; however, the spatial settings differ as facilities are punctured among rows of settled refugees.
No information could be obtained about the exact number of communal facilities in the camp and the number of refugees they are planned to serve. However, an IRIN (2013) article mentions around 2000 public tanks distributed around the camp. It also says that each communal latrine currently serves more than 50 refugees. A situation which is exceeding the SPHERE limits. In the future, each latrine is planned to serve 20 refugees (ibid). The water for the camp is pumped out of the aquifer underneath the camp: 4 million litres a day in one of the most water-poor countries in the world (ibid).

Since amendments to shelter units were only visible to the agency during surveys, it was changes to communal facilities that were visible all the time, frustrating and interrupting the flow of the humanitarian program for the camp. These changes included vandalism, theft, and privatisation of all parts of the facilities (see fig. 24). According to the previous report, water taps were even stolen 20 minutes after being installed (ibid). Another report diagnosed the problem saying that: ‘communal facilities (toilet and kitchens) were also regularly targeted for vandalism and theft, with the concept of community property being challenged by increasing demands for the
privatisation of such services to the individual household level’ (UNHCR 2014d: 3, emphasis added).

Obviously, the agency’s communal solutions for infrastructure were not exactly understood as ‘community’ solutions. Not for the reason that Syrian refugees have no sense of what ‘community property’ is, but simply that the community did not validate them as they were proclaimed. A current report revealed that 33% of interviewed refugees have safety concerns about using WASH blocks during the day, and 48% during the night (ACTED, JEN, OXFAM, & UNICEF, 2013). This was justified by lack of hygiene and privacy, in addition to the long travels needed to reach them at night (ibid). However, during field research, refugees frequently expressed their feelings of humiliation, disrespectfulness and insecurity of using communal latrines. This is especially for women, children and old people which made them socially unacceptable. One refugee explained: ‘my mom is an old woman and has had an operation for her kidney...she needs to use the toilet every hour...do you think I can carry her there whenever she needs? I’m not there all the time!’ while another said as he was finishing a toilet attached to his caravan with cement: ‘well, we need it! We cannot keep going back and forth to toilets every time we need them...I have a little child, you see’.

Communal kitchens are spaces free of men, since women are held responsible for cooking and preparing meals in Syrian culture. Therefore, it could be claimed that there are less concerns about communal kitchens. Moreover, the micro study sample reveals that communal kitchens are becoming spaces for socialising (see 4.3.4). This reflects the results of the latest Sweep report were 80% of respondents owned a private kitchen, however, 37% of them still use communal kitchens (REACH & UNHCR, 2013).

As for communal water tanks, it was observed that in older areas of the camp refugees tend to possess private water storages, whereas the newer parts of the camp seemed heavily dependent on planned communal water tanks. Further studies are needed to verify this observation.

On the one hand, refugee camps per planning are spaces of emergency, of what Agamben (1998) calls ‘bare life’. They are planned as machines for surviving, where refugees are supplied with what keeps them alive. They are, therefore, not expected to use electrical equipment. In the Handbook for Emergencies (UNHCR, 2007), elec-
Electricity is only mentioned while giving recommendations for public facilities. However, Zaatari camp was connected to the Jordanian power network in order to convey electricity to public facilities, base camp and to lighting poles. These were planned throughout the camp in order to keep lighting at night. Refugees on the other hand, were reluctant not to use electrical equipment even though they were in a refugee camp. Households and market stalls connected to electricity ‘informally’ at the lighting poles. This has resulted into a jungle of electric wires swinging above caravans frequently reported to be responsible for causing fire in the camp (see fig. 25).

In regard to the previous, it could be concluded that commons are not commons without the blessing of the community. In Zaatari camp, this notion was imposed on refugees as a community property; whereas it contradicted with the culture of this community. This explains, for instance, the extreme deterioration of communal latrines in the old camp against communal kitchens that are relatively in a better condition due to being utilised as a women-friendly social space. However, while communal infrastructure deteriorated, different household designs and typologies were emerging in the camp.
4.2.3. Household Typologies
According to the previous arguments, refugees have found the need to appropriate the usage of shelter units, to spatially extend beyond their standardised geometrical boundaries, and more often, support them with needed private facilities. This has resulted in different housing typologies, summarised as tents-only, caravans-only and a mixture of both (see fig. 26 & fig. 17). Since tents as housing solution are slowly disappearing from the camp; a focus on the other housing typologies will be given (see fig. 17). Noteworthy to say that the materials presented here, however, draw on observations within the limited field visits to the camp and are aiming to give an overview and generate an understanding on the dynamics of habitat. Therefore, further studies in this regard are encouraged to update the development of habitat in Zaatari camp.

Logically, caravans are closed spaces that offer privacy: they function as a single room. Following the camp’s policy of one caravan per family of five persons or less; the 16 m² are compressed to include most of the daily activities: sleeping, living, being intimate, raising kids, storing assets, as well as, preparing and cooking meals. According to observations, refugees tend to separate these spaces through flexible furniture or curtains. However, the cultural and functional pressure to distribute these functions on more spaces led to the expansion of households beyond the camp’s policy. Once caravans were distributed, the majority of refugees who previously owned a tent used it for the creation of additional spaces. These were attached to the caravan either on the sides or in front of the door to create a buffer zone – an additional space that could be used for guests or daily semi-private activities. According to surveys 32% used them as storage space, 20% for sleeping, 18% for living and 30% for all together (REACH & UNHCR, 2013).

One example is located in district 12. The randomly chosen household was composed of a caravan and two tents attached to it, inhabited by two married young couple and a child. The caravan was the only private space, thus included a kitchenette of a small cooker, a metal washing basin and moderate cooking equipment; two mattresses for sleeping/living, faced with few blankets and a television.

The first tent was hung at one side on the caravan, and fixed on the other with the ground, supported with thin metal columns. This has created a semi-private space accessible from two sides covering the door of the caravan for more privacy. The space had also cement floor so it can be cleaned and used for setting on it. The space
is usually used for storing, receiving guests, drying clothes, and is also connected to a toilet/bath that was built from stone collected around the camp and cement illegally smuggled inside the camp. It is connected to a septic tank which was dug underneath. The other tent was erected the same way on the other side of the caravan, creating more space for receiving guests. The refugees expressed their intention for sparing some space of that tent for raising some chickens. Around the household, a small garden for planting wild garlic and mint was added. The household was connected to electricity through an adjacent lighting pole (see fig. 27).

However, according to observations, the possession of more than one caravan is a turning point in household design. This is because they allow for the creation of an additional space that is similar to a lobby, or in Islamic culture – an inner court. This allows refugees to first assign fewer functions for each caravan, add more spaces and facilities around the court (kitchens, bathrooms, stores), and most importantly, move privately between spaces. Therefore, the emerging designs can be described to be similar to traditional Islamic house, which is not a surprising fact since refugees are currently the architect directly following the codes of culture, societal values and traditions.

Keeping in mind, the fact that household designs in the camp are so diverse that they are not easily categorised unless thoroughly studied; two main typologies were observed during the field research: 1) inner courts 2) outer courts. Both types follow the same rationale: the court is defined by caravans (at least 2); a cement floor is casted connecting them; and curtains, bags or tents are hanged above to create shade and protection from rain, sometimes supported with wooden or metal light columns (see fig. 28).

- **Inner courts:** are similar to those found in old Medina, they cannot be seen from outside, completely closed and used by families inhabiting the household. Additional facilities are usually placed directly inside the court, or created by shifting caravans, creating space between them for such facilities.

- **Outer court:** are the opposite, where caravans are placed inside, or at least at one edge of the court. The caravans can still form an inner court, or be simply placed adjacent to each other. Facilities can be found either inside the court or between the caravans as described earlier. The courts are defined by either adjacent caravans, or by self-made fence of humanitarian NFIs, or can be partially open creating an arcade.
(fig. 26)—Household typologies in Zaatari camp
Source: Author
An analysis of a household with a caravan and two tents

Source: Author
This can be observed on a household level, however, for different reasons households can be seen to connect to each other creating extended households or clusters. These are inevitably influencing through their small-scale spatial practices the overall morphology of the camp. For instance, the possession of more than one caravan is very influential for urbanisation as a process, since it increases stability of households. It allows them to develop a more appropriate habitat and release societal tension generated by the standardisation of camp’s policy. But the question is, if refugees are entitled with only one caravan per family how can this happen?

According to Sweep report in 2013, an average of 1.16 caravans per household was counted in Zaatari (REACH & UNHCR, 2013). The report further states that ‘there is a high chance that households who are in possession of one caravan may also possess a second caravan; 38% of households have 1 caravan per household, 33% have 2, 18% have 3, 8% have 4, and 3% have 5 or more’ (ibid: 7). This underlines the increasing interest in caravans as flexible units that can be formulated easily by refugees in order to create a culturally sustainable household.
Interestingly, among the 15,532 caravans found in Zaatari at that time, 53% were allocated by UNHCR, 43% were purchased independently, and 4% inherited from people who have left the camp (ibid:9). This can be explained by the fact that around 300,000 assisted refugees left the camp at some point (UNHCR, 2014b). This resulted in breaking the humanitarian system by considering caravans as privately owned personal asset, entering the economic cycle of the camp. Thus, caravans were being sold, dismantled and then either smuggled outside the camp or used to create accessories. Therefore, and in order to control this a new agreement between the agency and SRCD stated that caravans are considered as ‘public property’ (UNHCR, 2014b). However, caravans were not only a fundamental constituent of habitat, but also a mean of self-expression.

4.2.4. Symbolism
Humanitarian standardisation of norms and policies theoretically ignore differences between refugees. The system gives no attention in regard to diversity among refugees and the need to express oneself differently, even in an emergency refugee camp. In Zaatari, refugees were able to express individuality and class through symbolism
of architecture and the limited materials available. For instance, some households in
the camp were noticed to have been arranged similarly to what seems to be a tradi-
tional western house with a symmetrical façade (see fig. 29). According to refugees,
the owner of one of the households works as ‘caravan dismantler’ in order to smuggle
them. The accumulation of capital was expressed through additions of accessories:
a metal portico over a foyer floored with pieces of marble, and two handmade clay
statues decorating the entrance.

In relation to the four levels of societal hierarchy that Agier distinguished in refugee
camps, the owner of this household as a ‘trader’ is topping the proposed hierarchy
(Agier, 2002). This societal distinction was reflected on architecture that became a
mean for expressing individuality. As this might denote the emergence of social class
in Zaatar camp, further investigations on this matter are encouraged.
Additionally, drawings of flowers, trees, rivers and green landscapes on caravans can
be easily noticed around the camp (see fig. 30). These do not only stand for individ-
uality and self-expression, but could be also interpreted as codes and messages: a
claim to a better life and a healthy environment, a dream of a better future.

(fig. 30)— An example of refugees’ drawings on caravans
Source: Author
4.2.5. Conclusions
Previously, it was explained how refugees transgressed the spatial and material limitations of standardised shelter units to develop households and habitats. This process was driven by obvious tensions between a humanitarian planning and a socio-cultural practice. A clear step towards urbanisation, the findings of this section can be shortly summarised as follows:

- The frequently criticised universal standards of UNHCR fail to fulfil the socio-cultural needs of Syrian refugees as in Zaatari camp.
- No commons without community. The challenge of communal infrastructure is of a high concern to humanitarians operating in the field. Therefore, there is a strong need to look for suitable solutions that mediate between the socio-cultural needs of refugees and the capabilities of humanitarians to provide services.
- Two different housing typologies were observed in the camp, however, mapping and surveys on a camp level are still focused on the type of shelter unit occupied and meeting standards regarding covered space per person in a household. As this might be necessary, there is a need to upgrade the mechanisms and objectives of mapping in order to keep a pace with the emerging spatial practices on a household level.
- Caravans are a fundamental element of Zaatari’s habitat. Therefore, they are increasingly treated as an asset with a high value.
- The emergence of habitat appears to be a common phenomenon in the camp, however still, it succeed to express individuality, and social class.

The next chapter goes more in-depth to articulate these dynamics and tensions through a micro study for a cluster in the older camp.
4.3. **Micro-Study Cluster**

This section leads the thesis into a higher level of analysis. By observing habitat as a common phenomenon in the camp, the micro analysis takes a further step to undermine the complexity of the socio-spatial practices, connoting the emergence of habitat. It examines the relations between households in regard to urban form, social life, and micro appropriations of space.

4.3.1. **Why the Older Camp?**

Combining personal observations with REACH surveys, UNHCR reports and satellite images, districts 1 and 2 present an interesting model of urbanisation in the camp. According to the Sweep Report, ‘districts 1 and 2 are consistently reported as having the highest rates of privatised goods including the highest levels of access to electricity, television and private WASH facilities’ (REACH & UNHCR, 2013: 1). Despite the fact that there were no official plans for these districts while they were gradually populated with refugees (Interview with Mohamed Jertila February 2014), they present an advanced form of urbanisation in comparison to the rest of the camp. Many factors might have influenced this process such as:

- **Longevity**
  A recent analysis shows that the majority of the residents living in districts 1 and 2 arrived between July and December 2012 (the first 5 months of the camp’s life) (REACH & UNHCR, 2013). It also includes a minority of late arrivals situated more to the margins near the borders of the camp. The longevity factor was reported by refugees to have encouraged solidarity actions and initiatives.

- **The early existence of infrastructure and services**
  Satellite images taken by UNOSAT in late August/early September 2012 show that communal infrastructure existed at that time as well as other main facilities located on the main street. Another map published in mid-September 2013 show that districts 1, 2 enjoy a relatively high number of high poles compared to the rest of the camp (see Base Camp Map, UNHCR 2013).

- **The rapid caravanisation**
  There is no clear information on when the caravanisation exactly took place in that part of the camp, however, in UNOSAT images they appear after mid-March 2013. Interestingly, a map by ACTED published at the end of May 2013 shows an island of relatively high density of caravans within districts 1, 2 and a small part of 12 (between
150-250 caravans per ha). This could be interpreted as an attempt to substitute all tents with caravans, and might have suddenly stopped in district 12 due to lack of funding.

High density of caravans, the longevity while becoming familiar with neighbours and infrastructure around is not only the status quo of the older camp, but might also be the result of camp’s policy in the long term. Therefore, the micro study does not only give an insight on the current spatial practices but highlights the possible scenarios of urbanisation in the camp as whole. It is important to note that in contrary to the rest of the camp, urbanisation of this part was mostly led by refugees while the agency were merely reactive in terms of planning and providing services (Interview with Mohamed Jertila February 2014). The cluster is located between streets 13 and 14 in the first district near “Al-Khayma Al-Kabeer” mosque and communal kitchen number 44. This cluster was chosen due to its reasonable size that could be covered during the limited field visits (see fig. 31).

(fig. 31)—Map of the micro-study cluster
Source: Author
4.3.2. Clustering and Household Design: A Coincidence or a Community Initiative?

UNOSAT images show that districts 1 and 2 had already established a recognisable spatial pattern before caravans arrived the camp. As one refugee explained when asked about the spatial positioning of caravans he said “it is said that the donor who has distributed the caravans and put them this way...we thought it was planned like that, but it turned out to be not”. The direct replacement of tents with caravans has resulted into a congested island -what I previously called as zone A- where refugees have found themselves living in an intimate spatial setting.

There is no clear information on how families chose their caravans in the cluster. However, following the common rules of privacy in traditional Arabic house, caravans were considered as rooms needing to be linked with a private court – a very famous housing typology in old Arab cities. This has resulted into households with different sizes and designs responding to refugees’ needs and culture (see fig. 32).

(fig. 32)—Households that evolved from grouping caravans within the micro-study cluster
Source: Author
(fig. 33)—Analysis of household designs in the micro-study cluster
Source: Author
Refugees were faced with de facto cluster-like settings, and changes on the morphology of caravans by refugees were very few. However, the transformation from mere shelter units into clusters relied heavily on refugees’ solidarity, collectiveness, and sense of community.

Results show that 25 households out of 27 are connected to the sewage system, and thus, private latrines (see fig. 33). While 6 out of 13 owning private water storages are connected and sharing water tanks. The interviewee in household 15 described that as an act of solidarity reinforcing the sense of community. He explained: “we managed to collectively install pipes and connect to the sewage system from our own expenses... This would have never happened unless everyone here was so collaborative”. This was accompanied by additions such as cement floors to connect caravans, and keep households clean and less dusty from the inside, and canopies for shading and protection from rain and snow. Through that, refugees have reinterpreted the given elements and infrastructure, and challenged the standards and planning principles to create households that are culturally appropriate and sites that are clean and less hazardous. Surprisingly, however, districts 1 and 2 are still considered by the agency to be ‘poor’ in terms of shelter condition, infrastructure and site planning (REACH 2013: 3).

4.3.3. From Habitat to Neighbourhoods

Within the cluster, 13 males and 14 females were interviewed reporting that 164 refugees were living there at the time of the research. Based on results, the majority originate from Dara’a and Izra’ with a minority from As-Sanameyn (see fig. 34 & fig. 7), which echoes REACH findings on the demographic compositions in this part of the camp (REACH, 2013). Connecting origins with location in the cluster, it is clear that refugees mix with no tendencies for groupings based on origin. This has definite implications on the formation of neighbourhoods, or Haras, as a whole.

According to REACH sweep report (2013: 4), kinship relationships dominate the allocations of refugees within the camp, stating that:

‘Approximately half of the households (52%) reported that given the choice they would prefer their shelter location to be nearby Syrians from the same Fakhth. A quarter of the households, 26%, indicated they would chose to live with people with whom they had lived at the moment of leaving Syria, while 11% of households reported to prefer living with people from the same Ashira, and 11% reported to prefer residing with people originating from the same place in Syria.’
However, the results of the micro study showed that around half of the residents settled while the caravans were distributed for no specific reason. Interestingly, only 7 refugees have chosen to settle there because they already had relatives or acquaintances living near or in the cluster. Four refugees claimed that their choice was based on the existence of good services. Among those were 4 households who present an interesting case: Two households have recently moved extending the structure of the cluster wanting to be close to the mosque, while the other two have purchased their households from other families that were living there. This indicates the emergence of locational preferences while ‘households’ are becoming an economic asset - a part of the ‘informal’ economic cycles of the camp. And most importantly, refers to the rise of an informal real-estate market in the camp in less than three years from its opening.

While the formation of neighbourhoods in Palestinian camps was heavily dependent on kinship structures, refugees of the cluster related that to other factors. According to results, 21 interviewees affirmed that they have the feeling as if they were living in a Hara, while 3 were unsure about it. On regard to belonging, only 18 refugees claimed that they feel as if they belong to this Hara. Different reasons were given to justify this feeling. The majority explained that they became neighbours due to longevity, good behaviour, and social harmony while only two justified that for being close to relatives. This can be associated with more than half of the interviewees claiming to know many other refugees living around. Interestingly, three interviewees justified that with a growing sense of stability due to the possession of a Dar.

Unquestionably, the growing sense of community is a driving factor for urbanisation. Since it builds a social network through which initiatives, participative planning and interventions can take place; it is necessary to first define these emerging boundaries upon which planning needs to operate. In the cluster, refugees built these networks through social space rather than through the body of the cluster itself. This means that regardless of the exact locations, Haras are related to spaces of social interaction - the streets as semi-public spaces. This is reflected on the resulting graph (see fig. 35), where landmarks were used to define that space: the Souk, the mosque, the communal kitchen, the toilets and of course, the household of the interviewee. However,
the result refers to a strong relation between daily spaces of social interaction, and household location. However, the majority seem to define their neighbourhoods as the streets stretching from the Souk to what is known as Al-Sater Street. This might match with the agency’s divisions based on a street level; however, this might differ in other locations in the camp due to its different spatial morphology explained previously. Therefore a similar approach might be needed in order to define the social boundaries of neighbourhoods.

4.3.4. From Open to Social Space: A Collective Memory?
In the cluster, households were dominated by an old Arab city rationale. It is true that refugees might have had no say on the allocations of caravans as they were distributed. However, and as they were busy establishing their households, they have collectively produced a distinctive spatial morphology that is very similar to that found in old Arab cities. As this could be claimed to be a coincidence, I would argue that it was unconsciously produced by implementing the same socio-spatial practices of those of the old Arab cities. For instance, the formation of open or closed courts surrounded by rooms (caravans) gave priority, by principle, to the privacy of households. Similarly to Arab cities, this has produced a spatial nucleus that is able to organically expand, dominating the logic of the resulting urban structure, or more precisely, the open space.
Previous figures clearly show how the morphology of the cluster imitates that of an old Arab city with maze narrow streets and cul du sacs. Refugees managed to curve these spaces in the cluster creating very efficient semi-private spaces, leading to entries of houses of those living inside the cluster. While those exposed to the street – a semi-public space- have also managed to create curve entries, or side doors to create a buffer zone of privacy between private and semi-public spaces. Interestingly, 5 out of 27 could recall a place that reminds them of Syria in the camp, while three of them are refugees living in households located more to the inside of the cluster. Explaining that, interviewee number 4 explained: “Yes! Once I enter this street (pointing at the cul du sac) I feel like I’m in Syria...like these old Haras of Syria...you know, or maybe the Palestinian refugee camps”, while another enthusiastically responded: “Only this Hara here, you see it? These small narrow streets remind me of Syria” (Interview number 24).

On the one hand, through spatial practices, refugees developed semi-public spaces out of a monolithic perception of ‘open space’, while on the other, semi-public spaces emerged as spaces of interaction between refugees on a neighbourhood level. In addition to streets, as semi-public routes; the niches that clusters create with their irregular allocations are usually spaces for socialising and small economic activities. Within the cluster, four micro businesses extended out of the households onto the street: a snack stall (household 1), a vegetable stall (household 17), a caravan for selling goods (that is owned by the family who previously owned household 16) and another caravan run by a women who is designing and selling wedding dresses for prides (household 9) (see fig. 36 & fig. 37). According to the owner of the vegetable stall: “I enjoy being around the Hara. My friend and I set here to drink tea and talk...like an ‘aade sha’beye (informal gathering)”. It is true that women may have less presence in semi-public and public spaces than men; however, they enjoy gathering privately within households, or publicly in the Souk, and in communal kitchens. As cooking for family is usually the duty of women in rural areas of Syria where the majority of refugees come from, communal kitchens became spaces for women’s social gatherings. Interviewee from household 2 explained why by saying that: “Yes I have a private kitchen, but I prefer to cook my meals in the kitchen near my house where I meet my friends and neighbours...There, we can talk about the Syrian habits of cooking, and discover the differences between them...I’m learning new recipes in the kitchen every day!”
(fig. 35)—Geometrical borders of the Haras as defined by interviewees from each household
Source: Author
Based on the previous, Syrian refugees produced spaces of meaning. While planners were busy with calculating covered-open spaces, refugees were humanising them. They gave them purposes, functions and designs. They coded them based on a collective urban memory that the planners did not know anything about. The studied cluster helped to reveal these dynamics on the ground, and to demonstrate the significance of urbanisation, in a place where it was least expected.

4.3.5. Conclusions
Findings of the micro-study analysis could be summarised as follows:

- By transforming a set of caravans into a liveable urban cluster, refugees showed a high degree of solidarity and readiness to act collectively as one community.
- The allocation of refugees within the cluster shows no attempts for isolation and grouping according to places of origin in Syria. On the contrary, refugees favour to live next to relatives and acquaintances which is a socio-cultural habit in the whole region.
- The greatest majority of refugees consider themselves living in a neighbourhood due to longevity and socialising. The boundaries of these neighbourhoods differed according to each respondent, yet, the majority focused on the ‘street’ as space for social interaction and a backbone of these neighbourhoods.
- The designs of households tolerate the extensions of the cluster as a whole; and of the households in case of extended family structures.
- Two out of 27 households found in the cluster were bought from another family. This indicates the early emergence of real-estate market in the camp, and the increasing importance of households as a valuable asset in the camp.
- Communal kitchens became spaces for women’s gatherings. By that, it gained a social meaning beyond its basic function.
- The appropriation of spaces around the cluster was a socio-cultural-driven collective action that resulted into semi-public and semi-private spaces. Some of these spaces replicated in their forms, the collective urban memory of Syrian refugees.
(fig. 36)— Southern façade of the cluster
Source: Author'
(fig. 37) — The urban form of the cluster as a mean for creating degrees of social space

Source: Author
4.4. A Note on Findings

Based on the previous sub-chapters, it is clear that Zaatari camp is urbanising. Tensions between humanitarian planning and socio-cultural practices are creating the drive of this process. Moreover, it is challenging the role of actors, urging them to react against this unprecedented, unexpected, and rapid transformation. However, the implications of uncontrolled and unguided urbanisation yield threatening in Palestinian refugee camps (Al-Qutub, 1989; Hanafi, 2008; Misselwitz, 2009). Rueff and Viaro (2009: 340) summarised the spatial transformation of Palestinian refugee camps, by saying that:

‘Palestinian refugees were sheltered in tents, barracks, and other lightweight housing types. Later on, refugees were accommodated in single-room units made of concrete. Since then, different types of “habitat” evolved, ranging from the unregulated extension of the one-room unit to more specific development plans for the construction of houses according to the policies of the host countries’.

Similarly in Zaatari camp, the transformation of space followed the same steps: tents, shortly substituted with a more durable solution (one-room caravans) and then evolving into long-term habitat. Stopping at this point, it could be argued that caravans have fastened and facilitated the emergence of habitat compared to fix and less flexible concrete shelter units in Palestinian camps. Nonetheless, caravans resembling a sort of prefabricated room that is estimated to last at least for few years might have a pressure-releasing impact on the urge to build with long-term materials such as block and concrete. Either ways, however, it is not clear where this process of urbanisation is leading the camp to. In order to stimulate further understandings on the current direction, and possible steering options; socio-economics and power relations are further examined in the camp.
Chapter V

**Socio-Economic Analysis**

Urbanisation is usually connoted with socio-economic dynamics that influence and shape its process; but how and why do socio-economics emerge in a refugee camp? In order to understand these dynamics, the camp is first analysed by its position within Jordan’s economic structure. This allows one to first understand the challenges imposed by the influx of Syrian refugees, and then to see how various economic connections to Zaatari camp are being created. From there, the UNHCR attempt to promote ‘self-reliance’ as development and why this approach is failing is explained. Finally, the different patterns of socio-economics in the camp are explained with a focus on the creation of the market, not only as a hyper-active economic organ, but as an influential element on urbanisation of Zaatari camp.
5.1. Informal Economy, Syrian Refugees and Zaatari Camp

Despite all attempts to isolate refugee camps from their surroundings, history has shown that they always manage to create linkages beyond their isolating borders (Herz, 2012; Misselwitz, 2009; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). These linkages were observed to not only influence the urbanisation of these camps, but also determine the fate of the settlement on a longer term (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Therefore, in order to locate, define and understand these socio-economic linkages with the hosting country, it is important to understand how and under which circumstances, the Jordanian economy operates.

Jordan is a country that is very well known for its scarcity of resources, major dependent on external funds, and most importantly, its sensitivity towards sudden demographical changes. Forced migrations and influxes of refugees in 1948, 1967, 1991, 2003 have resulted in various economic pressures on Jordan’s economy and labour market (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2010). The inability of this economy to expand and adapt to these demographical changes is not surprising when compared to the economy’s main characteristics: fluctuating rates of unemployment; low crude rates of participation; imbalanced labour market; imbalance in sectoral distribution; and imbalance in geographical distribution (ibid). Moreover, by adapting neo-liberal and consumerist strategies, the Jordanian market increasingly shifted towards services (reaching 79% of all sectors), while agriculture dramatically fell from 16.8% in 1973, reaching 2% in 2010 (ibid).

The unsustainability of the Jordanian model of economics has not only influenced culture, society and politics - which discussing is beyond the scope of this thesis; but has also produced acute tensions regarding the scarcity of resources and job opportunities in the kingdom. This has resulted in 44% of the whole labour market in Jordan operating under the ‘informal’ sector, which involves all economic activities that are ‘not registered under specific forms of national legislations’, and thus, not exposed to taxations (ibid: 4).

The increasing pressure of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian economy led the government to restrict their involvement in the labour market. Although, locally, Syrians are very well known for their skills in business and efficiency as labour force, they were officially excluded from participating in the Jordanian economy. However, with almost half of the Jordanian economy operating ‘in the shadow’; Syrian refugees easily found their way into the labour market.
The concentration of refugees in Al-Mafraq governorate transformed it into ‘one of the most economically booming provinces in Jordan’ (Freihat, 2014). This was accompanied with a rise in international aid reaching three times of what the kingdom used to receive before 2011 (ibid). However, in the absence of comprehensive policies that would have engaged Jordanians and Syrians in the economy; societal tensions and discrimination against refugees as ‘cheap’ labour force aroused, and lead to the observation for the need to segregate refugees (See chapter 3).

In this context and despite all attempts to exclude it from local economy; Zaatari camp is a concentration of labour force and humanitarian aid, and most importantly, an extraterritorial land where Jordanian law does not apply. This renders the ‘informal’ and formal economic connections between the hosting country and refugees in the camp. It also renders the background upon which development strategies can be foreseen and implemented. However, in order understand how and why socio-economics in a refugee camp emerge, and how can they relate to urbanisation; the economics of refugee camps are explained in next section.

5.2. Humanitarian Aid: Between Insufficiency and Self-Reliance

Despite the frequent criticism they have and still receive, refugee camps are considered to be the agency’s favourite option. This is due to the fact that they allow aid to easily be delivered, distributed and monitored (UNHCR, 2014e). Refugees are assisted with humanitarian aid whether they’re being accommodated in camps or in hosting communities. It could be estimated that in many cases, the survival of refugees is highly dependent on humanitarian aid. This becomes even more crucial in segregated camps, and those located in remote and rural areas like Zaatari camp, where interaction with the local economy is minimised. However, aid was observed to be problematic on short- and long-term.

Ironically, while the survival of refugees is reliant on humanitarian aid, the survival of aid itself is reliant on international donations. In the long-term, these were observed to have decreased over time, as ‘few donors or host countries have or are willing to provide the necessary resources to meet refugees’ needs beyond the initial emergency phase’ (Hunter 2009: 2). And with camps existing for longer time than expected, the solution was introduced as ‘self-reliance’. Defined as ‘the ability of a community to function with a level of cohesion, social accountability and mutual dependence-taking decisions, mobilising resources, and building and maximising interpersonal capacity to address issues and initiatives for mutual benefit’; self-re-
liance is not only a tool to empower refugees but also a mean of achieving ‘real and measurable’ impacts on the nature and costs of the agency’s programmes (UNHCR 2005: 2, 3).

As promising as this may sound, the concept of self-reliance was investigated upon attempts to implement it in refugee camps, and was claimed to be even more problematic. Meredith Hunter (2009: 2) noticed that, ‘the key focus of self-reliance policy is unmistakably the reduction of material assistance in line with falling UNHCR budgets’. However, in order to achieve that, ‘refugees are expected to exercise rights they do not have to achieve a degree of independence which is not even expected of local populations in the same context and without access to the bare minimum of resources’ (ibid: 2, emphasis added). The researcher argues that self-reliance is constrained by different factors such as the unrealistic focus on agriculture to generate income; the spatial development of camps (see chapter 2); the will of the hosting countries to protect refugee rights; and most importantly, the agency’s inability to develop autonomous policies under which refugees can economically operate (ibid). That is on the one hand, while on the other, the distributed humanitarian aid fails to fulfil refugees’ needs in the immediate present. As this occurred in different camps around the world, the shortage does not seem to be related to context, culture, size nor location; but to the ‘emergency’ nature of aid (Agier, 2002; Herz, 2012; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). The distribution of aid as food rations and NFIs aims to support refugees with basic needs - with minimum assets to survive. However, once these basics are fulfilled; cultural and individual needs yearn for fulfilment. This moment sparks the emergence of socio-economics.

In Zaatari camp, and upon arrival, refugees are offered basic food rations such as rice, lentils, bulgur and oil; in addition to NFIs such as mattresses, sheets and tents. The amounts of rations depend on the number of persons per family. For instance, each person receives 1 kilo of cereals, while each 4 persons can get 1 bottle of oil. As for NFIs each person receives one mattress, however, families consisting from more than 5 members get no more than 4 mattresses, according to an interviewed refugee. In an attempt to provide wider variety of options, the agency provided two locations for well-known Jordanian mall chains to extend their economic activities inside the camp. By that, food rations have been substituted with vouchers distributed by WFP. Every refugee is entitled with one voucher every 15 days according to an interviewed refugee. However, neither the purchase value of vouchers, nor the options found in Jordanian malls fulfil the need of refugees. As one refugee explained, ‘...you know our
food! Fresh meat, chicken and lots vegetables...Not like the food we find in malls... frozen and tasteless!"

The gap between monthly expenditures and income is another factor in the emergence of socio-economics. Interestingly, an ACTED (2013) study in Zaatari camp on a household level revealed that the total average of expenditure was 292 JD, whereas the total average income was 208 JD, leaving an average deficiency of 84 JD per month. The study does not state how incomes were gained; however, it states further, that only 20% of respondents had zero income and are dependent on their family savings, while 80% earned income in the last 30 days of the interview (ibid). Note-worthy, the study was not implemented on a camp level; however, these results still indicate vital socio-economic dynamics that were observed as follow.

5.3. Income Generating Activities

“Refugee camps are concentration of humans, trading centres as well as labour markets” - (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000: 206)

Socio-economics might be the least investigated aspect in Palestinian camps. The few documents found on this topic rely mostly on the recent situation in order to give an insight on how socio-economics developed. Therefore, many socio-economic practices might have emerged at the beginning of life camp but did not develop, or have been left undocumented. In order to overcome this difficulty, comparisons with socio-economics with Dadaab camp were made, and findings were articulated on the development of socio-economics in Palestinian camps.

5.3.1. Selling of Humanitarian Aid

Obviously not a new trend, the sale of food rations offered by humanitarian organisations was claimed to be ‘one of the most controversial means of capital accumulation in the camps’ (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000: 216). Currently, the ‘classic’ food rations are substituted with vouchers of 10 JDs which can be seen circulating everywhere in Zaatari camp. Due to their purchasing value, refugees tend to sell them for a lower price (mainly 9 JDs). The money is then either accumulated, used in other businesses or simply used for buying assets that are not found in malls, nor provided by the humanitarian organisations like clothes and accessories.
However, there appears to be certain refugees who have taken on the responsibility of collecting, subsidising and circulating vouchers. Moreover, it was observed that refugees used vouchers to buy goods from the refugees’ market. No further information was obtained on how these vouchers end up at the Jordanian malls where they are supposed to be exchanged for food; however, this indicates the complexity of dynamics that the process of selling food vouchers generates in Zaatari camp.

NFIs are also a part of this process. It was explained how the development of household and the emergence of habitat introduced caravans as a valuable asset. Therefore, caravans became as well, a part of the exchange market in Zaatari camp, which was previously explained (see 4.2.3.).

5.3.2. Cash For Work (CFW)

Defined as ‘a short-term intervention used by humanitarian assistance organizations to provide temporary employment in public projects’; cash-for-work is the only official way through which refugees can earn money in the camp (Mercy Corps 2007: 2). The purpose of these programmes, however, is not to increase the income of refugees or promote self-reliance, rather they are ‘jobs required by the organizations to fulfil their role in the camp’ (NRC 2013: 17).

An unpublished NRC report (2013) counted around 900 jobs made available by NGOs at that time (see table 4). The majority of jobs offered by ACTED circulate among refugees in order to benefit as many refugees as possible. The selection of refugees is made through a site engineer assisted by a street leader. In every cycle a refugee is hired for 7 days earning 1 JD per hour (ibid). However, while this might be the only opportunity to earn an income for many refugee families who are not engaged in any economic activity; the report estimates that ‘an individual may get their turn in employment once every 43 weeks a year, or each household could benefit for 2-3 weeks a year from paid work with one of the NGOs in Zaatari’ (ibid: 18). Therefore, although a good opportunity, CFW alone is not enough to cover the monthly deficiency of 84 JDs per household. This is, however, unless refugee circulations were manipulated by street leaders, which was frequently reported (see 5.2.2).
5.3.3. The Market

‘Have you been to the Souk? It is something like you have never seen in your life before!’ That is what an SRCD officer said in order to express his confused thoughts about the market. Unquestionably one of the most significant aspects of urbanisation, the market, is not only a mean for generating income, but also a demonstration of resistance, and a strong will to survive. The hybrid result of advanced urbanity and limited materiality expresses how refugees rejected victimisation. On the contrary, they established all kinds of business that one expects to see in a city, which justifies the reaction of the SRCD officer (see fig. 38).
5.3.3.1. Public Space as an Economic Drive

UNOSAT images show that the market first appeared between September 2012 and January 2013. Starting as a set of shacks facing the main street in the older camp; it stretched now for more than 2 kilometres inside the whole camp. According to the planner Jertila, ‘asphalted streets usually facilitate the emergence of markets in camps…people make this to keep themselves busy’; however, the market in Zaatari camp did not appear on ‘any’ asphalted street. Interestingly, almost all main facilities (hospitals, clinics, schools and distribution points) were planned facing two perpendicular streets. The need for these facilities to be used by many refugees every day transformed them into spaces of vitality, busyness and social interaction – an unplanned public space.

Since they are increasingly reviewed from the perspective of struggle over property, sovereignty, democracy and emancipation in cities, public spaces are very problematic in camps context. Petti and Hilal (2013: 8) addressed the problem by saying, ‘the public in camps does not have a political body responsible for the collective interest’. While Manuel Herz (2012: 488) argued ‘public and private are categories that can normally be conceived of a relation of a state…Hence, in the absence of the home country and with the hosting nation unwilling to grant civil rights, we can say that the categories of public and private do not apply in a refugee camp’.

In Zaatari camp, it was not easy to determine whether the spaces surrounded by the market were ‘public’ or not. For refugees, it was considered as a distinctive spatial component of the camp. One shop owner explained: ‘people like to walk here, even if they don’t want to buy. They keep coming and going all the time… even after midnight. Oh, this place doesn’t sleep at all!’ While the interviewed women from household #9 replied: ‘I enjoy walking in the market with my friends. I feel comfortable to be surrounded with all these people…as if I was walking in old Souks of Damascus’.12 However, if no political or sovereign entity can declare or protect this space as public, who can? A question was asked to different shop owners in Zaatari camp: ‘what would happen if you want to extend your shop more into the street? What would you do if your neighbour extended his business in front of your shop?’ The immediate reaction of refugees was clear ‘no, this can’t be. And if it happened, everyone here will stop it’. Who is ‘everyone’ and why they will stop it? In the absence of legislators, refugees relied on an already existing societal system of values – a system that consolidates solidarity and commitment towards communal values – to define the market as public space. An articulation of that on our cities would be interesting to observe, however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
5.3.3.2. A Syrian-Jordanian Partnership?
In August 2013, around 685 shops were located in Zaatari camp (ACTED, 2013). These are composed of either a caravan or two connected together, or a construction of metal sheets and wooden structures (see fig. 39). Those varied from small kiosks and barber shops to electricians, butchers and super markets (see table 5). Necessary elements for these trades are smuggled inside the camp. However, the absence of regulations or any kind of supervision is subjecting shop owners for abuse as they have to pay extra fees for Jordanian security forces at the gate (NRC, 2013).

According to a shop owner, 90% of shops in the camp are financed by Jordanians who are living outside the camp. Those who can provide the necessary capital to buy goods, smuggle them in order to be sold by a Syrian refugee inside the camp. Taking advantage of the absence of law and taxes, this could be considered an emerging aspect of Jordanian ‘informal’ economy. This is not new in refugee camps as a similar approach was also observed in the market of Dadaab camp (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). However, other connections to the camp were made under ‘formal’ economy. These are the two Jordanian malls that supply the camp with food. Although the impacts and tensions between these malls and the market should be further investigated; one shop owner claimed that these are having bad influence on the vitality of the camp’s market.

(fig. 39)—Examples of shops and stalls from Zaatari camp
Source: Author
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shop type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dry goods</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>green grocer</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kiosk</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>convenience</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electrician</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vacant</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clothes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobile phone</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drinks</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beauty</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>butcher</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>bed</td>
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<td>sweets</td>
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<td>1%</td>
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<td>bureau de change</td>
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<tr>
<td>yogurt</td>
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<td>food stand</td>
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<td>computer</td>
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<td>appliance</td>
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<td>do it yourself</td>
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<td>fuel</td>
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<td>bakery</td>
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<td>water filterisation</td>
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<td>falafel</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>blacksmith</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>shoes</td>
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<td>beauty</td>
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<tr>
<td>cheese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table 5)—Shops found in Zaatari camp in August 2013
Source: ACTED, 2013
5.3.3.3. From Suspended Law to Ownership

It was estimated that a shop in the main market is expected to generate an income of 1000 to 2000 JDs per month – around three to six times more than the average of monthly expenditures, according to a shop owner. This indicates not only the huge amount of capital circulating in the camp, but also the possible reflections on social hierarchies, power structure, class, identity, habitat and ownership. For instance, as the market mushroomed along the main streets, refugees who first occupied these locations became owners of properties. While the market was flourishing, these properties started to gain value. For instance, the price of a shop can reach around 6000 JDs according to its size, location and quality of furniture and decoration. Moreover, in the absence of a legislative system, a contract between refugees is signed in order to document the process of selling or renting the property. The contract includes information such as the size (area), location (next to, in front of ‘refugee name’), and price; and is then signed by refugees who witnessed the process.

However, shops are not exhaustively located in the market. The micro study showed how refugees established businesses connected to their households in order to generate income. A recent UNHCR survey shows that this phenomenon is spreading in all districts of the camp, transforming them into mixed-used quarters (see fig. 40). Misselwitz (2009: 182) states that ‘the presence of businesses and other commercial activities in refugee camps is one of the clearest indications of urbanisation’. However in Deheishe camp for instance, 77% of all businesses appeared after 1994, which according to Misselwitz indicates that ‘urbanisation is part of the camp’s more recent history’ (DiBella 2007; Misselwitz 2009: 182). Compared with Zaatari camp where some ‘unconfirmed estimates’ suggest that the retail activity equates to approximately 2 million USD a month; it could be said that Zaatari camp is urbanising faster than Palestinian camps where the economy ‘remained marginal and education became the main route for improving the socio-economic status of individuals’ (UNHCR 2014e; Al-Qutub 1989: 99).

5.3.4. Other Possibilities

Not exhaustive to the previous, other income generating activities emerged in Zaatari camp out of public demand and personal interest. For instance, smuggling of goods and of people was reported as one of the best opportunities to make money in the camp. Smuggling however, requires strong connections to a Jordanian partner who is expected to support the process either on borders or outside of the camp.
Within a city-sized camp, the need to convey goods and caravans from a district to another is an exhausting mission. Therefore, many refugees—the majority being youth and kids—have made use of this opportunity to generate income by conveying goods and assets on trolleys. They can be seen roaming everywhere around the camp and waiting around the gate of the camp (see fig. 41). Same for caravans where a special conveyer was designed by refugees using available materials (see fig. 42). A caravan is then placed on the conveyer and pushed by men to the requested location. Another possibility to earn income in the camp is by sifting earth in order to separate sand and rocks, which are then sold in order to be used for creating cement mixtures, according to a refugee. Street vendors were also observed around the base camp and humanitarian offices selling cigarettes, tea and coffee.

5.4. Conclusions
This chapter gave an overview of the socio-economic activities emerging in Zaatari camp: what are they and how they influence the urbanisation process. Furthermore, in order to understand these economic dynamics in relation to the context of Jordanian economy, an overview of economics and how is it influenced by the existence of Syrian refugees living outside the camp was given. Therefore, it could be concluded that:

(fig. 40)—Mapping shops and businesses owned by refugees in Zaatari camp
Source: UNHCR & REACH, 2014
• A socio-economic system has emerged in Zaatari camp based on humanitarian aid, the skills of Syrian refugees, and the absence of legislation.
• The economies of Jordan and Zaatari camp are interlinked. While two Jordanian enterprises were allowed to extend their formal economic activities inside the camp; many connections with local economy are being informally established.
• The pressure of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian economy outside the camp needs to be taken into consideration while attempting to integrate Zaatari camp within the Jordanian economy.
• The market constitutes an essential economic, spatial, and social element of the camp. Its emergence and rapid development is evidence of the advanced level of urbanisation reached in the Zaatari camp, while its dynamics influence the overall process of urbanisation.
• Despite the absence of legislations and political entities in the Zaatari camp; public space and private property emerged backed up by common interest and a societal system of values.
• More income generating opportunities are needed in Zaatari camp to overcome the monthly deficiency; however, concepts like ‘self-reliance’ cannot be achieved in disregard to the socio-economic system that has already developed in the camp.
This chapter displays Zaatari camp as a field of power. It aims to explain the structures, tensions, and challenges under which urbanisation is taking place in order to generate a comprehensive understanding of this process. Therefore, it is explained how refugees are governed in the camp, who are the street leaders and how do they relate to humanitarians and SRCD. Afterwards, the new governance plan is analysed: what is the agenda behind it, and how is it expected to influence the existing power structures. Furthermore, it is explained how refugees look at governance, and how do they engage themselves into a polity that they were once excluded from.
6.1. Governance and the Urbanisation of Refugee Camps

In refugee camps, governance is a sensitive area, located at the cross roads between politics and humanitarian relief (Hackl, 2013). Since it denotes the connections and channels through which refugees communicate with their hosting country, and vice versa; it has a great influence on urbanisation. Theoretically, it was explained how and why, the agency was produced to monitor, support and govern refugees under its mandate (see 2.2.1). In this regard, refugee camps are ‘humanitarian bubbles’ created by the agency in order to regulate and camouflage, refugees’ contact with the hosting country.13

In Palestinian refugee camps, governance has always been influenced by different factors related to history and politics: the birth of UNRWA, the birth of PLO, Israe-li-Arab conflict, and the legislations of the hosting country. Urbanisation of Palestinian camps was highly influenced by this struggle for power, translated on the ground as politics and bio-politics. Within such a highly pollicised field, however, all camps developed as ghetto-like camp cities. Considered as heterotopian spaces, it is the distance from the state – in the political sense that produced the challenging urbanity of refugee camps (Agier, 2012; Ramadan, 2013b; Sanyal, 2010). Moreover, it was explored how the mandate of UNRWA has deteriorated over time, becoming problematic than pragmatic for Palestinian camps (Hanafi, 2008). Therefore, governance in camps is very influential in order to achieve the paradigm shift towards human development, rights and dignity.

6.2. Power Structure: The Emergence of Street Leaders

Reviewing how Zaatari camp developed (see 4.1.1); it could be noted that after July 2012, the camp was exponentially growing till March 2013. During that time, the agency and its IPs operated under the umbrella of JHCO – an NGO that was observed to have had no experience in governing camps (see 3.3.2) – while a Jordanian civil servant undertook the ‘governorship’ of the camp (UNHCR, 2014b). Where, at the same time, Jordanian military was responsible for securing the camp until mid-January 2013 followed up by the newly formed SRCD (ibid).

It could be easily expected that governing the camp as its population and size were rapidly increasing was not an easy task. The challenge was put on how to communicate with a population, suddenly reaching at times around 190,000 refugees in a city-sized camp. According to security report, ‘in order to create decentralised interlocutors with whom IPs and the security authorities could interact, “street leaders”
became an informal element of camp governance in 2012’ (UNHCR 2014d: 13). Street leaders are refugees who are considered to be representatives on the behalf of other refugees living in the same street. However, they are very problematic in terms of position to power structure. This is due to the critical fact that their appointment is based on different backgrounds. The same report explains that ‘the naming of street leaders appears to have been a combination of self-appointment, street appointed or organisationally appointed with the one common requirement that the names be vetted through SRCD or its forerunner’ (ibid: 13). This had even led to the existence of more than one street leader per street (ibid).

The name ‘street leaders’ stems from clear association between ‘leaders’ and ‘streets’, however, observing the morphology of the camp as it developed, streets were distinctive features of the old camp and more precisely zone A. This indicates that this phenomenon had early emerged in this part of the camp, and then was followed in the rest of the camp which is affirmed by the same report saying that: ‘district 1 and 2, comprising the oldest areas of the camp, hosted the most active street leadership structure and in April and May [2013], there were several attempts to informally engage the camp management on the provision of services’ (UNHCR 2014d: 4).

Whereas, further investigation might also be needed to understand how streets were recognised in the new camp as the transformation of physical structure and the appearance of quarters was occurring. This confusion about the nature of appointment, tasks and responsibilities has let the door open for personal interpretations, be it the street leaders themselves, the governed refugees or even the humanitarian workers. Supposedly, street leaders are the direct link between humanitarian actors and the refugees representing them. It is not clear how many refugees are located in each street, but it could be estimated to be around 1000 refugees. This will theoretically reduce the need to reach to 80,000 by communicating with only 80 refugees. As practical as it may sound, street leaders have suddenly acquired knowledge, tools and privileges by coming in close contact to humanitarians, increasing their possession of power.

Despite their ambiguous nature of responsibilities, street leaders were noted to have been responsible for monitoring the process of filling water tanks by trucks in each street, distributing donations arriving to the camp, and recommending which refugees to be hired by humanitarians in cash-for-work programmes (CFW). Actors in the camp rely on them to implement their programs as they are ‘trusted’ by them.
(Hackl, 2013). However, since this was an ‘informal’ way of governance, adding to that the fact that, refugee camps are spaces were law is suspended, no legislative basis for this pattern of governance were implemented. This was consolidated by the fact that no feedback system was legislated to monitor the process of communication as would happen outside the camp. Thus, rather than becoming a mean of communication, by their unconditional possession of power, street leaders were communicating a false message.

In Zaatari camp, different opinions about street leaders could be heard. These range between satisfaction and extreme opposition. The majority of those who were interviewed reported their unrest about how street leaders handle their position. One refugee explained that by saying: ‘I escaped Syria because I wanted to run away from Bashar Al-Assad, and guess what…I found him here, waiting for me in the camp!’. This comparison underlines how refugees feel about street leaders. As Al-Assad represented repression, injustice and autocracy; streets leaders were exactly the same – an unfair governor.

In a camp where every humanitarian item or service is understood as an opportunity, it is not surprising that the sudden acquisition of power is also one. An old couple living in household No. 11 argued: ‘since we have lived here many donations arrived to the camp and specifically to this street, but where? We have seen nothing...Why? Ask the street leader, he knows better!’ As elaborated later, these were collected first by the street leader who would distribute them first to his family, relatives and those who benefit him, and last, what was left to refugees in the street.

Similar approaches by street leaders were spotted during selecting refugees for CFW programmes. According to an NRC report ‘many camp residents testify that the cooperation of street leaders with the organization often lead to favouritism’ (NRC 2013: 17). This was reported to increase frustration among refugees as one women was quoted complaining: ‘we are sick, angry and totally frustrated to see people that do a nasty job in cleaning the camp’s water areas maintain their job with ACTED week after week after week’ (ibid: 18).

Street leaders were accused for smuggling and the selling of drugs (Hackl, 2013). They were frequently described as ‘thieves’ and ‘mafias’ responsible for developing networks through which humanitarian aid is being channeled and processed in their interest; yet, the humanitarian mandate in the camp stands neutral against this reality. In response to street leaders’ manipulation of the selection process for CFW
programmes, an ACTED employee clearly responded: ‘our area coordinators do everything they can to list and register interested individuals to make the process more transparent but we cannot overstep the “street leaders” completely’ (ibid: 17). Benefiting from their power on ground, SRCD and the agency keep a blind eye on street leaders. Even worse, they are planning to include them in the coming governance plan which will be explained further. However, understanding how critical this is for refugees escaping violence based on discrimination and injustice can hint on how these ‘channels of communication’ can be a threatening reason for increasing unrest in the camp.

6.3. Decentralisation: New Governance Structure
In an attempt to substitute the existing governance structure with a new decentralised and more efficient one, the agency in close cooperation with NGOs and SRCD proposed what they called the new governance plan.

As explained by the Community Service unit, each of the camp’s 12 districts will have an administrative compound that will be physically allocated within the district. Supposedly, each compound will operate and be responsible for the district to which it attributes; however, all compounds will be linked with head management in the base camp. Each compound is designated to have a representative from the agency, every NGO operating in the camp, and Jordanian civilians as representative of the SRCD. Nonetheless, representatives from each of the agency’s implemented programmes in the camp will be present, accompanied with representatives from the IPs.

(fig. 43)—New governance structure of Zaatari camp
Source: Author, based on UNHCR
In parallel, refugees in each district will be assigned to a certain administrative hierarchy in order to participate in the new governance plan. This implies that each district will have a community structure that is composed of eight main general committees covering issues like: public work; education; WASH; health; conflict and mediation; shelter; social affairs and women forum. Each committee will include 10 members associated to different topics and forming more precise sub-committees. Despite the fact that each structure will inevitably include women through the women’s forum committee, the agency prefers to maintain a gender balance among the refugee structure. In a hierarchal order, each committee will have one representative, and the whole structure will be headed by a representative and a deputy (see fig. 43). As promising as this may sound, however, refugees will not be allowed to elect their representatives. They will rather be appointed by humanitarian workers who will choose them according to their own criteria and experience in the field they are responsible for. This will open the doors again for malfunctioned and untrusted channels of communication between refugees and their governors.

The interviewed CS staff explained that the Jordanian government is the one standing against running elections in the camp. Although no further explanations were given, it is not difficult to estimate that government is worried about the political connotations standing behind the act of ‘election’ as an ‘unwanted’ political mobiliser and a demonstration of free will. The situation could be expected to be even more embarrassing when applied on a city-sized scale settlement like Zaatari camp. However, despite all restrictions, refugees had other ways to express themselves as political beings.

6.4. On the Moment of Refugees Becoming Citizens

“The passive refugee is the norm; the active refugee is a scandalous hypothesis”
– Michel Agier (2011: 149)

No documented information was obtained about security situation in the first six months in the camp. Even after the agency pursued its responsibilities in March 2013 forming a Security Working Group (SWG); reports on such incidents were limited in the first quarter of 2013 (UNHCR, 2014b). The report justifies that by the lack of adequate reporting structure, and most interestingly, the frequency of certain incidents (such as stone-throwing, distribution disruptions and disorders) that they were ‘considered so common place as to negate the need for reporting’ (ibid: 9).
This was affirmed by the same report as numbers of security incidents that have directly targeted implementing organisations were relatively high in percentage to the overall total of incidents in Zaatari camp (ibid: 9). Interestingly, the same report mentions that ‘one organisation was undertaking relocations “three times a week” in response to the rock throwing, which led to several injuries and subsequent hospitalisation during the month of February’ (ibid: 3). Kilian Kleinschmidt, who is broadly known as the ‘mayor’ of the camp, described an intensively unsettled relationship between refugees and humanitarian workers in Zaatari camp. The difficulty to provide humanitarian aid was questioned: ‘there were refugees throwing stones on us every day, or even cutting through the barbed wires to get into the base camp! How do you expect our employees to work in such an environment?’

In order to answer this question, one of the earliest observations in Zaatari camp was based on an immediate distinction between two types of space: a collection of fixed and fenced spaces punctured into a bigger space made out of fluidly moving collection of elements (see 4.1.4). No matter where these spaces were located or what they were made for, they had the same military appearance: high opaque fences gated and guarded by military force. These fences, mostly doubled or tripled, were made out of layers from barbed wires, sandbags, concrete walls, blocks, metal sheets and stakes. The stark reaction of humanitarians on refugees’ daily riots produced a shocking image – a military, defensive and paranoid architecture that theoretically contradicts with the proclaimed philanthropist nature of humanitarian work (see fig. 44). This reaction was not exhaustive to offices where humanitarians are located in the camp, but rather included spaces of services, were refugees are assisted by humanitarians: schools, hospitals, distribution centres, multi-activity centres and playgrounds. However, this was exaggerated in a UNICEF run space known as Al Bahraini School. ‘Guantanamo’ as on refugee described it was heavily protected by light-blue coloured fence that obviously was not only a matter of protection and security, but also a way of conveying a certain message (see fig. 45).

According to UNHCR report (2014d), refugees used the school for making demands. It was stated that in May 2013 ‘approximately 150 refugees threatened to occupy the Bahraini school unless they were provided with caravans’, whereas in November of the same year around 60 refugees occupied the school demanding SCRD to release a family member who has been detained the day before (ibid: 5, 7). According to refugees, the school was occupied by refugees who were suddenly left with no shelter once their tents collapsed from heavy snow. However, all explanations pour into one
direction: the act of demanding, of speaking out, which is claimed to be the very moment when politics are introduced into the camp (Agier 2011: 156).

The significance of these incidents stems from the principle that ‘demands’ implicitly entails ‘duties’ and ‘rights’. Michel Agier (2011: 155) claims that: ‘to act and speak out in their places of exile means for the refugees rejecting the principle of their “vulnerability” as justifying their treatment as nameless pure victims’. By that, refugees whose citizenship statuses were once ‘stripped away’ are suddenly becoming activist citizens (Agier, 2011; E. F. Isin, 2008; E. Isin & Rygiel, 2007). Re-crossing the borders of a dominating humanitarian system, refugees demand to participate in a polity that they were de facto excluded from once they were confined in a refugee camp. These on-ground politics, however, become very problematic to deal with, especially in a milieu were politics are taboosed. According to the planner of the camp Mohamed Jertila, no certain standards or recommendations were given regarding the architecture of facilities and bureaus in the camp. Contrarily, every NGO was responsible for setting and designing its own working environment. Therefore, the theoretical absence of polity in the camp, led to a generalised solution against refugees increasing demands expressed as riots, demonstrations, direct violence and squats. The militarisation of architecture could be understood as a solution that never aims to solve the real problem, but to minimise risks and losses – a bio-political solution. Stuck in this political impossibility the agency justifies its political disability by the absence of conflicting political groups in the camp, stating that: ‘the high “direct” number of incidents could be partially explained by the absence of conflicting parties or groups in the camp and that therefore UNHCR staff, IPs and SRCD are being targeted as they are the providers of services to the population’ (ibid: 9).

Since the urbanisation of refugee camps is not only a matter of spatial development, but also, and maybe most importantly, of polity; it could be claimed that Zaatarí camp is quite developed in this regard. This judgment is based on Agier’s distinction between the political as an institutionalised apparatus of power, and politics as a ‘breakdown of a given order and as a dissonant and granting voice’ (Agier 2010: 42, emphasis is original). It was explained how attempts to establish a functioning governance structure were constantly faced with difficulties, whereas refugees with their riots, sit-ins, demonstrations, squats, direct and in-direct incidents have manipulated the realpolitik of the camp which is perceived as a fundamental constituent of urbanity.
(fig. 44)—A sketch of IOM office in Zaatarí camp
Source: Author

(fig. 45)—A view on Al-Bahraini School from outside
Source: Author
6.5. Participation: Between Empowerment and Control

“Indeed, Camp Cities have frequently become frontiers of democratisation, emancipation, gender equality and grass-root participation.”
– Philip Misselwitz (2009: 17)

Rhetoric on participation, mobilisation and empowerment of refugees is not new. In the early 2000s, the agency witnessed a paradigm shift from ‘needs-based’ towards ‘community-based’ and ‘rights-based’ approaches (Misselwitz, 2009; UNHCR, 2008). Issued in 2008, A Community-based Approach in UNHCR Operations defines what community means, and how it should be approached by the agency staff, and then, how connections with the refugees’ community should be made in order to go further in the process of community mobilisation and participation. It states that ‘a community based approach is a way of working in partnership with persons of concern during all stages of UNHCR’s programme cycle. It recognizes the resilience, capacities, skills and resources of persons of concern, builds on these to deliver protection and solutions, and supports the community’s own goals’ (UNHCR 2008: 14). However, when asked about the tasks of community mobilisation program in Zaatari camp, an IRD worker explained that ‘in this stage, we want to build trust and strong relationship with the refugees… to enhance the feeling of ownership among the population where it’s still weak due to many reasons’ (Al-Araji, F, personal communication, 21.02.2014). Unfortunately, on the one hand, further information on this regard was difficult to obtain, especially due to hardships in communication and accessibility. While on the other, field visits portray things differently. It should be noted that an efficient depth for these observation might still be needed; however, they still reveal an interesting contradiction in the agency’s on-ground practices.

When asked about participative planning, the young Tunisian civil engineer explained how this is implemented in the camp by saying: ‘Ok, we sit down with refugees and they say what they are expecting from us, from the UN and the management of the camp next year, or next month…so we have like surveys, group surveys…women, men, adults…we call them focus groups…We sit with them, we have some questions…we basically hear from them, we digest that and put it in the plan’ (interview with Jertila 2014, emphasis added). The notion of power struggle that participation usually entails is reduced into a one-sided feedback system, where refugees can inform the agency about their expectations and desires for the future. And with
the absence of clear mechanisms through which refugees can actively participate in the process of planning and decision-making, refugees in Zaatari are going through ‘empty rituals of participation’ (Arnstein 1969: 216).

That was on a camp level, whereas on a district level, meetings with street leaders and neighbourhood members were reported to have been taking place regularly according to the agency. The content, goals and nature of these meetings are not clear in regard to the overall planning process and are expected to fall under the ‘community mobilisation’ programme. According to a worker in Save The Children, neighbourhood meetings take place on a weekly basis in which discussions between refugee families are moderated by the NGO and designated to always include a Sheikh (religious power) and a street leader (executive power). Moreover, few community centres were observed to have been planned in the old and new camp. No exact information about the activities designated for these spaces could be obtained; however, they are expected to be hosting community meetings in the camp. As promising as this may sound, the community centres are however fenced and gated spaces (see fig. 46). It could be expected that vandalism and mobility of habitat have led humanitarians to define the space and protect it from being stolen by fencing it. In this case, the community centres are protected from the same community that is supposed to use them and benefit from them. Therefore, community centres send contradicting messages: they aim to empower refugees while, at the same time, regulate this empowerment by making it conditional. This is what Jennifer Hyndman (1997: 140) exactly noted: ‘at times, staff members at CARE and UNHCR maintained that a refugee camp could be treated as a trustworthy community. On other occasions, they treated refugees as institutional subjects who could not be trusted’.

This contradiction continues with the new governance plan. According to RRP6 decentralised administrative structures will be implemented in Zaatari camp where ‘empowered refugee committees, sensitive to gender, age and disability, will work with these teams’ (UN 2014b: 13). As explained earlier, these committees will be appointed by IPs and are expected to empower and represent refugees in each district. However, according to the interviewed refugee in household# 21, initiatives from refugees’ side to establish committees were rejected. Being a civil engineer, the refugee explained: ‘we wanted to establish different committees: cultural committee, clans (sheikhs) committee, technical committee, police-friends committee and even, an art committee’. According to the interviewee, the committees were planned to include around 7 members each. Meetings were initially held in the mosque and he was in-
volved in the technical committee. The man later explained that all these committees were rejected except for the police-friends initiative.

This rejection has delivered a negative message to refugees. The man explained his disappointment by saying: ‘I was very excited about the idea...I studied civil engineering in Damascus...Yes! I have many ideas on how to improve the communal facilities, and propose a sewage and rainwater network ... adding colour codes on toilets to easily differentiate men’s and women’s toilets...but the initiative was rejected...I don’t know why, they say it was just a game’. Attempts to be active in the camp were faced by rejection. This generates a sense of disempowerment that other refugees have also sensed. A Sheikh interviewed in household #20 explicitly said: ‘you can find everything in this camp, the doctor, the engineer, the technician, the artist and the teacher...the camp is full of potentials, but you know what? They disrespect that, they treat us all the same...they definitely want to disempower us’. Many interviewed refugees mocked the fact that refugees with a long experience of teaching in Syria cannot use their skills and teach in the camp. On the contrary, NGOs are hiring Jordanian teachers whereas Syrian teachers are allowed to handle smaller tasks that do not reach up to their qualification, which the majority of interviewed refugees considered as ‘humiliating’.

Through its reports, the agency does not come to mention the refugee initiative to establish committee. However, only the accepted initiative for establishing a refugee policing structure that works in parallel to that of SRCD and Jordanian military was mentioned with no reference to the other committees. Police-friends initiative , or the ‘community watch’ was further developed by SRCD and the agency to include around 500 paid refugees that were deployed to ‘look after their areas and report any security concerns’ (UNHCR 2014d: 15). The report continues: ‘the paid element of the initiative and the lack of transparency as to its relationships or not with the formal structures led to the suspension of the program towards the end of 2013’ (ibid: 15).

On the one hand, humanitarians appear to be suspicious in their relationship with refugees; on the other, it was noticed that refugees adopted and developed similar strategies. For instance, as negative as street leaders are considered today, it could be expected that this spontaneous mechanism of representation developed first as defensive strategy against the ‘others’ who were suddenly in charge of their lives. This is also what the security report mentions as these street leaders appeared in
the old camp were very active, and almost about to be involved in the management of the camp (UNHCR, 2014b). This model, however, generalised by the agency and refugees who saw in the absence of legislations and rules, an opportunity to empower oneself, has lastly developed into what is described by the agency as ‘mafia’ or ‘Super-Abus’.\(^{15}\) This defensive strategy resulting from the need for communication in a new environment was accompanied with other mechanisms for community protection. Describing these strategies in relation to one of the ‘Abus’ in the older camp, an IRIN article stated that: ‘Abu Hussein is respected by many in the district he rules. He is often seen walking into the main street at night, where groups of young men are waiting for him. He sends them to patrol side streets in pairs, organizes female guards in community kitchens and keeps everyone “safe”...’ (Hackl, 2013).

Based on the previous, the need for establishing good patterns of governance in Zaatari camp is urgent. Despite all proclaimed attempts to work hand in hand with refugees and empower them, many observations indicate a paranoid relationship between both: refugees who are eager to protect themselves against an imposed group of foreigners who became suddenly in charge of their lives, and humanitarians who are unable to trust an indocile and demanding group of refugees who are not afraid to express their demands even if they used ‘violence’.

(fig. 46)—An example of community centres
Source: Author
6.6. Conclusions

On the light of the previous it could be concluded that:

• Street leaders may have emerged as a defensive strategy and a channel of communication with governors; however, they developed later into networks of ‘mafia’, mal communication channels and a critical component within power structure. Further dependence on them as mediators is expected to have negative impacts on all stakeholders and increase tensions in the camp.

• While UNHCR attempts to implement a westernised democratic and decentralised system of governance in the camp; clan leaders who have an ‘unquestionable’ on-ground sovereignty are left out of these plans.

• Syrian refugees are very active agents. Observed with suspicion and concern, humanitarians faced this by deploying a defensive architectural style and developing an ‘attitude’ towards refugees.

• UNHCR claims to support refugees’ self-sustainability in the camp; however, in practice, it keeps sending contradicting messages in this regard.
Previously, each chapter has analysed Zaatari camp from different angle. In this chapter, the findings of these analyses are synchronised in order to answer this thesis questions. It aims to reflect on the findings in order to foresee the future of Zaatari camp and to question the validity of this urban model, and the opportunity that it could entail.
7.1. Synthesis of the Findings

It is the intention of this thesis to utilise its findings as a pool of resources, data and references for steering the urbanisation of Zaatari camp. It sets the basis for developing integrative strategies, solutions and designs that can improve the camp and reduce conflicts and tensions. Key research findings include the follow:

• The urbanisation of Zaatari camp is rapid and uncontrolled.

By interlinking the findings of the whole research, it is clear that Zaatari camp is urbanising. It is developing beyond temporal and universal constrains of refugee camps in order to become a camp city. Despite the differences in size, reasons, circumstance and locations; Palestinian refugee camps can serve as an indicator for “things to come” (Misselwitz, 2009). Comparing both cases, it is clear that Zaatari camp achieved in three years, what Palestinian refugee camps could not in 40 years (see table 6). From a spatial-physical perspective, it appears that Zaatari camp is following the same steps of Palestinian camps: Once the camp was opened, a socio-cultural order influenced the design and function of the space, leading to the emergence of habitat and social space. However, it could be even argued, that because Zaatari camp did not develop closed quarters; and because caravans served as a movable one room unit, the crystallisation of the urban form could be argued to have been even faster in Zaatari camp than in Palestinian camps. Other striking indicators for rapid urbanisation are the market and real-estate. While the economy in Palestinian camps remained marginal (Al-Qutub, 1989; Misselwitz, 2009), Zaatari camp developed enormously. Similarly, it was estimated that the rise of informal real-estate market in Palestinian camps happened between 1967 and 1987 (Hamarneh, 2002; Misselwitz, 2009); whereas the micro-study and market analysis have shown early attempts to sell and buy households and shops as personal properties. If these indicators mean anything, it is the urge to take immediate actions to steer this rapid and uncontrolled process in order to guarantee a better future for refugees and the camp.

• Urbanisation has been led by Syrian refugees, driven through tensions between humanitarian planning and socio-cultural practice.

Syrian refugees have shown great abilities to utilise their skills in order to develop and transform the empty space of the camp into a distinctive urban setting. This process was stimulated by the failure of humanitarian strategies, policies and planning paradigms to fulfil the socio-cultural needs of refugees. Therefore, a Syrian so-
cio-culture took the lead to reconstruct space, give it meaning, function and order. It transformed and appropriated all materials, services and infrastructure to fulfil its agenda. This was accompanied with the active attitude of Syrian refugees who refused to be victimised and excluded. Despite all difficulties and challenges, they show a great readiness to participate in polity, economy and society; and therefore, while humanitarians were building a camp, they were making a city.

- There is an urgent need to implement comprehensive integrated urban planning in Zaatari camp

Between fragmented policies, interventions and implementing partners; UNHCR is standing helpless against the rapid and uncontrolled process of urbanisation in Zaatari camp. It is facing one of the most challenging tasks – a one that was not designated for, which is planning, governing and developing a city. While nothing seems to interrupt this process at the meanwhile, and the Syrian conflict reaching no clear end; urbanisation is expected to go further, and so does the gap between planning and practice. To overcome these obstacles, integrative urban planning is urgently needed in the camp. It is the only way to orchestrate the fragmented strategies, tools and initiatives and to steer the complex process of urbanisation – for which this research was initiated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestinian refugee camps</th>
<th>Zaatari camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All camps developed uneven densities and geographies that are still visible today (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>In Zaatari, uneven densities and geographies are also visible. They are the result of exponential growth and the velocity and time of Syrian refugees arriving the camp (see 4.1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The transition from refugees’ dispersal and nomadic movement to the crystallisation of fixed camps took place over a period of ten years (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>While refugees’ nomadic movement in Zaatari camp was observed to be minimal, many quarters have already been crystallised and gained an urban form (see 4.1.7 and 4.1.6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees arrange physical structure based on social order, and households around a lobby, or courtyard (Al-Qutub, 1989; Misselwitz, 2009; Rueff &amp; Viaro, 2009).</td>
<td>Similar approach was observed in Zaatari camp (see 4.2 and 4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After few years from their establishment, there has been attempts to substitute tents with single-storey block units, which was implemented in few camps (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>Tents have been – and still - substituted with flexible and moveable caravans. This has facilitated the emergence of household design and habitat. (see 4.1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clustering of refugees and the formation of quarters was strictly based on origins. This resulted into closed quarters and thus, weak social mixture. In the 1980s, the quarters became open and social mixture was accepted. (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>REACH surveys as well as the micro study show that refugees did not strictly clustered according to origins in Dara’a (see 4.1.6 and 4.2.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts hold the names of cities and villages where the refugee originate from in Palestine (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>Districts hold the names of Gulf countries were donated caravans are located (see 4.1.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy remained marginal and markets appeared in a later stage (77% of shops appeared after 1994 in Deheishe Camp) (Al-Qutub, 1989; DiBella, 2007).</td>
<td>Despite the monthly income deficiency on a household level; it could not be said that economy in Zaatari camp is marginal (see 5.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements of socio-economic conditions among refugees fastened horizontal growth, as camp policy did not allow for second and third floor (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>Similarly in Zaatari camp, the improvement of socio-economics is expected to have impacts on habitat and encourage horizontal growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of informal real estate markets took place between 1967 and 1987 (Hamarneh, 2002; Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>Indicators show the early emergence of real-estate market in the camp (see 5.3.3.3 and 4.3.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each quarter was represented by a leader responsible for speaking on behalf of the clan or place of origin mediating in cases of conflict (Misselwitz, 2009).</td>
<td>Each street is represented by a street leader. Representatives of clans and villages exist, but not associated to certain districts, nor involved in governance (see 6.2 and 6.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to the different nature of conflict, it is estimated that Palestinian refugees were not very active in the camps. This has changed after the politicisation and the birth of PLO. (Al-Qutub, 1989; Misselwitz, 2009; Sanyal, 2010).</td>
<td>Syrian refugees are very active agents. They are refusing to act as passive victims, and even more, they act like citizens, which made the agency very defensive in its spatial and verbal practice (see 6.4. and 6.5).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(table. 6)—Comparison between Palestinian camps in West Bank and Zaatari camp
Source: Author
7.2. Recommendations

The findings of this paper present a cornerstone on which urbanisation in Zaatari camp can be steered, guided and developed. However, this task is challenged by refugees being excluded from participation in local economy, polity and society. Under this condition, the urbanity of Zaatari camp is expected to be marginalised, just like slums and ghettos. Therefore, integration is a fundamental key strategy in order to achieve sustainable development in the camp.

This implies that UNHCR and the Jordanian government need to change their policies toward Syrian refugees; which is unquestionably, a great political effort. However, orchestrating these efforts in order to reach a sustainable solution for the camp needs to be integrative as well. This entails developing strategies that are aware of the tensions and interests of all stakeholders involved in this process. A diagram was developed for this purpose (see fig. 47). This diagram is not exhaustive to Zaatari camp, but can also be used in other refugee camps in the world in order develop integrated and sustainable strategies. According to this graph, Zaatari camp (the dotted triangle) is currently in an acute position that needs to be urgently balanced. However, while strategies are usually complex and multifaceted in nature, and thus, take time to develop; the following set of recommendations provides a starting point on:
• Establish an integrative planning unit that works on combining data, and researching the patterns of urbanisation in order to first understand, document and later create a solid basis for decision-making. In contradiction to the current policies that are solely based on standards, budget limitations, reactions and, at worse, personal intuition.

• Work with refugees: make use of their local knowledge, experience, and professional as well as academic skills. These skills should be first addressed, categorised in committees (with privileges and duties) and then deployed in different sectors of the camp, serving: infrastructure including electricity, water and sewage; construction; public work; education; craft work; farming and gardening.

• Reconsider refugees as an active partner and not a customer to serve. This implies that the agency has to stop improvising imported governance structures that do not fit and sometimes contradict with existing traditional structures, rather than developing one with traditional clan leaders who already have their weight and can be worked with to develop these structures, and at the same time gain refugees’ trust and respect.

• Formulate neighbourhood committees in each district. Each committee can be engaged in participative planning process in order to:
  - Document the existing physical settings.
  - Improve physical structure by giving recommendations for household design. This may also consider developing new NFIs to be distributed for refugees which can be used to improve its physical and functional efficiency.
  - Install pipes to connect each household to the sewage system.
  - Connect each household to electricity.
  - Define types of space in each neighbourhood. Limitations for these spaces have to be set in order not to be exceeded by refugees settling in, or expanding households.
  - Physical conditions of communal kitchens can be improved to serve as spaces for women to socialise.

• Reinforcement of the resulting open spaces in each neighbourhood in a spatial skeleton that connects the whole camp. This is not exhaustive on emerging routes or paved streets, but can also include spaces for gatherings – upon the request of the community. In older dense districts, the dismantling of communal latrines can provide such spaces.

• Encourage self-reliance and sustainability, by providing more work opportunities for refugees inside the camp than to international expats.

• Institutionalise of all economic activities in the camp.
• Develop a strategy to accommodate population growth in the coming years.
• Transform the camp from ‘closed’ to ‘open’ for better connectivity and integration with the context.

The following section takes a further step. It reflects on the findings of this research in order to evaluate the model of refugee camps, the role of UNHCR, architects, and urban planners in refugee camps.

7.2. Learning from Zaatari Camp
Between planning and practice, the urbanisation of Zaatari camp brings to the front many questions about the validity of its politico-spatial model, of categorisation, of borders, of true meanings of refuge. It challenges the role of architects and planners within this dilemma of uncertainty, and the paradox of tensions: between the ‘now’ and ‘then’, the ‘here’ and ‘there’, the ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’.

In a refugee camp, these tensions are inevitable; and so is urbanisation. When reviewing how Zaatari camp became urbanised, one asked ‘but why are refugees doing this? Don’t they expect to go back home?’ By rephrasing the question it could be asked: ‘Refugees already have a home so why do they want a new one here?’ Interestingly, home connotes unconscious meanings of stability and hospitality; while camps connote instability and temporality. Stuck in this dilemma refugees are offered a ‘home’ under one condition: to be excluded from local polity, economy and society; and in which are expected to be voiceless recipients of aid. They survive on generous donations from rich countries; their lives planned and taken care of by hundreds of humanitarian organisations, which come from all over the world just to serve them and pour efforts into making camps a safe, clean and liveable environment. However, despite all that, something was not right in Zaatari camp.

Refugees were throwing stones on humanitarian offices every day. They were demanding for more caravans, and then, changing their locations, connecting them one to another, or even selling them. They were vandalising WASH blocks, stealing bricks, water taps and connecting them to the sewage system. They were selling humanitarian aid, smuggling goods, and making business. Instead of shelter units they created households. Instead of blocks they created habitats and neighbourhoods. Instead of open spaces they produced public, semi-public and semi-private spaces. They built communities that stand up for one another. They formed committees and night watches. They transformed asphalt streets into a vibrant market that never sleeps. They planted trees and made gardens. They brought life into the desert. They
brought the city into the camp – a city that neither Jordan nor humanitarians were willing to offer.

Urbanisation of refugee camps is that unconditional love for life, even in the worst and most exceptional circumstances. It is resistance, driven by natural will to survive. In Za’atari camp, and while refugees are waiting to repatriate, they have refused to be victimised. They have refused to be externalised, marginalised and categorised. Without knowing, they re-crossed the borders. This proves the failure of this model to suspend ‘normal’ life behind its boundaries, and to prevent the city from emerging inside. It demonstrates the weakness of all borders against power and free will – whether those are borders drawn between camps and cities, refugees and citizens, or dominating majorities and submissive minorities.

However, borders are part of our world. They serve as a parameter upon which we can measure and approximate our position to things, as well as, our position to others. Therefore, they are tools for delineation and categorisation. On the other hand, borders are not postulates. They are designated in response to power, and thus, are constantly changing.

The real challenge will be to further push these borders which are excluding camps from their surroundings; to link the city inside the camp, with that outside; to capitalise on common interests and similarities rather than on categories and differences; to build up partnerships and collaborations rather than barriers and fences; to give rights for refugees to live in dignity rather than to marginalise them; to offer them a home instead of that they once lost.

This is not a utopian propaganda; but a call for a real ‘paradigm shift’. It is a ‘cry and demand’ to have the right to the city even in a refugee camp. This is not an easy task, yet, achievable. First, it is necessary to revisit the model of refugee camps in order to restructure it as an opportunity. This implies a concrete involvement of urban planners and architects in constructing refugee camps, along with professionals from fields of economy, politics, environment and social science. While refugee camps are usually a rapid reaction to a turbulent series of events; a focus on achieving win-win solutions during all phases must be the basis on which this process is steered and guided. This also implies that camps should not be designed as a no-man island. The influx of refugees should be seen as a drive as an economic and development drive which must be utilised rather than excluded. Therefore, finding options in order to integrate camps with their surroundings is a priority, upon which other decisions
can be taken. During this time, and after the camps are being put into context and perceived as opportunities to achieve development; humanitarians have to avoid imposing their services and mandate on refugees. They are encouraged to rather devote their knowledge and skills in helping refugees to build the camp. In this stage, it is highly necessary, that skilled personnel and expertise who already have a background on the socio-culture of refugees and the implications of that on space be involved. It is even advised that they mediate the planning and communication process between humanitarians and refugees in order to avoid misunderstandings and clashes. However, while this might be highly political; convincing governments about the validity of this change might be a challenging task, yet, achievable. It needs to constantly present the advantages of considering camps as de facto part of the national state, and refugees as partners that can nourish development in the country. At the same time, threats, disadvantages and dangers of treating camps as exclusionary spaces must be constantly stressed out through this process.

Although Zaatari camp was not constructed in the same manner, and although the inevitable and rapid urbanisation is leading the camp to urbanise as spaces of marginalisation and exclusion; there is a chance to change this reality. This research serves as a starting point. By focusing on urbanisation, it encourages all stakeholders to re-imagine the camp as an urban site – a site for opportunities and partnerships. It even presents a wide variety of topics and analytical tools that can be further developed and investigated. This step is very necessary to create a cornerstone and a basis for a comprehensive and integrated urban planning that can orchestrate the complexity entailed within urbanisation, and transform Zaatari camp into a win-win solution. If this was successfully achieved, Zaatari camp will not only be space for dignity and rights; but also a turning point in the history of refugee camps, and a model that can inspire approaches toward all other spaces of refuge.
Chapter IIIV

Appendix
End Notes

1 For further definitions of each category see Master Glossary of Terms, Rev1 – UNHCR (2006).

2 Glocalization was referred to by Agier as: ‘the rapid creation of a global order which inevitably results in local tensions among international actors that clash with one another in local circumstance, and with the multiplicity of local actors too’ (Michel Agier, 2010: 17).

3 I refer to the Syrian experience in hosting Palestinian, Lebanese and Iraqi refugees before the crisis.

4 In the Handbook, families are considered between 5 to 6 persons (see 2.2.3).

5 Misselwitz relates the density of formulated quarters in Palestinian camps with social power, claiming that dense quarters could refer to weakness whereas spacious quarters stand for strength and social status.

6 This is especially with refugees under 18 years old that are not accepted as married couples, or those who get marry inside the camp through Islamic laws ‘Shari‘aa’ without being registered in camp’s management records. For more information see RRP6 – Jordan, page 21.

7 Michel Agier ironically refers to it as ‘hierarchy of misery’ (Agier, 2010).


9 Michele Agier proposed four levels of social hierarchy: 1) notables (elders and traders); 2) voluntary community workers; 3) small traders and occasional craftsmen; 4) recipient of basic minimum aid.

10 As I was trying to approach refugees living inside the cluster, cul du sacs’ spaces were alarming as inhabitants only that are not open for outsiders and public. Therefore, I always had to ask for the help of refugees living exposed to the semi-public street.

11 This quotation underlies the influence of political and economic systems on culture. It could be argued that Syrians culture has developed in a sustainable manner, in the contrary to a consumerist and neo-liberal culture in Jordan.

12 In Damascus, Souk Al-Hamediye is one of the most famous and vibrant markets in old city which interestingly have similar arrangement to that of the market in Zaatari camp.


14 Refugee camps are considered by Giorgio Agamben as states of exception where the temporal suspension of law due to emergency, becomes a permanent state.
15 According to security report: ‘The term ‘Abus’ and street leaders are often used interchangeably in the camp by organisations and more broadly refer to someone of influence within a particular area. ‘Super-Abus’ is another term used by organisations and refers to an ill-defined structure of senior Abus who occasionally deal with senior camp management officials or IPs on issues of concern, though the membership appears to be somewhat opaque and transient and there are questions as to how representative the body is’ (UNHCR 2014d: 13).

16 Civil wars have destructive impacts on communities. They are fed on exclusionary thoughts that work to produce mechanisms for hatred, segregation and disintegration. Therefore, even with the option of repatriation becoming available for Syrian refugees, societal changes in Syrian community may push refugees to stay for longer periods in the camp.

**List of Interviews**

Interviewee Mr. Kilian Kleinschmidt, camp manager (UNHCR unit), 21/4/2014.
Interviewee Mr. Mohamed Jertila, planner (UNHCR unit), 24/2/2014 and 27/2/2014.
Interviewees Mr. Khaled Abdelfadil and Mr. Tambi Zokha, community service (UNHCR unit), 27/2/2014.
Interviewee Mr. Dr. John Kennedy, researcher and ex-Shelter Programme manager in Dadaab camp, 6/3/2014.
Interviewee Mrs. Dr. Fatima Al-Nammari, ex-director of CIP in Talbieh camp, 18/3/2014.
Interviewees with Syrian refugees in Zaatari camp during field visits between February and April 2014 (names are anonymous).
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**MICROCLUSTER QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Longevity and Demography:**
Household Number:
Gender of interviewee: Male ( ) Female ( )
Since when are you living in Zaatari Camp?
Where are you from?
Since when are you living in this household?
Is this the first place you lived in? Yes ( ) No ( ) – In case no, where have you lived before?
Is there a reason for choosing to live in this area of the camp?
How many people live in this household?
Have the number of household inhibitors changed? No ( ) Yes ( ) – In case yes, why and when?

**Habitat:**
Number of: Caravans ( ) Tents ( )
Do you have: Private kitchen ( ) Private toilet ( ) Private water storage ( ) Connection to sewage system ( ) Garden ( )
Can you describe the phases that led to the current household situation regarding location and orientation?
What are the reasons for this transformation?

**Neighborhood:**
Do you feel yourself as if you are living in a Hara? Yes ( ) Sometimes ( ) No ( )
If yes:
• Do you feel you belong to it as if it is your Hara? Yes ( ) Sometimes ( ) No ( )
• Is there any specific reason that makes you feel that?
• Can you define the borders of your Hara? Where does it start and where it ends?
• Do you think this Hara is different from others? Yes ( ) No ( ) – If yes, why?
Do you know the people living around you? Yes a lot ( ) Few ( ) No one ( )
If yes:
• What type of social relation do you have with them: Friends ( ) Relatives ( ) Neighbors ( )
• Do you have any common social activities with them? Yes ( ) No ( )
• In case yes: what are they, how many times a week?
If no: why?
**Socio-Economics:**
Is the humanitarian aid enough for you? Yes ( ) No ( )
Do you have any economic activity inside the camp? Yes ( ) No ( )
If yes: Where is it located?
If no: Are you thinking to start one soon? Yes ( ) No ( )

**Memory:**
Can you estimate the duration of your stay in the camp?
Is there any place in the camp that reminds you with Syria? Yes ( ) No ( )
In case yes: what is it, and why?
خلاصة

ما زالت مدن المخيمات تمثل عنصرًا بارزاً من مكونات التشكيل العمراني في الشرق الأوسط. بعد أكثر من 65 عاماً في المنفى، تحولت مدن المخيمات الفلسطينية إلى فراغات لا إنسانية و معزولة عن السياق الذي ولدت فيه نتيجةً لعملية طويلة و معقدة من التحضر العمراني. و بعدما كانت هذه العملية مهملة و غير مسيطر عليها، اجتاحت آثارها المجتمع الدولي نحو إعادة النظر بالآليات و العمليات التي كانت تتبع في مدن المخيمات، وكانت النتيجة قفزة نوعية نحو التنمية البشرية و الحقوق. إلا أن هذه القفزة لم تؤتي بأي تحسن ملحوظ، فما زالت مدن المخيمات تعاني تحت وطأة الذل و اللاكرامة، وذلك لعدم وجود دراسات متكاملة ترصد التحضر العمراني لهذه المخيمات من أجل توجيه العمليات و الاستراتيجيات ضمنها نحو الهدف المطلوب؛ ألا و هو التنمية. ضمن هذا السياق، يعمل هذا البحث على رصد التحضر العمراني في مخيم الزعتري وذلك من خلال ربط الوثائق و التقارير الصادرة حول المخيم، بالدراسات و التحاليل الميدانية فيه. يركز البحث على إظهار الآليات والسياق الذي تؤثر و تقوم هذه العملية من خلال التركيز على ثلاثة جوانب رئيسية: الفراغ، الاقتصاد، و علاقات القوة. بعد دراسة معمقة لهذه الجوانب الثلاثة، أظهر البحث أن التحضر العمراني في مخيم الزعتري سريع و غير مسبوق و مؤثر بالعلاقة المتوازنة ما بين التخطيط الإنساني و المنظومة الاجتماعية الثقافية للأجئين. و هي عملية متفوعة برفض واضح من قبل اللاجئين إلى أن يكونوا مجرد جمع من الضحايا بدون اسم أو تاريخ. إن فشل مدن المخيمات كمنظومة لاحتواء اللاجئين و لتوجيه عملية تحضر عمراني لا مجرد منهجية لعدم إعداد النظرة بجودة هذه المنظومة، و بالحاجة الملحة لإعادة بناء مدن المخيمات من جديد كفرصة للتنمية البشرية و التطور العمراني.
إقرار

هذه الرسالة مقدمة في جامعة عين شمس وجامعة شوتجارت للحصول على درجة العمران المتكامل والتصميم المستدام. إن العمل الذي تحرره هذه الرسالة قد تم إنجازه بمعرفة الباحث سنة 2014.

هذا ويقرر الباحث أن العمل المقدم هو خلاصة بحثه الشخصي وأنه قد اتبع الإسلوب العلمي السليم في الإشارة إلى المواد المؤرخة من المراجع العلمية كلًى في مكانه في مختلف أجزاء الرسالة.

وهذا إقرار مني بذلك،

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مدن المخيمات بين التخطيط و الواقع
رصد التحضير العمراني في مخيم الزعتري

مقدمة للحصول على درجة الماجستير في العمران المتكامل والتصميم المستدام

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